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This thesis critically examines a national programme in mental health which 
has been driven by the implementation of National Institute of Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance. Assumptions which underpin research 
method, drawn from the natural sciences, are critiqued in terms of their 
adequacy in accounting for human relating and expert therapeutic practice. 
The work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) is problematized in how they 
account for proficiency and expertise as intuition and the leap that they make 
from calculative to deliberative rationality. An alternative source of 
understanding, based on non-linear causality and complex responsive 
processes, is developed, building on the work of Stacey (2001, 2005, 2007). 
The ineffability of expert practice (or clinical judgement) is contrasted with 
competence based, rule governed practice, which necessarily underpins the 
early stages of learning. It is argued that because research practices 
undertaken in randomised controlled trials (RCTs) must be describable, 
measurable and focussed on predictable outcomes, then these cannot account 
for expert practice, therefore the assertion that the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies programme (IAPT) is wholly based on research 
based, evidence based therapies, cannot be substantiated. 
 
The work explores professionalism and specifically considers the role of 
psychiatrists, psychologists and psychological therapists in mental health and 
in increasing access to psychological therapies. The role of managers and 
managerialism are explored, specifically how the NHS has sought to manage 
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professional staff and multi-disciplinary teams in adopting corporate and new 
ways of working (NWW). This includes the importance of and difficulty in 
countering professional identity using competence based approaches. The 
performance management processes in the NHS are recognised as an equally 
relevant source of evidence (to that of NICE), despite there being a poor 
(traditional) evidence base for it (Stacey, 2010; Seddon, 2008). 
 
Power relating in human relationships is identified as immanent, using the 
context of a management group, and it is argued that Foucault’s concept of 
disciplinary power (1994) can account for what is considered to be 
knowledge and truth, drawing on specialist expertise based on science and 
research, with a forceful potential for rendering others silent as well as 
pervasively self-silencing, in processes of inclusion and exclusion (Elias, 
1978). It is argued that these on-going processes of relating influence policy 
decisions at national and local levels and how these policies are implemented 
in practice. The inevitability of unpredictable outcomes is highlighted, 
despite strong centralised programme management along with the provision 
of an explicit blueprint for implementation. 
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         INTRODUCTION 
The material in this thesis has been drawn from my experience as a 
participant in the development and implementation of a flagship programme 
of mental health policy on improving access to psychological therapies 
(IAPT). During part of this time, I led a separate but related national 
programme on the mental health workforce. The ways of thinking that have 
emerged from IAPT, as I have researched them in this thesis, are, I would 
argue, equally applicable to that workforce programme, and to many similar 
policy implementation processes in the NHS, and indeed in a great number of 
public and private organisations.   
 
The reader’s journey  
 
The method of this thesis has been to take up my direct experience of 
working as part of a management group on a national programme, to explore 
themes that have arisen for me as I reflect on my experience and to consider 
and compare authors to help me gain a greater understanding of what may 
have been going on. The reader will be taken through four projects: the first 
is retrospective, looking at my career to date and what has led me to 
undertake this research, leading to my question of enquiry. This question is 
how far professionalism, evidence and power influence change management 
in the NHS. Projects two, three and four explore each in detail. My argument 
as it has emerged from this work is summarised below. The final section is a 
synopsis and critical review, where I reconsider what I have come to think as 
I reach the end of the DMan research. In this, four themes have required 
greater analysis: the role of management as a profession; the theme of 
expertise and its problematisation in considering the nature of evidence; 
power; and finally method, because of the different assumptions 
underpinning research method in IAPT and the DMan. I finish my thesis with 
what I consider to be my contribution to knowledge and practice. This 
includes: that it is expertise that is a critical factor, for me, rather than 
professionalism, expertise based on evidence drawn from scientific research 
trials has high status and can influence policy development and evidence 
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from performance management is taken as seriously as evidence based 
medicine or practice in the NHS. Evidence, however, as it is currently 
promulgated cannot account logically for expert therapeutic practice and all 
are inextricably bound by disciplinary power in what can and cannot be 
questioned. Finally, irrespective of the specificity of a blueprint, it will 
always be interpreted differently in local situations, based on complex 
responsive processes of relating, building on the work of Stacey et al (2001) 
resulting in unpredictable outcomes. 
 
The context 
 
To situate the subject of my enquiry, the national IAPT programme and my 
role within it, it is important for the reader to be aware that the National 
Health Service (NHS) consists of two key elements: generalist healthcare 
provided by general medical practitioners and nurses working in local 
communities (described as primary care); and specialist services provided 
largely in hospitals, through consultant medical practitioners and multi-
disciplinary teams (secondary care). I came to the IAPT programme, which is 
located in primary care, having spent my career in secondary specialist 
mental health care. I have continued to work in a (specialist) Trust, 
throughout my involvement with IAPT. The issues which have challenged 
me most in secondary care have been the dominance of the psychiatrist, the 
ways multi-disciplinary teams operate and how far the needs of the person 
using those services are properly understood and met.  
 
At the time of embarking on the DMan, there were two options available to 
me. Firstly, working as a management consultant to support the 
implementation of New Ways of Working (NWW) in the Trust, which would 
have drawn me to focus on professionalism and power. Secondly, working in 
IAPT, which had evidence based practice as its raison d’être. I would have 
preferred to do the former, but as luck would have it, my new role in the 
Trust took some time to bed in so I took IAPT as the main focus of my 
research. This has proved both interesting and challenging as it has opened up 
a number of questions, which have tested my taken for granted assumptions 
10 
 
in ways that may not have emerged had I relied solely on my work with 
psychiatrists and multi-disciplinary teams. 
 
My argument 
 
I outline how I have (inadvertently) adopted a managerialist approach to 
managing clinicians. I now take this to be a naïve foundationalist stance, 
believing that a better understanding of the needs and views of people, who 
use services, embedded in policy, would transform professional practice. This 
approach has met with only partial success. I examine the role of the doctor 
as it has emerged historically and conclude, in psychiatry at least, that it has 
been equally, if not more importantly, influenced by its social status as by its 
clinical expertise. I argue that the status of psychology has grown because of 
its adoption of a scientist practitioner role and its promotion of a research 
evidence base. In contrast, I posit that the status of counsellors and 
psychotherapists has suffered by their fragmented organisation, their 
perceived historical lack of commitment to research and their perceived 
resistance to regulation. I discuss how I have supported the use of 
competences as a means of workforce planning, to challenge a professionally 
dominated process, but have come to recognise the limitations of such an 
approach, given the strength and importance of professional identity. I 
consider the assumptions underpinning the evidence base for NICE 
recommended psychological therapies and problematize the application of 
positivistic approaches to human relating. I argue that the target culture of the 
NHS, critiqued by Seddon (2008), although having a very limited evidence 
base, is taken as seriously as NICE guidelines by commissioners and policy 
makers. I critique the concept of expertise, as defined by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986), and contest the leap they make from rule governed to 
intuitive practice. I argue that evidence can only logically be based on 
measurable behaviour. As expert behaviour cannot be so described, then the 
scope of evidence based practice must be limited to rule governed behaviour. 
Finally, I identify the importance of power-relating in influencing what gets 
addressed in policy development and implementation and how we are all 
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subject to disciplinary power as described by Foucault (1994). I highlight 
how this is inevitable and the risks where silencing of conflict is a key factor.  
 
Organisations and the context of complex responsive processes of 
relating 
 
Generally speaking, it is common to think of organisations as systems, 
operating at different levels, such as executive, middle management and team 
level, where the board sets the strategic direction for the organisation and 
staff are expected to implement the service, often requiring change, 
efficiency savings and improved quality. Performance is managed through 
activity, costs and adherence to standards, inspected and regulated by outside 
bodies. This process assumes that the chief executive is similar to the captain 
of a ship and that (s)he will guide and control the ship through stormy and 
calm waters and the crew will undertake their roles as required to run a tight 
ship; all is consciously planned and predictable. In the NHS, the complexity 
of the organisation(s) and the huge costs have come to be managed through 
performance targets, although there has been a constant struggle between top 
down and bottom up planning. Furthermore, the importance of managing 
organisational culture and winning hearts and minds is recognised as of key 
importance. Clinical staff working in the NHS, usually characterised as 
doctors and nurses, are clearly not corporate crew members and promoting 
their involvement in leadership and management is seen as vital. 
 
From a complex responsive processes perspective (Stacey, 2001, 2007) there 
is no discrete organisation existing as a whole ‘thing’, rather, there are groups 
of people working and interacting together in different ways to implement 
policy targets, although they may take up the idea of the organisation as an 
idealisation. Of key importance is that whatever may be intended, no matter 
how clear, the meaning will be interpreted differently locally, because of the 
different professionals involved and the variable nature of services, including 
funding and local priorities, all of which are influenced by power relating. 
This local interpretation cannot be controlled nor fully predicted and the 
process of change is likely to be iterative. This analysis is based on the 
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complexity sciences of uncertainty, which I will discuss more fully later. At 
first, this perspective paints a rather alarming picture of potential chaos, 
because it contradicts a taken for granted view that we are all part of a 
managed system, which leaders can stand apart from and guide. On closer 
examination, most people will recognise how plans rarely get implemented in 
the way intended by policy or senior staff. The theory of complex responsive 
processes of relating is inspired by writers such as Elias (1978) and Mead 
(1934), by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000), and by Foucault (1972, 1994). It 
is a way of thinking that is constantly changing and emerging and I will be 
taking up these authors to see what insights they offer in my thesis. 
 
Method 
 
The research method that I have adopted is one of reflexive narrative. The 
DMan requires that narratives are reflexively contextualised to current 
working practice as this develops over a three year period. There is no initial 
hypothesis that is to be tested nor variables that are to be controlled and 
measured. As the process develops, the issues that emerge cannot be 
predicted in advance and therefore the issue of internal validity, whereby 
causal relationships and replicability are sought, has little meaning in 
traditional methodological terms; nevertheless validity is sought through 
plausibility with peers. External validity or generalisability has specific 
relevance however, as I am seeking to describe how what happens in a 
specific context can have relevance or resonance with my peers. 
 
In my critical appraisal I conclude that this thesis has allowed me to look in 
depth at what I have understood to be taking place in managing a national 
programme. I present a critique of my assumptions based on reading and 
comparing authors who have contributed to the relevant discourses, and I 
have come to a better understanding of the social processes that have been 
taking place. Precisely because it is reflexively unique to my specific context, 
I argue that my research has direct relevance to others, offering insights into 
how people work together in organisations, often in unpredictable ways. 
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I will now turn to my first project, which seeks to understand the influences 
and assumptions in my career to reach my research question. 
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PROJECT ONE (2008/9) 
PROFESSIONALISM, EVIDENCE AND POWER: INFLUENCING 
CHANGE PROCESSES IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE 
NHS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I have reached a point in my career, where I have been reflecting on what I 
have achieved. My early experience as a clinical psychologist made me 
realise that trying to help an individual with learning difficulties on a one to 
one basis without regard to their social environment was not effective. 
Exploring what the social environment meant, in this case the institution, and 
realising this was its staff, its physical space and its routines, led me to think 
that it was ideally placed to promote deviant behaviour, not only in its 
residents, but in everyone involved. I wondered how I could change the 
system to develop alternatives to institutional care and practice; in doing so, I 
began to make a transition from being a clinician to a manager.  
 
My experience has been that changing buildings/ physical settings is limited 
in its impact on the experience of the service user; the most important 
element is the interactions that they have with staff and with each other. This 
is much more difficult to influence, so a key area of interest and engagement 
for me has been the nature and behaviour of professionals - primarily, but not 
exclusively, psychiatrists. The work I have just completed has taken six years 
–New Ways of Working (NWW) in mental health - can be summarised as 
how to enable staff to work more flexibly in multi-disciplinary teams, to 
overcome their professional barriers and to shift some of their usual ways of 
working to meet the needs of service users and carers more effectively. 
 
Although people in the NHS now commonly use the term ‘NWW’, I am 
doubtful that it has changed the way staff and multi-disciplinary teams work 
in any significant way and in this project and thesis I would like to explore 
why this is so. People who use mental health services still complain of the 
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same things they did ten years ago. So, I have thought, with growing 
frustration, commonly after having been in meetings with professional staff, 
what does it take to change things? I have made some things happen in 
organisations at a local level and have produced publications nationally, but 
my power, in the way I currently think about it, seems less effective than that 
wielded by clinicians as they go about their work and chat to their colleagues. 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists now wants ‘evidence’ that NWW is 
working, but this seems a thinly veiled attempt at securing complaints from 
psychiatrists in the field to discredit my work; exploring this will be a key 
theme of my research. 
 
I am also involved with and will become more so, in the national programme 
on ‘Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’ (IAPT). This is a major 
change process to train 3600 new therapists by 2011. A key issue emerging is 
the power of evidence, that is scientifically based, and the implications for 
therapists already in the workforce who are not competent in what the 
evidence suggests. Some of this relates to professional practice and identity, 
some about the limitations of the concept of evidence and some to the 
imposition of a service and staff model on local services, which does not fit. 
 
I am attracted to the idea that change is not predictable, that people who 
manage and practise clinically are not acting rationally and appear to muddle 
through. Some of the best experiences I have had have been working with 
teams who come up with their own solutions, not ones that I thought of 
earlier. The idea therefore that local interactions might be the key to things 
changing in ways, which service users and carers say would help them, is 
important to me. I am becoming more conscious that some of my 
assumptions as a manager, that modernisation is a good thing per se, that if it 
is right for the service user then it must be right in a taken for granted way, is 
probably open to challenge and that I need to reframe this. In this regard, the 
work of Ralph Stacey (2007) has drawn me to this research. I want to use the 
DMan research to help me think and do things differently, perhaps to 
experiment in my work, based also on other authors I have begun to read. 
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TRAINING AS A PSYCHOLOGIST 
 
The importance of a scientific approach and the development of evidence 
 
My entry into the world of applied psychology came when I trained as a 
clinical psychologist in England in the 1970’s. Psychology places great store 
on being a science, with the scientist practitioner role at its centre and audit 
and research as key functions. At that time, in that place, the dominant 
discourse was that of Skinner’s Operant Conditioning and Radical 
Behaviourism. It sought to provide a science of human behaviour that would 
enhance predictiveness and ultimately control. Skinner stated: 
  
Social sciences are sometimes said to be fundamentally different from 
the natural sciences and not concerned with the same lawfulness. 
Prediction and control may be forsworn in favour of interpretation. 
(Skinner, 1953: 8)  
 
He emphasised the benefits of taking a scientific approach, including 
focussing on facts, avoiding premature conclusions and searching for lawful 
relationships in nature. Behaviour was acknowledged as a complex subject as 
“it is a process, rather than a thing” (ibid.: 14), but statements about 
behaviour had commonly been about single events. Skinner argued that this 
was fine as a starting point, but the move should be towards discovering 
‘uniformity’ or rules. He argued that, although behaviourism was often 
criticised as being reductionist, that starting from the simple did not negate its 
relevance to the complex: 
 
In our present state of knowledge, certain events...appear to be 
unpredictable. It does not follow that these events are free or 
capricious. (Ibid.: 17) 
 
This approach appealed to me as there was a lot of material about the use of 
operant conditioning to change behaviour in clinical and educational settings 
which had practical relevance. 
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Two points strike me on reflection. Firstly, the role of the observer in that 
“(i)t is now accepted as a general principle in scientific method that it is 
necessary to interfere in some degree with the phenomenon in the act of 
observing it” (ibid.: 21); this will be relevant in thinking about the 
interpretation of a scientific approach and the status of evidence in the NHS. 
Secondly, how behaviourism can be seen as denying internal processes of 
self, mind and consciousness. 
 
(T)he objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that 
they are not relevant to a functional analysis. We cannot account for 
the behaviour of any system while staying wholly inside it; 
eventually, we must turn to forces operating upon the organism from 
without. (Ibid.: 35)  
 
Natural scientists had assumed that the mind required a different mode of 
enquiry and Skinner criticised this, commenting “(t)he contribution which a 
science of behaviour can make in suggesting an alternative point of view is 
perhaps one of its important achievements” (ibid.: 258).This resonates with 
Mead (1934), who stated: 
 
Behaviourism in this wider sense is simply an approach to the study 
of experience of the individual from the point of view of his conduct, 
particularly but not exclusively, the conduct as it is observable by 
others. (Mead, 1934: 2)  
 
This in turn led to his transforming the behaviourist argument and developing 
more fully the social nature of human beings and their interaction in terms of 
the “generalised other”. I plan to return to Mead’s work and the relation of 
his thinking to behaviourism in the course of my research. 
 
In my practice, over time, I found the application of the principles of operant 
conditioning to more complex interactions, social situations and 
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organisations, although a stimulating intellectual exercise, was less helpful in 
getting to grips with how to make changes in those areas.  
 
The relevance of evidence 
 
Many of the approaches and interventions used in mental health are not 
evidence based. The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) was established in the NHS to provide clinical guidelines for practice 
and commissioning based on “best available evidence and expert consensus” 
(NICE 2009). This is a collaborative process, but starts with considering 
studies that are based on randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Those 
interventions in mental health that lend themselves most easily to RCTs are 
largely around medication and types of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). 
Many psychological practitioners take exception to RCTs being the gold 
standard of excellence in demonstrating evidence of effectiveness. This is a 
major issue currently in the national IAPT programme. 
 
A question here is: is psychology a natural science, like physics, or a social 
science, like sociology? It is usually classified as the latter. In this case, 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001) analysis of why social science or inquiry has failed - 
because it seeks to emulate both the theory or ‘know why’(episteme) and the 
‘know how’ (techne) of the natural sciences - and should be more focussed 
on context and values (phronesis), is relevant. Nevertheless, in seeking to test 
out psychological interventions through RCTs, psychology, as a profession, 
is clearly wishing to model itself on natural sciences and to be on a par with 
medicine. 
 
My first encounters with the question of professionalism 
 
During my clinical training, my perceptions of professionals working in the 
NHS began to form. On one occasion, during a medical training session, a 
person with schizophrenia was brought in and his symptoms were discussed 
at some length in front of him but without his involvement; eventually a 
diagnosis was given and medication agreed upon. No thought was given to 
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his feelings or to his broader needs. Although I was a novice, I felt that this 
illustrated a narrow, pseudoscientific and inhumane approach. The doctors 
were seeing the brain as the object and its functioning modified through 
medication as the primary explanation and treatment of the condition, without 
reference to the person as a whole. 
 
About this time an ‘anti psychiatry’ movement developed, led by people like 
R D Laing (Boyers, 1972). This challenged the view that doctor knows best 
and acknowledged that physical and medical interventions could be actively 
harmful. The effects of long term psychotropic medication were beginning to 
be understood, causing, for example, Parkinson’s Disease in long term users. 
I remember being asked to do some work with a woman with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder; on my second visit I found she had been moved and on 
enquiry, was informed that she had had psycho-surgery (lobotomy). One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (Kesey, 1962) was made into a film about this 
time and its theme resonated with me and my fellow students very forcibly. 
The hero in the story, Murphy, has elected to plead insanity to a crime in the 
belief that a spell in an asylum will be easier than going to prison; he gets 
away with it and is pleased that his ploy has paid off. As he becomes a 
patient, he hides his medication as he can see the effects it has on other 
patients and he goes on to radicalise them to take back control over their own 
lives. Although this produces positive responses in the patients, it is seen by 
the professional staff as a challenge to their authority. Too late, he realises 
that his duration in hospital will depend on his perceived response to 
treatment and that he has fewer rights than he would have had in prison. He is 
ultimately given a lobotomy which results in him being powerless. For me, in 
reality, psychiatrists seemed hugely powerful. I did not see any expert 
psychology role models in mental health settings, and so I did not feel I had 
sufficient means of explaining or interpreting people’s verbal behaviour 
(therapy), nor sufficient skills to be effective in counteracting what I 
perceived to be unquestioned medical primacy. 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF MY FIRST NHS JOB 
 
In contrast with mental health, I felt that I could make a contribution by 
joining a department of radical behavioural psychologists working in a 
hospital for people with learning disabilities, where I had had a successful 
placement. We worked as a team and were able to modify behaviour under 
controlled settings, e.g. enabling people to eat by themselves, dress and speak 
a few words, as well as reducing inappropriate behaviours. But these 
behaviours disappeared when the individual returned to their ward. Very 
clearly, the hospital ward, and the staff within it, had shaped and maintained 
dependent and inappropriate (sometimes life–threatening) behaviour. 
 
Many of hospital residents had been rejected when young (often on medical 
advice) and been put into care.  There were still children there, but contact 
with an adult was only a few minutes per day. There were no “ordinary” 
rhythms of development and routine, the large numbers of residents (about 30 
on a ward) meant that they were treated as a group rather than as individuals. 
Staff were trained to look after rather than to enable them to do things for 
themselves. There were long periods of time when individuals were not 
engaged in any social interaction, they would become apathetic but also 
violent to themselves and others: head banging, eye gouging and other 
behaviours were common. Their lives were being wasted. From a behavioural 
perspective, they had a very limited repertoire of ‘appropriate behaviours’, 
resulting from an absence of opportunities to learn new skills and ways of 
interacting. Instead, staff tended to spend time doing things for them or in 
intervening to stop them doing things, both of which served to promote 
dependence and increase levels of challenging behaviour. 
 
The hospital was powerful in maintaining the status quo. Staff, originally 
enthusiastic, were changed by working in these settings. It also seemed their 
training contributed to their formulation of the needs of the people with 
learning difficulties as having a pathological or medical origin. We trained 
staff in changing behaviour: principles, analysis, techniques and monitoring, 
but there were frequent occasions when observation charts were not 
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completed and programmes of intervention not followed. As a result, I found 
my view of nurses was developing in a negative way. I blamed them for not 
collaborating with us to improve the experiences of their patients. As a 
psychology team, we perceived ourselves as innovators. But on reflection, 
although we were well intentioned and ahead of the technological game, we 
were arrogant about our superior psychological formulation and practice and 
no doubt came across to others like that. We were not working in a ward 24 
hours a day and thus not gaining that knowledge of being with the person on 
a continuing basis, which Benner (2001) identifies as one of the significant 
contributions of the nurse. All in all, despite our self-perceived superiority, 
we as psychologists were powerless to influence the institutional practice, 
except at the margins. 
 
The importance of values 
 
Skinner might help us understand what was going wrong, but I concluded, 
from my position of being based in an institution, that there needed to be a 
better way of understanding, planning, delivering and evaluating good 
services, which he did not provide. So, in 1980, with the encouragement of 
Chris Gathercole, an eminent psychologist at the time who was proselytising 
about a new approach in learning difficulties, I attended a five day residential 
course on ‘Normalisation’ and the ‘Programme Analysis of Service Systems’ 
(PASS) Implementation of Normalisation Goals (Wolfensberger, later 
published in 1983). This was what I had been wanting – a clear articulation of 
values and of how individuals identified by society as ‘deviant’ (different 
from social norms in a negatively valued sense) not only suffer from that 
primary impairment (e.g. learning disability), but they then are handicapped 
by our response to them: segregation, labels, loss of relationships and of a 
hopeful future. As a result of this analysis, services could be identified which 
could re-dress the process and break into the vicious circle of devaluation and 
non-achievement. These included ordinary housing, mainstream education, 
jobs, good health care and so on (all with support appropriate to individual 
needs). What staff were called, how they dressed, how they addressed their 
clients, all became highly relevant and influential. 
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These five days changed my professional life dramatically. The nature of the 
training had been exacting and persuasive in that it drew on real life 
examples, was delivered by an inspirational leader and had us applying a 
process of assessment in real life settings. I came away with a means of 
understanding and articulating why we did things, the importance of values, 
philosophy and culture and how these had long term and often unconscious 
effects. But just as important, I had a way of envisaging what future services 
could look like for people with disabilities. I could describe it and it was 
simple – they needed the same opportunities as everyone else. ‘An Ordinary 
Life’ (1981) was subsequently published by the King’s Fund and had a key 
impact on thinking about disability in England.  
 
Interestingly, the term ‘normalisation’ used here is different from that of 
Foucault. Wolfensberger talked about normalising everyday experiences and 
opportunities to improve access to valued roles in society by people with 
disabilities. Foucault (1976) meant it rather, as a way of classifying people 
around a norm, whereby anomalies or deviance from the norm were 
identified for corrective purposes. 
 
Back at work, I started immediately to apply the standards I had learned to 
current projects.  Needless to say, I found myself unpopular: changing the 
planning of buildings, once underway, is well nigh impossible; but the 
psychological readjustment, an admission that we had all been wrong, was 
not acceptable to people who had not been through my “conversion 
experience”. This was the beginning of my career in change management. 
 
INITIAL REFLECTIONS  
 
The origin and nature of the psychiatric institution has been described by 
Foucault (1994). He chose this area of inquiry as the foundation of an 
analysis of power because 
 
...if, concerning a science like theoretical physics...one poses the 
problem of its relations with the political and economic structures of 
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society, isn’t one posing an excessively complicated question? 
Doesn’t this set the threshold of possible explanations impossibly 
high? But on the other hand, if one takes a form of knowledge...like 
psychiatry, won’t the question be much easier to resolve, since the 
epistemological profile of psychiatry is a low one and psychiatric 
practice is linked with a whole range of institutions, economic 
requirements, and political issues of social regulation? Couldn’t the 
interweaving of effects of power and knowledge be grasped with 
greater certainty in the case of a science as ‘dubious’ as psychiatry? 
(Foucault, 1994: 111) 
 
Clearly the scientific credentials that most psychiatrists would emulate are 
not rated highly by Foucault, and this is echoed by other branches of 
medicine. He is also alluding to the fact that the evidence base for psychiatric 
practice at that time was not convincing. The early development of the 
institution, in his view, together with the growth in the importance of the 
doctor resulted more from a ‘being there’ way of interaction between the 
doctor and the patient rather than any interventions that could be shown to be 
scientifically effective. 
 
In thinking about the development of psychiatry, Foucault in Madness and 
Civilisation (1961) described his schema of three ways by which the person 
(the subject) is objectified. Firstly, through ’dividing practices’, such as the 
establishment of the Hôpital Générale in Paris in 1656, where the poor, the 
insane and vagabonds were confined together, moving through to 
classification of diseases and the rise of modern psychiatry in the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 centuries; secondly, through ‘scientific classification’; and thirdly, 
through ‘subjectification’. In this case this was about the establishment of the 
doctor-patient relationship and the willingness of the patient to subject 
himself to the practice i.e. become an object. 
 
Scott describes the development of a theory of state since the 16
th
 century, 
through, for example, ‘‘maps of legibility’’ (1998: 3) to enable states to 
classify and control its subjects. Foucault uses the concept of 
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‘’normalisation’’ or scientific classification (Rabinow, 1984: 8) whereby 
people were differentiated with the purpose of control, which influenced the 
direction of law and medicine in the 19
th
 century. Classification could take 
place through isolation of ‘anomolies’ and corrective or therapeutic 
procedures could be instituted. All were intended to collect detailed 
knowledge about and exercise strict control over the population in the name 
of its welfare. The legacy of these processes could be seen in the long stay 
hospitals that were still thriving in the middle of the 20
th
 century. 
 
MOVING INTO MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
 
Beginning to question power relations 
 
I had been successful in developing some innovative community services and 
moving people with learning disabilities from long stay institutions into them, 
with positive results. On reflection, I believe I was able to do this because I 
had moved to a new area, where there had been no institution, no established 
hierarchies and traditional ways of doing things. I was leading the process of 
service development, supported by an operational manager, who was forward 
thinking. My vision was completely based on a belief in normalisation and I 
had had little opposition to this perspective. It was only when my 
organisation merged with another and the new chief executive asked me, in 
1989, to move into mental health services that power and conflict became a 
core issue for me. My task was to set up a resettlement team to help move 
people out of the long stay psychiatric hospital. Although the hospital had 
been planned for closure for several years, no action had been taken by 
managers or clinicians to do this. My boss was determined to close the 
hospital at last, and I would be instrumental in the process. 
 
It had been fourteen years since my last exposure to mental health services 
and it proved to be a complete shock for me. I was struck by the attitudes of 
staff and of nurses in particular, who seemed to see mental illness symptoms 
and not the person, echoing my earlier experience. For a period of time I was 
seriously worried that I was being naïve. After all, I had never worked in 
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mental health services, I was not an expert therapist, and perhaps things 
really were different in the mental health world. This reflected my lack of 
experience in this area of work and unfamiliarity with the dominant medical 
discourse, which in any case I was resistant to. Benner’s (2001) view of the 
caring role of the nurse differs from my experience of them; describing the 
role of nursing as including caring for as well as enabling the person to regain 
their independence. 
 
In 1991, I was given the role of Director of Planning and was charged with 
closing the psychiatric hospital and designing and implementing a 
community based service, by 1995. I set about developing a service user 
group to help advise me and organised an important event that helped shape 
strategy, called a ‘Search Conference’, where external facilitators worked 
with a multidisciplinary stakeholder group, including service users and 
carers. People were asked to consider what their ideal future would look like, 
what their current experiences were, what the gaps were and what needed to 
be addressed to redesign services. What emerged was in sharp contrast to 
current services and to the plans of the professionals. This was essentially a 
‘modernising’ agenda, arrived at democratically by gaining consensus from 
the group of stakeholders. I used this as a mandate to move forward to plan 
on this basis in a rational manner. 
 
I established a set of multidisciplinary project groups with service users and 
carers as members, to develop proposals on how all of those elements could 
be developed. On the face of it, this was a strongly managed, inclusive, 
process, but behind closed professional doors, forces were gathering to 
protect power bases. Specifically, from the psychiatrists’ perspective, this 
was to re-provide the same number of acute admissions beds as they had 
already (as this was generally seen to be their power base). Audits of 
admission were carried out, however, to identify where admissions could 
have been avoided and what services could have made this possible. It 
showed that there were real alternatives with fewer beds; but none of this was 
fully embraced by the consultant body, which mistrusted the data as 
evidence. 
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Interpreting evidence from professional perspectives 
 
Let us consider a concrete example, in older people’s mental health services. 
I was persuaded by a psychologist to use a model of demand and capacity, 
which suggested that a huge change in services was feasible: reducing from 
62 beds to 12 because most people could be supported at home, and changing 
the staff skill mix to a ratio of two support workers to one qualified 
professional, resulting in a radically different service model. It was piloted 
for a year and found to be successful and was implemented fully from 1995. 
Success was measured by quick access to the service, satisfaction from 
service users, their families and GPs, as well as managing within the reduced 
number of beds. The effectiveness data were there. 
 
It seemed that this was successful because there was a robust methodology, 
based on need. Unusual in mental health services, there was a clinical 
champion, the psychologist, a rigorous researcher, who collected data on the 
use and quality of services, thus creating an evidence base. There was a 
management champion, me. But there was a weak psychiatrist base – there 
was one consultant for an older population of 30,000. This was contrary to 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists norms which recommended three full time 
consultant psychiatrists for this population size. The consultant in question 
was specifically recruited to work to the new model. 
 
But, within a year problems emerged. The consultant decided he wanted his 
own outpatient clinics, rather than just working with the team (a traditional 
approach leading to potential duplication of effort). Some social workers 
were unwilling to carry out a ‘core’ assessment (one done by everyone 
irrespective of discipline) because some of the questions were psychological 
in nature. Some nurses felt more comfortable with more qualified nurses 
rather than support workers. It was, therefore, hard work to keep the process 
on the rails and meant me having regular meetings with all concerned to 
trouble shoot.  
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Subsequently, the hospital was closed and a modern, dispersed, community 
based service was implemented. Staff were transferred to their new 
community posts and although the buildings had changed and some training 
was provided, they continued to talk and behave in ways they always had. 
Indeed, the manager of our service user network, with whom I had worked 
closely to develop plans for the new service, said to me one day ‘it is all very 
well you involving service users in planning, but when they see a psychiatrist 
in an outpatient clinic, they do not feel that they are being listened to and you 
can’t do anything about that, can you?’ Although by that time I had been 
made an executive director for the Trust with strategic responsibility for 
mental health services, he was absolutely right. I had not been able to 
influence the clinical practice of psychiatrists and other professionals. This 
has led me to reflect on the power of professionals, why they did not want to 
be challenged nor change and how I could address this more effectively. 
 
FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERWEAVING OF POWER 
AND EVIDENCE 
 
In thinking about a rational approach to change and accumulating evidence to 
support decision making, the issue of what constitutes evidence and who 
defines it through this process is a classic example of one of Flyvbjerg’s 
propositions: 
 
Power determines what counts as knowledge, what kind of 
interpretation attains authority as the dominant interpretation. Power 
procures the knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores 
or suppresses that knowledge which does not serve it. (Flyvbjerg, 
1991: 226) 
 
Much of what I was trying to do was logical, planned and had been agreed 
through consensus, but it did not seem to work that way in practice: services 
emerged that were similar to, but definitely not the same as, what had been 
agreed. Stacey (2007) recognises this, in articulating a different way of 
conceptualising organisations as complex responsive processes of interacting: 
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From a complexity perspective, stability, harmony and consensus 
cannot be equated with success and unpredictability is fundamentally 
unavoidable, making it impossible to talk about being ‘in control’. 
The ‘whole’ is not designed or chosen in advance because it emerges 
in local interaction. Such emergence is in no way a matter of chance 
because what emerges does so precisely because of what all the 
agents are doing or not doing. (Stacey, 2007: 237) 
 
Among Flyvbjerg’s propositions arguing the relationship between rationality 
and power, he states that rationality is context dependant, “...whenever 
powerful participants require rationalisation and not rationality, such 
rationalisation is produced” (Flyvbjerg, 1991: 228). He cites Machiavelli 
from The Prince.  
 
We must distinguish between (t)hose who to achieve their purpose 
who can force the issue and those who must use persuasion. In the 
second case, they always come to grief. (Machiavelli, 1984 [1591]: 
51-52) 
 
In relation to the struggle to maintain the new service, this resonates with 
Flyvbjerg’s proposition six: “(p)ower relations are constantly changing (and) 
demand constant maintenance, cultivation and reproduction” (1991: 231). 
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THE BROADER QUESTION OF PROFESSIONALISM 
 
TAKING UP A NATIONAL ROLE TO ENABLE NEW WAYS OF 
WORKING (NWW) 
 
In 2003, I took up the post of Director of the National Workforce Programme 
for the National Institute for Mental Health in England (NIMHE), which was 
established to support the practical implementation of Department of Health 
policy. I was very aware of the dangers, in working at a national level, of 
becoming remote from services. I had often felt that the further away 
managers get from what happens at grass roots, the more likely they are to 
get it wrong. But I knew the limitations of facilitating and sustaining local 
change, particularly where there were national barriers, and felt this was an 
opportunity to see if I could make a difference by working at a national level.  
 
My opportunity arrived quickly. The then President of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists had approached Ministers to see if anything could be done to 
address the crisis of recruitment and retention of consultant psychiatrists. 
Since psychiatrists were a key group in the workforce, it fell to me to work 
on the project. Their stories were similar: large caseloads, a feeling that the 
buck stopped with them, a resentment at the high usage of locum 
psychiatrists (who were paid twice as much as them, did less work and were 
often of poor quality (SCMH/NIMHE 2005)). They expressed their 
discontent, were heard and were presented with some challenges: how to 
make the best use of their time and how they might work with others to take 
on some of their work and responsibilities. 
 
Beginning the process of challenging professional boundaries 
 
NWW was born. We focussed on how to use the expertise of the consultant 
most effectively, how to extend the role of other professions to take on some 
of their work and how to develop different roles to bring new people into the 
workforce: all to improve the experience of the service user, their carers and 
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supporters. We published extensively (2005, 2007, 2009). Below, I highlight 
some specific aspects of the work. 
 
Defining the limits of clinical responsibility: The General Medical Council 
(GMC) ruled that consultant psychiatrists were NOT responsible for all 
patients seen by the team nor for the work of other team members, but they 
were responsible for those patients they saw directly and for the quality of 
their advice to others. This confirmed that other professional bodies expected 
their members to be accountable for what they did within their professional 
scope of practice. They could not assume the doctor would take clinical 
responsibility for their work. 
 
We reviewed and amended College Guidance on the employment of 
consultant psychiatrists and replaced it with new joint guidance in 2005, 
sponsored by Trust Employers and the College, without norms but with 
‘indicative numbers’, which was a compromise. Since then, the interpretation 
of the guidance has proved conservative, so a more radical revision, which 
removed all reference to numbers, was published in May 2009. The College 
has signed up but its commitment remains to be seen. As Flyvbjerg 
comments “…constitution writing and institutional reform may often be 
essential to democratic development, (but) the idea that such reform alters 
practice is a hypothesis, not an axiom” (Flyvbjerg, 1991: 234). 
 
Changing practice through pilot sites: Some key changes in psychiatric 
practice emerged through funded pilots. One, in Bromley, reviewed the use 
of outpatient clinics where consultant caseloads were commonly 350 to 500; 
it found that 46 doctors could reduce their workload by 60%. Additional 
freed up doctors could then see people quickly in a crisis, thus being much 
more accessible: a win–win for all. 
 
Describing the Distinct Contribution of the Psychiatrist: It was felt important 
by psychiatrists to clarify this as part of the process in case there was a move 
to ‘de-medicalise’ the workforce. Subsequently, all professions produced 
their own “distinct contribution” paper. Although I was not personally in 
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favour of this, as I felt this would serve to emphasise difference as opposed to 
working more collaboratively to meet the needs of service users and carers, I 
recognised this was important to their professional identity.  
 
Developing a methodology for analysing cross professional working: We 
looked at what only one profession could do, what they could give up if 
others were able to take on those aspects and what they would like to do if 
they had the capacity. The emerging matrix showed clearly that there were 
very few tasks that only one profession could do. But, everyone was 
dissatisfied with it as they felt it was a reductionist view of multidisciplinary 
working. What was much more important was how each professional 
approached the formulation of peoples’ needs. Dreyfus and Dreyfus found 
that expert practitioners often find it difficult to articulate what it is that they 
do in clearly differentiated terms as “the performer is no longer aware of 
features or rules and his/her performance becomes fluid, flexible and highly 
proficient” (1977: 12). Eventually, the group came to the view that we were 
approaching it from the wrong direction and needed to shift from a 
professional to a service user focus .To help teams apply the process, we 
developed the Creating Capable Teams Approach (2007): a way of 
addressing NWW in a systematic way within teams. Interestingly, I always 
insisted that it was described as an ‘approach’, but others were keen to label it 
a toolkit.  
 
The final major publication, New Ways of Working for Everyone (2007), 
describing what NWW meant for every profession, was widely welcomed. 
Employers were struggling, however, to implement NWW comprehensively 
across their organisations. It was still largely dependent on enthusiasts 
working at an individual level, changing their own practice and providing 
leadership in teams and services. So, to assist managers in organisations in a 
strategic process, we produced an Implementation Guide (2007) and ran a 
series of learning sets for directors and senior clinicians in 38 trusts in 
England. Results confirmed that Trusts had a long way to go with workforce 
reform and modernisation. 
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An emerging backlash 
 
A telling confrontation occurred in summer 2007, in the final stages in the 
preparation of the Mental Health Bill. The role of the doctor as Responsible 
Medical Officer was proposed to be replaced by that of a Responsible 
Clinician, which could be undertaken not only by a doctor but also by other 
professions. The British Medical Association (BMA - the medical ‘trades 
union’) and the College asked for an eleventh hour change to restrict that role 
to doctors. They were unsuccessful and from November 2008 that role has 
been open to all professions.  This challenge was a flash point for 
psychiatrists and a significant backlash to NWW has ensued, articulated in an 
article by Craddock (2008) titled ’A wake up call for psychiatry’, which 
suggests a loss of identity and authority for the profession. This has been a 
rallying call for the disaffected. 
 
Since the Blair Labour government came to power, there has been huge 
investment in the NHS. Regular staff surveys however, suggest that doctors 
and nurses were not positive about the NHS. The Prime Minster in 2007 
therefore commissioned Lord Darzi to produce his ‘Next Stage Review’ 
(2008). This highlighted the importance of clinical staff not only delivering 
clinical care but being team members and service leaders: described as “new 
professionalism”. This is seen by some as an opportunity to reassert old 
hierarchies, whilst one of its key intentions is to draw practitioners into 
leadership roles. The current president of the College is re-writing his 
definition of the role of the doctor, which reasserts that the doctor is 
responsible for the work of the whole team - the position that we clarified 
was NOT the case in 2005. My programme finished in March 2009 and led to 
an outburst of triumphalism from those who dislike NWW. The outcome 
remains to be seen.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
My career as a psychologist and manager has been a set of transitions from 
seeking to understand people at an individual level to understanding how to 
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change systems for more radical and sustainable transformation. Skinner’s 
radical behaviourism offered the most promising discourse to me in working 
with people with learning disabilities, where working with carers/their 
environment was of key importance. Understanding how we are shaped by 
our environment can seem to be, but is not necessarily, simplistic nor 
reductionist. There is a tendency to look either outside or inside the person 
for explanations as though these are alternatives, but Mead identified how the 
two could inform one another; this was to be echoed by Skinner.  
 
Conceptually, this made sense but it did not offer me a way of thinking about 
institutionalisation and how or what alternative shape this should take. My 
influence in 1980 was Wolfensberger’s notion of ‘normalisation’. This 
clearly drew on Foucault’s analysis of the rise of the asylum and the evolving 
role of the doctor, where he described how he produced a set of tools for 
local use, without a prescribed outcome. I suppose the PASS manual 
developed by Wolfensberger, was just such a tool or more importantly a way 
of thinking, based on a clearly articulated set of values, which proved 
invaluable to me in identifying what needed to change in services. I was able 
to facilitate changes in learning disability services. When it came to mental 
health, however, I found not only a different way of interpreting behaviour, 
based on a medical model, but also that this was firmly located in the role and 
hence the power of the psychiatrist. This was altogether a different discourse 
for me. It was what I had perceived and avoided many years earlier.  
 
The developing importance of the role and power of the psychiatrist has its 
origins, according to Foucault, in wise and moral philanthropists in early 
institutions, such as Samuel Tuke, the first doctor appointed to the Retreat in 
York. Their influence was perceived as quasi-miraculous rather than 
scientific. Developments in the 19
th
 century changed that role but not its 
importance, shifting to psycho-analytic and then to biological interpretations 
of mental illness in the 20
th
 century. This almost unquestioned power of the 
doctor is still with us today - the expertise whilst it can be considerable, is not 
infallible, and can be harmful, particularly in the field of mental health. 
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The power of professionals has been a continuing theme throughout my 
career: how they interact with one another, on an intra and inter disciplinary 
basis, their perception of management (from the dark side) both locally and 
nationally, and the great variation. All have proved to be both fascinating and 
infuriating. The formal and the informal processes at work, the political and 
the realpolitik at the Department of Health and at the Trust Board, show how 
important it is to be aware of power and how it can be made to work. A 
rational approach to change, with explicit benefits for all, articulated in lucid 
documents, has proved to be necessary but not sufficient to effect change on 
a large scale. 
 
A theme from NWW is about the importance of defining and using 
competences to describe what an individual and a team might need to 
demonstrate in order to deliver effective interventions. Competence 
underpins the analysis of the developing practitioner and this, of itself, has 
led to defensiveness in the workforce. I feel this approach has strengths and 
drawbacks: it helps flush out what people can mystify as their ‘clinical 
judgement’, but it can atomise behaviour into such small elements that 
become unwieldy and overly protocol driven. There has also been a time 
honoured approach in the NHS (and elsewhere) of people going on training 
courses, but not being able to use their learning and skills on return to the 
workplace. There can be an assumption, too, that an expert practitioner has 
transferable skills, that almost becomes a ‘trait’. Benner suggests that: 
“skilled performance is defined situationally rather than as a talent or trait 
that transcends all situations” (2001: 178). This could be highly relevant in 
understanding why some psychiatrists are reluctant to change their practice 
through NWW, such as by reducing outpatient clinics and specialising more, 
as they may not feel they have the expected expertise to work differently in 
new settings. 
 
All of this has been happening in the context of an evolving scientific 
paradigm. Power and position are enhanced by evidence, usually drawn from 
the physical sciences. This is a developing area of importance in the NHS; 
and in mental health, where psychiatrists and psychologists are perceived to 
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have the greatest expertise. This does not change the fact, however, that much 
of what is done in mental health services does not have such an evidence 
base. This has resulted in two perspectives: firstly, that staff spend much of 
their time doing things that should be stopped (e.g. tea and sympathy); and 
conversely, that service users are helped by some interventions that are not 
NICE approved - these can be articulated by them and by practitioners. Both 
have led to people feeling aggrieved. Interestingly, the call for evidence of 
the efficacy of NWW is rarely juxtaposed with the need for more evidence 
for traditional ways of working. This reinforces the point that what 
constitutes evidence and how it is collected is politically as well as 
scientifically determined. This issue is gathering strength in relation to 
psychological therapies. 
 
It is not clear to me, as I reflect on implementing NWW, if I could have done 
things differently that would have influenced this change in the views of the 
upper echelons of the College and of some psychiatrists in the field. I doubt 
it, as it is the result of a myriad of conversations and debates up and down the 
country. The sociologist Elias, reflecting on the rise of the social sciences, 
commented on new ideas that challenge the established order, observing “that 
the greater the anger and passion aroused by the conflict, the less chance of a 
changeover to more realistic, less fantasy-laden thinking’’(1978: 22) there is 
likely to be. Scott (1998) reviewed how often well intentioned national 
schemes had at least unlooked for, and sometimes downright harmful, effects 
on the recipients, taking as examples political, economic, urban planning and 
environmental schemes. It is likely that some critics of the NWW programme 
would perceive it as just such a catastrophe: they thought it was worth trying 
just because there was a shortage of psychiatrists. For them, it had the 
unlooked for outcome of seeing other professions taking on work that 
traditionally only they did. The same is true for other professions, some 
psychologists are bemoaning ‘giving away’ (a frequently used term) their 
psychological skills, particularly in the light of the national IAPT 
programme. 
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At the beginning of the process of NWW, I had no real idea where it would 
lead; I knew we needed to clarify and get away from restrictive practices, but 
the form that new ways of doing things would take was not clear to me, nor 
anyone - there was no blueprint. The unpredictability of change is 
unsurprising therefore, as Scott says: “(v)irtually any complex task involving 
many variables…values and interactions cannot be accurately 
forecast’’(1998: 327). The implementation of NWW was left to local people, 
there were no targets and the CCTA was developed to help individuals and 
teams come up with their own solutions. This might be described as using the 
‘know how’ or the practical skills of local practitioners and teams to solve 
their problems based on their own knowledge. This is part of the current 
strategic direction of the Department of Health - local decision making at all 
costs. However, the frequent experience in mental health teams is of 
unhelpful power differentials, inefficient services and disrespect of staff and 
service users alike. The principles of NWW are quite general and so they 
require “...translation if they are to be locally successful” (ibid.: 318). It 
would be a mistake, however, to think things are not changing. As Oakeshott 
observes:  
 
The big mistake of the rationalist...is to assume that ‘tradition’, or 
what is better called ‘practical knowledge’, is rigid, fixed and 
unchanging... No traditional way of behaviour...ever remains fixed... 
Its history is one of continual change. (Oakeshott, 1962: 31 ) 
 
But these changes are likely to be slow and incremental. So far in the NHS, 
this has led to very variable and therefore inequitable services and to what is 
referred to as a ‘post code lottery’. 
 
So, I am interested in thinking more about how there can be more timely, 
effective shifts in practice and attitudes in mental health services. Flyvbjerg 
suggests that there needs to be a re-orientation towards what is actually done 
“(i)nstead of thinking of modernity and democracy as a rational means of 
dissolving power, we need to see them as practical attempts at regulating 
power and domination’’ (1991: 236). Foucault reminds us that power is often 
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negatively viewed as repressive, but the reason that power has such 
importance is “...simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force 
that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse” (in Rabinow, 1984: 61). 
 
In trying to bring about change, Scott (1998: 345) has some practical 
suggestions: take small steps; favour reversibility; plan on surprises; and plan 
on human inventiveness. I am therefore keen to explore what using power, in 
the context of a rational framework, can look like in local services and 
national policy implementation. 
 
Having spent my career trying to straddle a top down and bottom up 
approach to service development, I would like to use the DMan research 
process to help me think how local interaction could help me address the 
issues of professionalism, evidence and power in mental health services in 
the NHS 
 
I will now move to my second project to focus on professionalism, which is 
based on my involvement with the national programme to increase access to 
psychological therapies. 
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PROJECT TWO (2009)  
HOW ISSUES OF PROFESSIONALISM ARE SUSTAINING AND 
CHALLENGING THE POWER RELATIONS IN A NATIONAL NHS 
PROGRAMME 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I have been working on an English national programme to improve access to 
psychological therapies (IAPT). The government announced, in 2008, that it 
would provide £173m to fund the programme to enable 900,000 more people 
with anxiety and depression to access evidence based psychological therapies 
by 2011. The national target is to train an additional 3,600 therapists to 
deliver therapies, recommended by NICE. The rationale for the investment, 
put forward by a member of the House of Lords (Gerald
1
), was that as a 
significant number of people on incapacity benefit were suffering from 
anxiety and depression, if they could be helped by therapy back into work, 
this would be a short term investment, that would save money in the longer 
term as well as promoting ‘happiness’ in the population. Project two is about 
how I have experienced the implementation process of this programme, 
primarily in the context of the Programme Management Group (PMG), both 
through the formal meetings and the informal communications outside the 
meeting. 
 
The management structure of the IAPT programme has two components: a 
core group of relatively junior generalist staff, headed up by a general 
manager, and a number of National Advisors (NAs) to the programme. The 
latter have gradually joined the programme, some explicitly because of their 
clear expertise in this area, some have just appeared without a clear 
explanation and others have been inherited from other programmes - I am 
included in this last group. Some members of the core group, all the NAs and 
Gerald are members of the PMG. 
 
                                                          
1
 Names have been altered to protect identities 
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The PMG meetings take place monthly and are usually chaired by the senior 
civil servant in the mental health policy branch of the Department of Health. 
They are attended by John, the IAPT programme lead, a general manager by 
background, who usually sits next to the civil servant, whom he always pre-
briefs. Gerald and the NA on Clinical Issues (Derek), who is a psychologist 
and world expert on the use of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) in 
people with anxiety disorders, usually sit next to one another as they have 
collaborated from an early stage in the process and both are academics. The 
NA for Informatics (Ricky) is a nurse therapist, educator and researcher, 
brought in because he was led one of the early IAPT demonstration sites. 
Other NAs include Primary Care – Abe, a general medical practitioner; 
Education and Training – Brian, a psychologist, educator and academic; 
Counselling and Psychotherapy – Jack, a clinician with a non CBT power 
base; Service Users – Luke; Carers – Laura, and me, as Workforce lead. 
 
BACKGROUND AND THE TENSIONS IN THE IAPT PROGRAMME 
 
The starting point for the IAPT programme was to implement NICE guidance 
on anxiety and depression. There was little doubt, at a national level, that this 
was the correct thing to do. The psychological therapy most strongly 
recommended by NICE was CBT. With its emphasis on behaviour, on 
structured processes and measurability, CBT had lent itself to rigorous 
scientific investigation, namely randomised controlled trials (RCTs). The 
research outcomes suggested that in the case of people with mild, moderate 
and severe anxiety and depression, it could have enduring benefits for around 
50% of them. There was a key problem, however, as there were only small 
numbers of CBT therapists across the country. The picture was complicated, 
as well, by the fact that the service delivery model in which such therapists 
were expected to work was what was described as ‘stepped care’. This was 
based on the assumption that people should be offered the appropriate level 
of intensity of intervention, according to their needs. The rationale for this 
was twofold: firstly, that referring people to specialists too early could be 
stigmatising and overly interventionist and secondly, that it would not be cost 
effective. So CBT intervention needed to be differentiated into two steps – 
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step 2, low intensity, which largely consisted of assisted self-help and 
signposting and step 3, high intensity, which was face to face therapy. (step 1 
being primary care – the generalist health process in the UK). 
 
Two national demonstration sites were established to test out the 
recommended service model. As luck would have it, one staffed the service 
largely with CBT therapists (high intensity) with only one assistant (low 
intensity), the other employed mainly ‘case managers’ who delivered low 
intensity interventions, with back up from a small number of CBT therapists. 
The mix of staff in the two sites could not have been more different and they 
reflected the beliefs of the two clinical leads. The former was a psychiatrist 
psychotherapist, who firmly believed that face to face therapy was the most 
valuable; the latter was an academic with a nursing background, who had 
spent years training and developing graduates in new bespoke curricula 
(Ricky). Therein lay the rub: what was the right balance of staff and mix of 
skills and competences, to meet people’s needs in the shortest period of time? 
The evaluation of the two sites suggested that when looking at depression 
alone (excluding anxiety, specific related conditions, such as post traumatic 
stress disorder) there was little difference in the two. Both produced similar 
rates of recovery to that published in NICE, but the low intensity focussed 
site saw larger numbers of clients and was much cheaper.  
 
As the IAPT programme gained momentum, based on these two 
demonstration sites, a business case was developed to deliver this model of 
service on a large scale. Workforce modelling was rapidly undertaken, but 
the emerging evidence for the utility of the low intensity workforce was 
overthrown. This was decided by Gerald and Derek, (who saw the IAPT 
programme primarily as a training initiative), because of their decided 
preference was for highly qualified therapists who could replicate the work 
undertaken in research studies. They pronounced that the NICE evidence for 
stepped care was poorer and could not be relied upon, therefore a decision 
was made to produce more CBT therapists rather than Low Intensity (LI) 
Workers (subsequently named Psychological Wellbeing Practitioners 
[PWPs]) and a 60:40 split was adopted. I was unhappy with this, but was 
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pragmatic in that if the business case was successful, it would bring in more 
resources that could be used flexibly if necessary. I also knew that my 
influence would not be powerful enough to change this view. 
 
My role in this process, at the time, was as workforce director for the IAPT 
project; it was part of a broader role leading the national mental health 
workforce programme until March 2009. In this role, I had worked with 
various mental health professionals, including psychiatrists, psychologists, 
nurses, occupational therapists, pharmacists and social workers, both 
individually and through their professional bodies. During this programme 
and throughout my professional career, I have always been struck by the 
professional defensiveness of many practitioners, in that they have covertly 
or overtly viewed themselves as superior to their multi-disciplinary 
colleagues. They have also assumed that professionally qualified staff must 
be better at providing services to clients than those who are not professionally 
affiliated. In contrast, and perhaps counter-intuitively, feedback from service 
users has consistently been at odds with this professional view, with stories 
that people feel more listened to by support staff than they do by professional 
staff. I was directly involved in the development of a new role, the ‘Support 
Time and Recovery (STR) Worker’, recruiting people from local 
communities and with lived experience of mental ill health. Initial evaluation 
and ongoing feedback from service users has been very positive about the 
role. As a result, I came to IAPT with a propensity to challenge professional 
assumptions and to promote more diverse roles, so I was sympathetic to the 
case manager / low intensity role. The first battle lines were drawn therefore - 
the professionally qualified CBT therapist versus the non-professionally 
affiliated PWPs. At that time, many psychologists disassociated themselves 
from the CBT focus as they felt it was too narrow. Later, rancour developed 
amongst counsellors and psychotherapists, who felt they were being 
overlooked in what was acknowledged to be an unprecedented, well funded 
national programme for psychological therapies.  
 
PMG is, therefore, a microcosm of these clinical tensions, which have 
developed since the programme’s inception. 
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A typical meeting of the IAPT Programme Management Group (PMG) 
 
At the time of writing, PMG has only been meeting for about a year; before 
that, there was little in the way of governance structures for the programme 
and it was not at all clear how decisions were made. Now, PMG has taken on 
a critical role in the management of and influence on the programme.  
 
The atmosphere is always tense and there is rarely a corporate feel to the 
discussion. There are usually some tête-a-têtes going on before the meeting 
between those with known alliances and there will be much non-verbal 
communication between those people throughout the meeting. The business 
of the meetings to date has been almost exclusively on the performance 
management of the implementation process, the political and policy agenda 
and the means of delivering quality standards for CBT. 
 
The agenda is usually dominated by John, leading the performance 
management side of things and by Derek questioning in great detail and 
making authoritative statements about the programme. This is often in terms 
of impending catastrophes that are likely to befall the programme if there is 
any deviation from the key task of implementing CBT. The practical realities 
of implementing an IAPT service in 115 organisations simultaneously, all of 
which have different starting points and therefore the necessity, in my view, 
of accepting that there will be differences in configuration of services, is 
considered to be heretical and likely to lead to chaos. Jack, Abe, Brian and I 
seem to have become constrained by the joint voices of Gerald and Derek. 
John sometimes challenges us to make a contribution, but we seem 
uncharacteristically hesitant when we do. I always feel much more relaxed if 
Gerald or Derek is absent. In individual talks with others, they all dislike 
coming to PMG, but recognise that it is important to be there as things will 
get decided in our absence. 
 
At a recent meeting to review the role of the NAs, significant preparation was 
made to elicit individual views in advance and to plan sharing of perspectives 
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that would give us equal weight. Although this was chaired by John, it was 
hatched by the excluded NAs in informal discussions. The meeting itself was 
amicable enough on the surface and views were straightforwardly expressed, 
which was a big change, but John explicitly acknowledged Derek over others 
at the end of the meeting, which left the rest of us feeling deflated. 
 
Similarly, at a subsequent national conference for new IAPT services, chaired 
by Derek, where Gerald gave a keynote address, he attributed the success of 
the programme entirely to Derek and John, in the full knowledge that there 
were three other NAs in the audience.  
 
So I am led to reflect on what is going on in this process, where a small 
number of people, within a group of others well regarded in their field, can 
dominate the discussion and the focus of the programme overall. I have been 
surprised at the intensity of the emotions I have felt during these meetings: 
anger at the dominance of such a small number of people who claim the 
intellectual and moral high-ground; frustration at the narrow focus that 
privileges an ideology of evidence, based on the natural sciences, to the 
exclusion of all other perspectives; annoyance that a major service redesign 
and change process can be portrayed only as a training initiative, ignoring the 
complexity of local differences and the implications for the sustainability of 
the workforce in the longer term; and humiliation that my role and 
contribution is constantly being minimised. I know I am not alone in having 
these feelings, but I suspect as the only woman involved at a senior level, 
perhaps overly concerned with a preference to collaborate, that I have been 
more overt in my concerns. 
 
There is now, however the beginning of a fight back of the constrained group 
to have a more inclusive approach to other therapy modalities and 
practitioners, on which I will elaborate later. 
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KEY THEMES EMERGING 
 
There is unquestioning support of the NICE approved evidence based 
therapies. To suggest that there is anything of value in conducting therapy in 
any other way, which does not have an evidence base, anchored in scientific 
RCTs, is to risk personal and public humiliation. Evidence based practice, 
based on the natural sciences, is therefore an ideology of the programme and 
of the PMG. It is rooted in a cognitivist and positivistic view of the world, 
both in relation to clinical issues and in relation to management processes. 
 
This value impacts on the constituencies of the NAs. What have primary 
care, counselling and psychotherapy, workforce, service users and carers got 
to offer here? Although they have their own evidence base and practical 
experience, they are on the whole ‘messier’ and less concrete. They cannot be 
so easily demonstrated through tables of outcome data, which is a key focus 
of the programme as a whole. This has led to me and these other NAs to feel 
silenced and to feel like outsiders. I am interested in what has led to this 
splitting in the group. 
 
What makes Derek feel able to trump the views of all others in the group is, 
in my view, that he is recognised as the expert in this context. Although all 
the NAs have joined the programme because of the expertise they bring: 
knowledge, skills, know how, experience, prestige and political influence, 
there seems to be a clear hierarchy of expertise. This seems to be based, at 
least partly, on academic knowledge and on the ability to show evidence from 
one’s area of expertise that can be objectively measured. 
 
This seems to be directly linked to the unspoken and unchallenged view of 
the value of professionalism. NAs are professional advisors but this is not a 
typical NHS inter-professional conflict commonly seen in multi-professional 
teams, particularly where there is challenge to the primacy of the doctor. 
Academic credentials are key to this and when combined with clinical 
practice expertise, they are perceived to be irresistibly superior to clinical 
practice on its own, without the research evidence base, and to management 
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expertise, including dealing with the practicalities of organisational change 
and service redesign.  
 
There is clearly an imbalance of power in the group currently, directly 
related to political influence and professional identity. This results in anxiety 
about individual positions concerning potential and actual influence, not only 
in terms of the internal PMG, but also in terms of the knock-on effect on 
external constituencies and whether NAs will be able to meet the 
expectations of the diverse groups they seek to represent. The issue of 
personal identity and potential exposure raises the issue of shame on the part 
of the NAs. 
 
A final theme is control in that there is an expectation within the national 
programme that it will provide the answers for local people in local services 
in what are new circumstances of developing psychological services. Gerald 
and Derek are extremely concerned at the loss of control that is inevitable in 
the coming year of the programme, as there has been a political decision to 
devolve the funding to local commissioners. Financial incentives are 
considered to be the main levers for local development, along with IAPT 
being featured in what is known as the “NHS Operating Framework”, which 
identifies ‘must dos’ for commissioners. IAPT is a tier three priority, which is 
more of a ‘may do’ and it has proved impossible to increase its priority 
nationally. This has caused Gerald and Derek, in particular, a great deal of 
concern, resulting in much political lobbying and catastrophising statements; 
but they have not been successful. In terms of working with uncertainty, even 
more so at this time, the ‘outsider’ or constrained NAs openly acknowledge 
the unknowability of what the impact of this policy may have. This is 
particularly in the light of the economic downturn and the expectation that 
savings will have to be made to fund these new developments There is a keen 
feeling that PMG should be used to explore these issues, test out assumptions 
and come up with new ideas. But that it has not been safe to do so as this 
would be to expose the individuals who profess not to know. This is clearly 
unproductive and poor use of the people in the PMG and their potential to 
create new ways of understanding by debating and problem solving together. 
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There is a clear intention in the group to address this, as articulated by John, 
but it feels like the group is stuck in a groove of CBT and its service 
enactments.  
 
I intend to consider how professionalism is important in this project and how 
this might inform my ways of understanding the processes of PMG and the 
way the NAs interact.  
 
PROFESSIONALISM: KEY THEMES  
 
I take a professional to be a person in an occupation, who has specialist 
knowledge and skill, the exercise of which requires discretionary judgement 
and the possession of which enables the person to control their own work and 
to hold privileged economic, cultural and social status. Professionalism is the 
qualities or typical features of a profession. Professional bodies control entry 
to and expulsion from the profession, linked to codes of ethics and protection 
of professional and commercial interests (Stewart: 2008). Having spent most 
of my career bumping up against professionalism, I want to explore if 
professionalism is a major issue that is being played out in the PMG.  
 
My starting position is that I am suspicious of professions. Although almost 
universally, they may have the best interests of their clients at heart, it has 
been my experience that they have frequently taken the view that they know 
best, by virtue of their knowledge and expertise, therefore downplaying the 
experience of their patients. They also tend, depending on the primacy of the 
profession, to consider themselves to be superior to other professions. There 
is nevertheless an idealisation of professions that has developed over 
centuries. 
 
Larson (1977), in a Marxist analysis, begins by saying that in most cases 
sociologists perceive that  
 
...professions are occupations with special power and prestige. 
Society grants these rewards because professions have special 
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competence in esoteric bodies of knowledge linked to central needs 
and values of the social system, and because professions are devoted 
to the service of the public, above and beyond material incentives. 
(1977: x) 
 
Khurana (2007), in describing the development and fall of management as a 
profession, took a positive view of professionalism. 
 
Professionalism and professionals are powerful ideas and 
institutions...They often occupy the highest status positions in an 
occupational hierarchy. In cultural terms, they are carriers of 
important societal norms and values concerning such matters as the 
relationship between knowledge and power and the maintenance of 
trust. (2007: 8) 
 
THE IDEOLOGY OF CULT VALUES OF PROFESSIONS AND 
LINKS WITH ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE 
 
Abbott (1988) viewed professions, not in isolation from each other, but in 
terms of inter-professional competition. ‘Control of knowledge and its 
application means dominating outsiders who attack that control. Control 
without competition is trivial’ (1988: 2). His concept of ‘jurisdiction’ and 
how this differentiates professions formally and academically is particularly 
interesting where he reflects how this changes in practice. Boundaries 
become blurred as people work together and develop skills and knowledge 
that can become interchangeable. The public would be shocked, for example, 
if they were to learn of the number of assumed medical roles, which are 
actually undertaken by non-medical staff. In IAPT, we see the role of the 
PWP taking on that of a more experienced therapist in terms of screening 
assessments. 
 
Griffin describes how Mead’s (1923: 237) concept of a ‘cult value’ of, for 
example, a hospital to ‘provide each patient with the best possible care’ 
(2002: 189) will emerge in different practices as it is implemented by 
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clinicians on different wards, thus becoming ‘functionalised values’. He 
argues that this process gives rise to conflict as differences will arise which 
may be contested. These practices in turn can impact on the cult value and 
how it may evolve. 
 
Academic knowledge is interwoven with defining jurisdictions and is 
controlled by academics. In the mind of the public, there is a belief that 
abstract knowledge implies effective professional practice, but this is not 
necessarily true. It is the symbolic combination that is culturally powerful; so 
having a strong academic, abstract knowledge system is important for all 
professions. Khurana suggests, in thinking about the development of 
management as a profession, that there were deliberate links made by 
employers with universities to establish business schools as a means of 
legitimising the role of the manager (2007: 3). Here, there is a linking with 
science for respectability. Freidson (2001) describes how the level of 
abstraction informs the level of academic qualification and hence the status of 
the profession. 
 
Professionalism itself can be considered to be a “cult value”. Stacey and 
Griffin state “cult values are precious aspects of collective identities, that are 
always aspects of personal identities” (2005: 16). The PMG is a process 
where cult values are functionalised in ordinary, everyday situations as 
people interact, which inevitably causes conflict. It is in this 
functionalisation, with its conflict, that cult values enact a sense of identity 
and evolve at the same time. 
 
A vital issue that emerges from the discourse on professionalism is that of 
academic knowledge as an abstraction and how this sits with practice and 
competences, which I will return to later. 
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PROFESSIONALISM: THE ROLE OF THE DOCTOR 
 
I want to reflect on the historic development of professions and focus initially 
on medicine as it has come to influence the NHS and provided the dominant 
interpretation of the needs of people with mental health problems. 
 
Gaining status through social position 
 
Foucault’s work, Madness and Civilisation (1961), traces the development of 
institutions in the 17
th
 century, from the opening of the Hôpital Générale in 
France in1656, as I describe in project one. The institution provided ‘great 
confinement’ and herded together people, who had committed all types of 
transgressions and had a variety of difficulties, but was ‘not a medical 
establishment’ (1961: 37). It was more a means of social and economic 
control. The subsequent development of the asylums, through Pinel at 
Bicêptre in France and through Tuke at the Retreat in England, have now 
passed into legend. Tuke was portrayed as a Christian philanthropist, but 
Foucault argues that the truth was different and that a key principle was, 
quoting Tuke himself: 
 
The principle of fear, which is rarely decreased in insanity, is 
considered as of great importance in the management of the patients. 
(Ibid: 232) 
 
Pinel took a less religious, but still moral stance, towards patients. But both 
he and Tuke developed the role of the ‘medical personage’ as the ‘essential 
figure in the asylum’. This position controlled entry and discharge and was 
one of significant power. It was not, however, based on medical skill. “It is 
not as a scientist that homo medicus has authority in the asylum, but as a wise 
man” (Rabinow, 1984.: 159). Any power to cure was borne from the “quasi-
miraculous” (ibid.: 162) power of the doctor-patient relationship and the 
presumed efficacy of moral behaviour. Foucault posits that the development 
of the natural sciences in the 19
th
 century and the role of medicine within this, 
obscured the views of psychiatrists from their roots as ‘very soon the 
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meaning of this moral practice escaped the physician, to the very extent that 
he enclosed his knowledge in the norms of positivism’(ibid.: 162). This is not 
surprising and perhaps reflects Elias (1978) when writing about the 
development of sociology, who said that in the development of thought, 
natural forces were explained in terms of magical and metaphysical 
explanations until scientific theory, offering explanation and prediction, took 
hold. Scientists challenged conventionally accepted ideas and Elias described 
them as “destroyers of myths”. Although this new scientific approach became 
the dominant discourse in how doctors thought about their work, there was 
(as yet) little reliable evidence on their efficacy.  
 
So we have here an historic development of the role of the doctor, powerful 
for his gravitas rather than for his ability to cure. Abbott (1988) says 
something similar in his historical view of the rise of professions working 
with people’s problems, in that institutions had been developing at a great 
rate to house the insane and thus remove them from society. It was here that 
the role of psychiatrists grew as they became directors of those institutions. 
Their treatments were focussed on moral therapy, which proved to be ‘a clear 
failure’ in his view, but incarceration had powerful cultural influence, both 
for society and for the profession. As Abbott comments wryly, although ‘the 
failure of moral therapy put psychiatrists’ jurisdiction in an embarrassing 
position, there were no real competitors, and psychiatrists retained control by 
default’ (ibid.: 294). 
 
Foucault’s description of the local interactions of a small number of key 
people like Tuke and Pinel and the ensuing power the psychiatrist assumed in 
controlling institutions, despite the lack of efficacy of their treatments, 
suggests that other factors were involved. It seems that the physician, in 
working with the insane, who were feared by the public and who themselves 
were in awe in the doctor-patient relationship, took on the appearance of the 
supreme expert, the idealised professional. 
 
Starr (1982), in his analysis of the Social Transformation of American 
Medicine, from the 19
th
 century onwards, describes medicine as a sovereign 
51 
 
profession, which is “an elaborate system of specialised knowledge, technical 
procedures, and rules of behaviour… (but), by no means are these all purely 
rational.” (1982: 3) He talks about the ‘authority’ of professions, which is 
secured through the influence of two necessary elements, “legitimacy, 
(which) rests on the subordinates’ acceptance of the claim that they should 
obey, (and dependence) on their estimate of the foul consequences that will 
befall them if they do not” (ibid.: 9-10). Both of these clearly play out in 
Foucault’s analysis of role of the doctor and the acceptance of this by the 
patient. 
 
Starr describes how medicine in the US was able to establish cultural 
authority through the nature of the doctor- patient relationship. The 
emergence of psychiatry and how it came to dominate not only the care of 
people with severe mental ill-health but also how this metamorphosed into 
what Abbott described as the ‘personal problem jurisdiction’ (1988: 280) 
directly influenced the rise of psychotherapy as a profession. It therefore has 
clear links to the context of IAPT, but in a more subtle way than is the day to 
day experience in specialist mental health services. 
 
Individual and social perspectives 
 
According to Abbott, personal problems were largely dealt with in the family 
or by the clergy until the mid-19
th
 century. The clergy would have been 
focussed on religious exhortation to change to receive redemption. As society 
changed, however, with the growth of industry, cities and worker movement, 
not only did this result in people finding it difficult to cope with these 
changes, but also family networks were disrupted along with their potential to 
provide support. The clergy, because of their number and place in society, 
continued to be the key source of help for people; but they began to see the 
causes of mental ill health as being socially determined. Abbott states: 
 
Washington Gladden and other social gospellers attributed many of 
these personal problems directly to such social causes as poverty, 
unemployment, and rootlessness. At the same time, Gladden defined 
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the pastor-client relation as one of friendship, strongly opposing 
“unbending professionalism”…This new construction of everyday 
life problems appealed to legitimating values: to egalitarianism, to 
efficiency, to altruism. But it made little appeal to science. And its 
diagnoses more reflected general social criticism than skilled 
investigations, while its treatments required social changes that elites 
found unacceptable. (1988: 293) 
 
At the same time, neurologists were developing as a respected academic 
group within medicine as they became skilled in the categorisation of often 
unexplained or untreatable illnesses. There was a huge demand for their 
services at this time as unhappiness in the population grew, but their numbers 
were too small to meet such demand and the efficacy of their treatments was 
very poor.  
 
So, at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, we see two professions: psychiatrists 
and neurologists, who were in much demand for dealing with people with 
mental health problems, but with little in the way of effective treatments to 
cure them. Both, however, were working to a medical model to explain and 
predict behaviour. 
 
Psychiatrists began to move away from their institutional power base because 
the nature of the work was leading to a high turnover of doctors. They did 
this by shifting from focussing their work solely on the institutionalised 
severely mentally ill, to what they considered to be preventative work. Notice 
here how an historical perspective can reify groups, such as psychiatrists and 
can infer intention to a process, which would have emerged iteratively over a 
number of years. This interpretation will have shifted with the retelling, 
which is what Mead (1932) would argue as being in the living present, acting 
into the future, whilst re-inventing the past as we do so. 
 
Abbott posits that psychiatrists were forced then to look at social conditions 
as the cause of problems for many and hence adopt a social stance. This was 
problematic however because those causal factors were difficult to change. 
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The academic group within the profession, supposedly, therefore, developed 
‘adjustment theory’, a body of knowledge based on the adjustment of the 
individual to society. This meant looking at how the person could adapt to 
their circumstances rather than change them, the purpose of treatment 
becoming therefore social control. Abbott, quoting from the Commonwealth 
Fund, stated 
 
(p)sychiatry may do much to adjust human beings, children or adults 
to tolerable conditions of life. The implicit assumptions of this theory 
were (1) that all social factors in nervous and mental disease were 
important only through their effect on the individual; (2) that any 
violation of social rules (“the mildest psychopathies, the faintest 
eccentricities”) signified mental problems and (3) that the proper 
approach to such problems was individual and not social’. (1988: 
298) 
 
This individualistic perspective is based on a positivistic philosophical 
stance, on the assumption that there is the individual and the society and that 
the individual can stand outside of that society. Elias, as reported in 
Goudsblom and Mennell (1998), in a presentation that he gave to the Royal 
Medico-Psychological Society in 1965, drew attention to this: 
 
All these groups (of professionals) are inclined to see their own 
province of the human universe as the most basic and the most 
central... In the psychiatrist’s perception, as I see it, the single 
individual - the single patient - stands out sharply in the foreground. It 
is not unusual to speak of a patient’s ‘social background’… and 
‘environment factors’. The terminology itself implies the existence of 
a wall between the highly structured person in the foreground and the 
seemingly unstructured network of relations and communications in 
the background. (Gouldsblom and Mennell, 1998: 78-9) 
 
Griffin on the same subject, states: “Just as scientists succeeded in splitting 
the atom, various disciplines began to ‘split’ the understanding of the 
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individual” (2002: 128). This can be seen clearly in multi-disciplinary teams 
in the NHS; each profession is bent on demonstrating their distinct 
contribution in relation to the biological, psychological and social 
determinants of behaviour. There is something more fundamental, however, 
which was being asserted by psychiatry in the early 20
th
 century, and indeed, 
still today, and this is that there are standards, which are taken for granted in 
the western world, by which man can be judged, and that it is possible to 
manipulate the individual to conform to those standards. Mead (1908), in 
considering the philosophical basis of ethics suggested that: 
 
Moral advance consists not in adapting individual natures to the fixed 
realities of a moral universe, but in constantly reconstructing and 
recreating the world as the individuals evolve. (1908: 194) 
 
Abbott states that this psychiatric stance of moulding the individual to society 
was remarkably popular with the public as it appealed to their understanding 
of their conditions, to science, to individualism and to social orderliness. I 
take this to mean that, at that time, there was still a strong pioneering 
inheritance in the US, which was focussed on the individual and there was an 
equally strong belief, linked to Christianity, about accepting one’s lot. 
Whatever the complexity of these influences, it did place the profession of 
psychiatry in a quandary about its knowledge base. This has proved an 
enduring issue, in my view, and has caused difficulties for the profession in 
articulating its basis in natural sciences, whilst also clearly having intrinsic 
links with psychology and, more importantly, with sociology. There was also 
a clear differentiation, still prevalent today, between mental health problems 
which arose from organic or physical/neurological causes, such as dementia, 
and those which arise from functional causes, such as depression, relating to 
the psyche. Abbott suggests that this originates from the overlapping 
jurisdictions of psychiatrists and neurologists, where agreement was reached 
that neurologists would concentrate on organic problems and psychiatrists 
would concentrate on those with functional difficulties. This jurisdictional 
divide was, of course, simplistic and it reinforced the Cartesian mind/ body 
split, which is still prevalent in the delivery of healthcare today in the UK. 
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Reflecting on whether there is an individual versus a social perspective in 
IAPT, I find that it is very individually focussed. Therapy is seen as a way of 
helping people manage their problems more constructively, including 
supporting them in (to) employment. Its social impact is through the 
aggregated results from individual therapy on the economy and therefore on 
society as a whole.  
 
The influence of Freud? 
 
Abbott suggests that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, which took into account 
basic drives, affect and intellect, offered a “more rigorous and consistent” 
(1988: 305) approach to understanding personal problems, emphasising the 
importance of professional inference. Elias ( Goudsblom & Mennell 1998: 
77), who trained as a group analyst, was respectful of Freud, but he was 
critical of Freud in not considering the relationship of the id, ego and super-
ego within the person and between individuals. He also criticised his 
‘ahistoric’ perspective that ignored the long civilising process of mankind, 
during the course of which “the wall of forgetfulness, separating libidinal 
drives and consciousness or reflection has become harder and more 
impermeable” (1934: 64). Elias therefore felt that Freud’s approach was an 
individualistic one that took insufficient account of the social development of 
sexual and social norms. 
 
In his early years, according to Flyvbjerg (2001), Freud was optimistic that 
psychology would become a natural science, be measurable and “free from 
contradiction”. In later years, he became more sceptical, commenting “mental 
events seem to be immeasurable and probably always will be so” (2001: 26-
27). 
 
Abbott observes that “Freud himself saw no reason why therapists had to be 
physicians, and only the violent opposition of American psychiatrists 
prevented the International Association from following Freud’s policy” 
(1988: 307). Here we see an early suggestion that (psychodynamic) therapy 
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could be carried out by a wider group of professions or therapists. In contrast, 
it is clear that Starr felt that this was a threat to the power base of doctors, 
agreeing with Rabinow, who described the impact of Freud as follows 
 
To the doctor, Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had 
set up within confinement. He did deliver the patient from the 
existence of the asylum within which his “liberators” had alienated 
him; but he did not deliver him from what was essential to this 
existence; he regrouped its powers, extended them to the maximum 
by uniting them in the doctor’s hands; he created the psychoanalytical 
situation where, by an inspired short circuit, alienation becomes 
disalienating because, in the doctor, it becomes a subject. (1984: 165) 
 
What accounts for this discrepancy of views? Was Freud more interested in 
the patient-therapist relationship and power differentials within that as an 
integral part of the transference process with the patient, rather than on the 
professional status of doctor?  Starr touches on this when he suggests that the 
reasons that medicine gained such power over the public was because it 
sought to link its area of competence with science but more importantly, that 
the professional could diagnose and re-interpret for the individual the 
meaning of their needs. 
 
By shaping the patient’s understanding of their own experience, 
physicians create the authority under which their advice seems 
appropriate. (1982: 14) 
 
Until the 1960’s, psychiatrists in the US and the UK controlled the 
development of the profession of psychiatry, as well as that of nurses, social 
workers and psychologists. Although other professions were keen to develop 
as psychotherapists, as Abbott observes: 
 
If Freudianism was the only legitimate psychotherapy and only 
doctors could be Freudian analysts, and personal psychotherapy was 
necessary for work with personal problems, then psychiatrists had 
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absolute control both of jurisdiction and knowledge system. (1988: 
307-8) 
 
This ensured that neither social workers nor psychologists could practise 
unless under medical supervision and were in subordinate positions. This has 
been changing, but it has left its mark on current power configurations of 
therapists nationally. 
 
The importance of professional inference 
 
Abbott explores how professional jurisdictions get defined. Borrowing the 
metaphor from medicine and applying to all professions, he suggests that 
professions get linked to the tasks they undertake by the use of diagnosis, 
inference and treatment.  
 
Diagnosis and treatment are mediating acts: diagnosis takes 
information into the professional knowledge system and treatment 
brings instruction back out of it. Inference, by contrast, is a purely 
professional act. (Ibid.: 40) 
 
Inference is the mystery ingredient of professionalism. 
 
Professional thinking resembles chess. The opening diagnosis is often 
clear, even formulaic. So also is the endgame of treatment. The 
middle game, however, relates professional knowledge, client 
characteristics, and chance in ways that are often obscure. (Ibid.: 48) 
 
If there is too little inference required and hence a transparent link between 
diagnosis and treatment, he suggests this makes the profession vulnerable to 
others challenging its’ jurisdiction, perceiving they could do it just as well. 
On the other hand, if most of the work is idiosyncratic and based on 
inference, it will not be persuasive to the public. Psychologists prefer to 
describe inference or the interpretative process as formulation. All 
professions have a tendency to assess the patient according to their own 
58 
 
classification system and conceptual framework, as Elias pointed out above 
(1998: 78). Abbott’s view is that the strongest reason for Freud’s success was 
that his approach to professional inference was more complex and internally 
coherent. 
 
The issue of assessment is a much debated one in mental health, including 
IAPT. Screening by PWPs (the least qualified practitioners) is part of the 
stepped care model to manage demand through protocols. Many services 
have not set up this system and use experienced staff instead. Although 
intuitively this seems to make sense, the results do not bear out the 
superiority of an expert assessment. Most professionals assess using their 
own frame of reference and do not necessarily accept the views of colleagues. 
In relation to doctors, Craddock (2008), in a gesture from disaffected 
psychiatrists, railing against the modernisation of professional working 
practice, wrote ‘(w)e should seek to minimise the unhelpful influences of 
political idealism’ (2008: 7). He asserts that psychiatrists need to see 
everyone referred in order to carry out a ‘thorough, broad based assessment’. 
This is highly impractical, but the article has been a rallying call to some 
psychiatrists and is framed very much as the insider/ established order versus 
the outsider groups of other professions, managers and policy makers. 
 
Reflection: The Relevance of the Medical Profession to the Development 
of IAPT 
 
It would seem, then, that the ideology of the profession of medicine, in 
relation to mental ill health, has been developing for over 300 years. Its 
influence arose through its social position which conferred high status on the 
role and title. It is interesting that this statutory role has continued, although 
its rationale has now been overtaken by its links with science, even though 
evidence of efficacy remains variable. 
 
In secondary mental health care, the role of the doctor, although being 
challenged by other professionals and managers, remains dominant as I still 
see on a regular basis. Mental health policy is clinically led by a psychiatrist, 
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which forms the context for IAPT. There is no psychiatrist, however, within 
PMG. Abe, the GP on the group, is a doctor but is also one of the outsider 
NAs, because, I suggest, he is a generalist rather than a specialist, without a 
specific evidence base. So, although psychiatry has had a profound influence 
on the development of psychotherapy, it has now bowed out of the field of 
common mental health problems in the UK. I want therefore to consider the 
rise of other professions and their importance in relation to IAPT. 
 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE EMERGING INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
The explosion of demand for therapy in the 1960’s was due to political, 
educational and pragmatic factors. The social move to close mental 
institutions and the development of psychotropic medication led to a shift in 
service models and professional roles. In the US, psychologists and social 
workers gained independent status and psychiatrists lost their grip of this 
jurisdiction, shifting to more biological and psychopharmacological 
jurisdictions. This latter movement was reflected in the UK. 
 
Psychologists developed their professional profile initially through 
developing and using intelligence tests in World War 1. They continued to 
build on this, and personality testing, by expanding their knowledge and 
evidence base through academic research. This work focussed on 
experimental psychology and appeared to have the unexpected effect of 
reducing the amount of research being carried out on clinical research 
including psychotherapy and pharmacology. Clinical and other applied 
psychology roles developed in the latter part of the 20
th
 century. 
Experimental psychology, concentrating on research, has sought to measure, 
manipulate and predict behaviour, and has had a longer pedigree and more 
prestige than applied psychology until recently. By building their scientific 
credentials, although at that point it did not extend to the efficacy of 
therapeutic practice, psychologists began incorporating a “scientist 
practitioner” specialism into their jurisdiction. This subsequently played out 
in the development and evaluation of behavioural and then cognitive 
behavioural therapies. 
60 
 
I recall, training as a psychologist in the 1970’s, being imbued with a strong 
sense of being superior to nurses, occupational therapists and social workers 
and being competitive with psychiatrists. At that time the qualification was a 
Masters level degree; but in the 1990’s the training of clinical psychologists 
became a doctorate. 
 
Clinical psychologists became part of a powerful elite ‘us’ group with 
the title of doctor… Doctoral status also helped to identify us as a 
group distinct from counsellors and psychotherapists. Counsellors and 
psychotherapists are considered ‘other’. Our superior status has 
become an important aspect of our professional 
identity…Furthermore, achieving doctoral status has strengthened our 
power base vis-à-vis our other main rivals, psychiatrists… This has 
been a crowning achievement for the profession. (Hester O’Connor, 
2005: 110) 
 
So it is only fifteen years since psychologists could legitimately feel 
themselves equal to doctors based on their title and on their research 
expertise. Furthermore, they have led a shift away from psychoanalytic 
approaches to therapy and towards one that lends itself to systematic 
evaluation based on observable and measurable phenomena. 
 
CBT and its challenge for the profession of psychology 
 
CBT was developed in the late 1970’s through merging behaviour therapy 
and cognitive therapy (Gilbert, 2009) and was taken up because 
 
...it had two key strengths. In part because of opposition from 
psychodynamic and other approaches that were contemptuous of its 
apparent simplicity and “conscious mind focus”, it needed to prove its 
value with outcome research, and so strove to do so. Second, it was 
adopted by many clinical psychologists who brought their ”science” 
to the study of psychological processes in psychopathology, and over 
the years welded psychological science into CBT. However, clinical 
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psychology commitment to CBT has been both a strength and a 
problem - a problem because...CBT is a model for therapy, not a 
science of mind or a service model. (2009: 400) 
 
The latter is a real dilemma for psychologists now, in relation to IAPT. From 
a professional perspective, they are exploiting the opportunity provided by a 
national programme to enable them to lead service developments and hence 
enhance their professional status. On the other hand, this involvement in 
IAPT can imply that they are solely defined by a therapist role and by a CBT 
perspective within that. This caused a split in the profession from the outset, 
which still persists. 
 
In articles in The Psychologist (2009), Gilbert, Marzillier and Hall criticise 
IAPT for focussing on CBT. They seek to emphasise the complexity and the 
messy nature of clinical practice and express their concern that an overly 
simplistic message of IAPT will be received by commissioners and the 
public, which might promote a reductionist view of causal factors and 
ensuing interventions. They are also concerned that there is now too heavy an 
emphasis on one to one individual therapy with a tendency to locate the 
problem within the individual and effectively reinvent the medical model. 
This ignores the fact that there is good evidence that poor mental health is 
linked to poverty and that interventions may be more appropriate with 
communities rather than with individuals. White (2009), for example, 
working in the most deprived areas of Glasgow, has identified that large 
proportions of people in that community, when asked, do not rate themselves 
as depressed (even though they may be unemployed, in poor housing and in 
bad health), as this is what they have always known. Explicitly he says  
 
...the assumption that mental health problems are exclusively 
attributes of the person (‘symptoms’ in the language of medicine) and 
that individuals can overcome their problems (‘get better’) needs to be 
challenged. (2009: 406) 
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This has echoes of the emergence of psychiatry 100 years ago and the 
comments of Washington Gladden (1988: 293). Here, we need to consider 
the breadth of the knowledge base and scope of clinical psychology practice 
as being ‘bio-psycho-social’. Psychologists have made a great deal of the 
importance of social influences on behaviour and have compared themselves 
favourably with psychiatrists, whom they often caricature as operating on a 
medical model, looking within the person for the source of the problem, often 
for a biological cause which will respond to medication. 
 
Nevertheless, psychologists are themselves positivists; consider this 
definition. 
Clinical psychologists tend to define their profession in terms of 
(a) the basic science of psychology and (b) its application to the 
understanding and resolution of human problems. The clinical 
psychologist is first and foremost an ‘applied scientist’ or 
‘scientist-practitioner’ who seeks to use scientific knowledge to a 
beneficial end. (Marzillier & Hall, 1999: 9) 
 
The cognitivist paradigm relies on an assumption that in order for evidence to 
have value it must be hypothesis-driven and empirically testable. Gilbert 
expresses his view that the profession of clinical psychology has 
 
...springboarded from CBT and (is) developing sophisticated models 
of the mind, combining various aspects of psychodynamic theory 
with a better understanding of non- conscious processing. We are 
some way from an integrated science of mind, psychopathology and 
psychotherapy, but clinical psychology will be fundamental to 
moving us in that direction-provided we stay evidence based. (2009: 
401) 
 
Psychologists clearly see themselves as leading the way in developing 
evidence based psychological therapies. This is the position that Derek takes 
up in PMG and IAPT. 
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COUNSELLORS AND PSYCHOTHERAPISTS – A DIVERSE 
PROFESSION?  
 
Abbott (1988) says very little about the general development of counsellors 
and psychotherapists. He implies that counsellors grew from the clergy as 
they developed their pastoral role and that psychotherapists were drawn from 
the traditional professions, including social work and psychology. 
 
In England currently, there are more than 30,000 counsellors and 
psychotherapists. They mainly fund their own training, have varied 
qualifications and rates of pay, their conceptual frameworks are very diverse 
and they have a number of professional bodies which offer voluntary 
registration. There is a lot of infighting between the different groups, 
evidenced by the debate in 2008 on the subject of professional regulation 
(Sunday Telegraph: 2008: 3-4), the boundaries between counselling and 
psychotherapy, their protected titles and standards of proficiency. 
Counsellors are mostly employed in primary care and are valued by GPs 
because of their ready accessibility. Psychotherapists work more in specialist 
mental health trusts. To a large degree, both groups work in private practice. 
 
This diversity and lack of cohesion has caused both groups to struggle for a 
professional profile in the NHS. The lack of research into the efficacy of their 
modalities has resulted in a paucity of evidence, which in turn has led to 
NICE, largely, not recommending their therapies. All in all, with the 
introduction of IAPT, with its national profile and CBT focus, counsellors 
and psychotherapists have felt disaffected and excluded from dialogue and 
development. This is the constituency that Jack represents. I find myself 
wondering: are these groups of people members of a single profession? It 
does not seem like it. The way that Derek and Ricky describe them is often 
pejorative. Out there, in practice, counsellors have been asked to undertake 
CBT training, which some have done, but not always willingly. In other 
areas, counselling services have been decommissioned, resulting in 
unemployment and a feeling of being devalued. Their professional identity is 
not highly valued, I would suggest, because of the lack of evidence of 
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efficacy of their treatment and the lack of social status that they have had 
historically. 
 
PROFESSIONALISM AND ITS MEANING FOR MANAGERS 
 
So far, I have focussed on clinical professions: doctors, psychologists and 
therapists, but managers as professionals are important in IAPT and PMG. 
Professionals claim a body of knowledge and skills, but also usually a set of 
ethics and values to underpin their practice. This is the basis of the argument 
put forward by Khurana (2007) in his analysis of the rise of managers as a 
profession. 
 
By the end of the 19
th
 century, with the growth of larger organisations, a new 
management role emerged, requiring different sets of skills to lead and co-
ordinate processes. However, “managers were controversial or, at the very 
least, members of a new and unfamiliar economic and social group whose 
role required explanation” (ibid.: 3). In order to enhance the skills of 
managers and the prestige of business, employers made alliances with 
universities and established business schools for the first time. The 
subsequent professionalization of managers ensued for sixty years until the 
1950s. Khurana suggests that this began to be eroded as the role of the 
manager as a professional, looking after the interests of the business and its 
employees, was replaced by the entrepreneur, who could maximise profits for 
shareholders, irrespective of what implications this may have for employees’ 
lives, such as through mergers. The charismatic CEO began to be seen as 
only able to be recruited and retained if high personal rewards were offered. 
No assumptions were made that such people would have loyalty to their 
organisation nor have an interest in its long term future. In Khurana’s view 
this constituted managers moving “from higher aims to hired hands”. In his 
view of the world, he appears to assume that being a professional is a good 
thing in its own right, specifically having motivation beyond self-interest, in 
having a “calling” for an organisation. 
 
Starr describes the tensions between professionalism and rule of the market: 
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The ideal of the market presumes the “sovereignty” of consumer 
choices; the ideal of a profession calls for the sovereignty of its 
members’ independent, authoritative judgement. A professional who 
yields too much to the demands of the client violates an essential 
article of the professional code: Quacks, as Everett Hughes once 
defined them, are practitioners who continue to please their customers 
but not their colleagues. (1982: 23). 
 
I find this a surprising assertion. Perhaps it relates to the slightly confused 
notion in the NHS, that patients are also customers. The use of market 
principles in the NHS in encouraging competition between providers has 
been a means of modernisation over the last 20 years. In the NHS, though, 
people are not customers because their treatment is free. Although I would 
argue this is a good thing, it means they have no purchasing power, which is 
what drives market and provider behaviour change. Professionals almost 
universally are now direct employees of the NHS and are therefore subject to 
organisational constraints. This is different from the US, where health-care is 
funded through private insurance and where the patient may be more of a 
customer; however the vast majority of doctors are self-employed and exert 
more professional influence. The different cultures of the two countries 
appear to result in the differing status of doctors in those societies. Doctors 
and pharmaceutical organisations have more power and authority in the US, 
which has resulted in strong control of non-medical interventions such as 
CBT. 
 
Management as a profession is clearly taken for granted in the NHS. There 
are organisations for managers, bespoke training that recruits high flyers, and 
a weekly national magazine covering policy, politics, job adverts and gossip. 
But until 1989, there were no such roles as general managers, only 
administrators, who worked to support matrons and medical superintendants. 
The change to adopt general management was driven by the government at 
the time, which wanted to make better use of resources and to challenge the 
traditional power of the medical profession. Many professionals saw this 
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initiative as wresting power from them and so it is hardly surprising that this 
was seen as an overt challenge by them. There has been, since that time, a 
clear split between what is characteristically described as management versus 
clinician perspectives.  
 
Clinicians as managers 
 
There has been a recent policy imperative to attract senior professionals, 
doctors in particular, into clinical leadership roles, through the Darzi “Next 
Stage Review”, which I mention in project one. Corrigan (2009), a former 
advisor to Number 10, wrote that some doctors were arguing against this 
 
... based on the belief that practising medicine revolves around the 
autonomy of the doctor. The core of this model is that doctors take 
decisions and stand by them. Therefore any doctor seeking to lead 
another doctor essentially undermines that autonomy and needs to be 
resisted....Good leadership needs good followership…But following 
does give up something to the leader who is carrying out leadership at 
that time....And if medical school teaches doctors that they are or 
should be in charge of their practice, this is a poor start for the 
development of followership. (2009: 22)  
 
This statement is interesting as it highlights one of the difficulties with how 
Kant’s (1790) thinking has been interpreted. As Griffin (2002) states  
 
Kant resolved and “eliminated” the paradox of determinism and 
autonomy by creating the “both...and” way of thinking which is at the 
very core of systems thinking. (2002: 91)  
 
In other words, it is paradoxical that individuals can be construed as having 
the freedom or autonomy to make their decisions whilst also being 
determined by the system in which they operate. Kant suggested that we 
think of nature ‘as if’ it were a system about which we could hypothesise. 
Unfortunately this has been taken up in systems theory as though the model is 
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reality itself and can be applied to human interaction. This is the basis of the 
critique of systems thinking in Stacey’s (2005) work on complex responsive 
processes. If one person is taking a leadership role, others should follow; but 
we know that does not necessarily happen and hence the dilemma faced by 
the government on the professional resistance of doctors. There is a clear 
intention in the NHS, which I have shared, to seek consensus and thus 
achieve an ideal service; a feeling that if only some professionals would 
embrace the vision (and therefore tow the line) that services for patients 
would be improved. Leaders are intended to challenge practice, so conflict is 
inevitable, but with the intention of achieving harmony. Mead (1923: 238) 
described this as fooling ourselves with ‘hopelessly ideal’ illusions of being 
in the right. Identity is a powerful characteristic of being a professional, 
which is at the crux of the protectionism of professional boundaries or 
jurisdictions. The struggle between and within professions can be seen clearly 
in the development of professions delivering mental health care generally and 
in delivering psychological therapies more specifically. Although IAPT is a 
newcomer to the scene, it is entering a variety of practices and beliefs at a 
local level, where professional identities are being challenged. We are seeing 
emerge, unsurprisingly, a variety configurations of professionals and 
practices, not all of which are judged, centrally, to be appropriate. 
 
The development of new and enhanced roles in IAPT (the PWP and High 
Intensity therapist) has been a significant gesture to the existing professional 
workforce. It has caused positive reactions (investment in psychological 
interventions) and negative reactions (only CBT). A way through the 
professional rivalries has been sought through the use of competences to 
underpin practice. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETENCE OVER PROFESSION 
 
I should say, at this point, that I have always found it sensible, intellectually, 
to consider competences as a building block for practice. It seems obvious 
that people should be clear about what they need to do, based on specific 
knowledge, with a means of assessing whether they are able to practise 
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according to these standards; this is the essence of the Sector Skills Council’s 
National Occupational Standards (NOS). In practice, however, I have usually 
found them too detailed and overly complicated to engage with. Skills for 
Health, which produces competences in the UK health sector, is keen to 
develop web based tools to assist people to use NOS to develop job 
descriptions, education and training and career frameworks for psychological 
therapists. In my previous role, I tried to devise an approach to working with 
multidisciplinary teams to help them review their practice, based on the needs 
of the people using their service (CCTA) and I had initially tried to use NOS 
tools to help teams to review their competences. It proved too difficult a task 
and I decided instead to look at capabilities which were broader and easier for 
teams to engage with. There is no consensus on these distinctions; however, 
Fraser and Greenhalgh (2001) distinguish the two as 
 
Competence - what individuals know or are able to do in terms of 
knowledge, skills and attitude. 
Capability - extent to which individuals can adapt to change, generate 
new knowledge, and continue to improve their performance. (2001: 
799) 
 
The World Health Organisation (1988) described competence as something 
that 
...requires knowledge, appropriate attitudes and observable 
mechanical or intellectual skills which, together, account for the 
ability to deliver a specified professional service. (1988:2) 
 
Assumptions behind competences are that learning is the activity of separate 
individuals, there are measurable outcomes of learning, and there are 
minimum standards which define what all practitioners should achieve. They 
belong to a technical rationalist approach to teaching and learning. 
Distinctions between competences and capabilities have their roots in the 
development of specialisms: the mechanistic and the discretionary. The first 
can be reduced to a set of steps that need little training or knowledge, the 
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second requires not only a body of knowledge but also judgement to change 
practice, informed by that knowledge in the face of uncertainties.  
 
In IAPT, competences have been used to develop national curricula for both 
high and low intensity CBT training, where there is a heavy emphasis on 
skills in practice that are enacted and evaluated on video by raters. Some 
people with previous professional backgrounds are considered less easy to 
teach than others without a professional background. It is postulated that this 
is because of the differing conceptual frameworks or mental models that they 
bring to the learning process. Video ratings have shown less experienced 
students doing better than experienced practitioners. 
 
This raises an important issue about human learning. Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) developed their five step learning model from novice to expert. 
Flyvbjerg (2001) discussing this, quoted a fascinating example of six people 
administering Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) to victims, where five 
out of the six were inexperienced trainees, and only one an experienced 
practitioner. Videos were shown to three groups of subjects: experienced 
practitioners, students and teachers of life saving techniques. The subjects 
were asked who they would prefer to resuscitate them; 90% of the 
experienced subjects chose the experienced paramedic in the film, 50% of the 
students and only 30% of trainers picked correctly. The trainers’ concept was 
that good CPR was about following the rules, which they could more easily 
observe in the trainees. The expert had gone beyond rule based behaviour and 
made, in what Dreyfus argues, a qualitative jump from the first three to the 
fourth and fifth levels of practice. Unfortunately, this proficient and expert 
practice is not easily measurable, indeed Dreyfus argues that ‘(e)xisting 
research provides no evidence that intuition and judgement can be 
externalised into rules and explanations, which, if followed, lead to the same 
result as intuitive behaviour’ (1986: 21). I take this to mean that competences 
cannot assist training beyond the level three ‘competent practitioner’ 
category; all first three levels being based on calculative rationality. Experts 
and proficient performers act without thinking and hence work intuitively 
with a level of virtuosity. This is perhaps a way of thinking about what 
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defines an expert professional; someone who can act into the unknown, 
modify their practice depending on the context and exercise ‘clinical 
judgement’. The latter is always acknowledged as important, but it is 
uncomfortable as it is less easy to identify and categorise into competences. 
This has been taken up as ’metacompetences,’ in the production of 
competences for CBT (Roth & Pilling, 2007).  
 
I now feel I am calling into question this predisposition to value 
competences. My view has been that they offer a different way of describing 
the workforce, being based on what professionals do rather than what they 
are called. I have, however, found myself becoming concerned that there 
seems to be an increasing reliance on them in workforce terms. Having said 
that, I do not think we would have achieved what we have so far in IAPT 
without clear guidance on training and practice, based on competences. 
 
REFLECTION ON TAKING UP PROFESSIONALISM IN MY 
CAREER 
 
In thinking about professionalism through my career, I have tended to focus 
on the professions of clinicians and not of managers. I have not considered 
myself to be a professional manager nor have I sought training or read much 
management literature. This lack of building a knowledge base to support my 
practice in management positions for twenty five years suggests to me that I 
tacitly favour experience and knowledge in practice rather than academic 
credentials. I also wonder whether, having openly eschewed being defined as 
a clinical psychologist, I have, nevertheless, used the scientist practitioner 
framework of my psychology training as my way of viewing organisational 
change. Khurana describes the content of MBAs as drawing on a wide range 
of other professions and disciplines, which of itself weakens its jurisdiction. I 
am coming to the view that this has been influencing my views of different 
professions and of PMG now. Having moved from an executive role in 2001 
to a workforce role, for which I have no management qualifications, I have 
gained experience and good outcomes. It seems to me that the systemic 
approach that I have absorbed in working in NHS management, together with 
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my affiliation with a scientific perspective as a clinical psychologist, has led 
to my difficulty in critiquing the IAPT programme in PMG: professional 
clinical and academic expertise is what is clearly valued by key players. I 
agree with having clarity of purpose, outcome measurement, and of defining 
the workforce in terms of competences instead of professional labels. 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PMG 
 
The scientific basis of psychology as a profession has profoundly influenced 
how the IAPT programme has been constructed and implemented, even 
though there are intra professional concerns about the interpretation and use 
of evidence. Having trained in clinical psychology, in common with many of 
my IAPT colleagues, I have been acculturated to the value of being a scientist 
practitioner. Although I worked in a radical behavioural tradition that 
disavowed cognitive considerations at that time, it nevertheless was drawn 
from the same positivistic perspective. This, together with the highly 
focussed managerial perspective which is target driven and imbued in 
systems thinking, makes it is hardly surprising that the dominant discourse is 
one which results in treating organisations, groups and therapeutic 
relationships as if they were biological phenomena. 
 
From a complex responsive processes perspective, attention is paid to 
experience (Stacey & Griffin, 2005: 22). Research begins with a process of 
starting to notice experience in an exploratory manner to address meaning 
and is therefore not hypothesis driven. This perspective does not seek to 
predict behaviour but accepts that the future arises as continuity with 
potential transformation. I find this a persuasive perspective and I am 
convinced that the IAPT model is too rigid to survive the coming changes in 
funding and organisation. The forces at work in local organisations and 
professional practice will cause mutations. Furthermore, the limitations of 
NICE recommended treatments and the assumptions about science, the 
evidence base and its transference to human interactions is where I feel least 
comfortable and will explore further in project three. 
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Will the balance of power in PMG change? 
 
I can see now that IAPT has been developed in a rational manner to remove 
as much uncertainty as possible about how to train the workforce. It has, 
therefore, focused on the need for clear curricula, competences, learning 
materials, qualifications and now course accreditation to maximise 
replicability. It has not been possible to be as prescriptive about services as 
they partially existed before and it is this area where there has been the most 
diversity. Performance management, in the form of rates of people seen and 
outcomes of numbers recovering, together with data on costs, has been the 
way that the programme has been monitored. When I joined the programme 
at its inception I was curious at the ‘bubble’ nature of it, in that the model 
was conceived of and implemented as though arriving on virgin ground. I 
have learned that implementing change is a challenging, not to say thankless, 
task. I have viewed this programme as a process of service redesign, 
supported by training. Gerald and Derek have always chosen to portray IAPT 
as a training initiative and as a result I been drawn into the remorseless 
prescription of education and training. The production of new workers 
without a clear understanding of how they will fit into existing service 
configurations and be sustained in the long term is a huge risk. Nevertheless, 
letting a thousand flowers bloom, which has hitherto been the process, has 
led to hugely inequitable services in England. Adding rigour to the process 
makes sense to me and as part of PMG, I am inevitably drawn into its 
influence. Elias and Scotson (1994 [1965]) commented about the 
compromises that are made in joining a particular group.  
 
The satisfaction of belonging to and representing a powerful and, 
according to one’s emotional equation, uniquely valuable and 
humanly superior group is functionally bound up with its members’ 
willingness to submit to the obligations imposed upon them by 
membership of that group. (1994: xxiii) 
 
Griffin comments: ‘It is astounding that we continue to hold fantasies that 
single persons or small cliques of persons can steer such complexity to 
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achieve targets that they have set in advance’ (2002: 200). Nevertheless, in 
IAPT, there have been successes so although services have not been fully 
replicated, I am left wondering how I would have done things differently. 
 
Ironically, at this time, other evidence based therapies, recommended by 
NICE, are now being taken up, partly in reaction to professional and lay 
dissatisfaction with the single focus on CBT. These are being addressed in 
the same systemic way by defining the underpinning competences to 
distinguish those practitioners from their colleagues, as NICE compliant. In 
entering the middle year of the programme, we are looking to describe what 
IAPT will look like in a “steady state” in 2011, meaning with the full 
implementation of all NICE recommended therapies in a single local service. 
 
But a shift in the balance of power is emerging. The very fact that other 
therapies are being  announced and worked on, that are less tightly defined 
than CBT, has led to a strengthening of Jack’s and my voices. More energy is 
being expended by John on formalising processes to make this a focus for 
PMG. Derek has begun to make approving noises although this is still framed 
entirely on the basis of what NICE says rather than on the importance of 
enhancing relationships with a wider range of professions. Perhaps I also 
need to review how I see conflict, to see that it can produce creativity and to 
see how opportunities can be taken to make things happen more 
constructively. Is it possible, as Elias says, that   
 
(p)eople need to distance themselves from the configuration in which 
they stand as opponents to each other, if they are to see it as it were 
from the outside. But they are scarcely in a position to do this 
sufficiently while the dangers and threats they represent to each other 
in their interdependence are relatively great, and while they 
consequently still perceive and think about their mutual entanglement 
very emotionally. (1978: 166) 
 
Emotions still run high, so there is not yet an obvious time to embark on a 
process that seeks to explore this way of working in PMG. In thinking about 
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the NAs who continue to be constrained, Elias and Scotson’s observation, 
based on the community of Winston Parva, “outsider groups, as long as the 
power differential is great and submission inescapable, emotionally 
experience their power inferiority as a sign of their human inferiority.” (1994 
[1965]: xxvi). Power and the taken for granted views of evidence will 
continue to be major issues facing the group over the coming year I am sure. 
However, if ‘they begin to bite it is a sign that the balance of power is 
changing’ (ibid.: xxv). 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
 
Professionals as I have viewed them, in more traditional mental health 
specialist services in the NHS, have not had a direct influence on IAPT. It is 
more subtle than that. The long development of the status and power of the 
doctor and of the psychiatrist in particular, has more to do with their social 
position than their evidence based interventions. This perception has been 
altered by scientism in the 19
th
 century and the great strides in physical 
medicine, but this is not been clearly demonstrated in psychological 
medicine. Other professions were constrained by psychiatrists but social 
change in the 1970’s loosened that grip and they stepped forward to provide 
psychological and social approaches; in therapy terms, this jurisdiction came 
to be dominated by psychologists. 
 
The growing importance of scientific evidence, the knowledge and research 
base of professions are increasingly important in the NHS and in IAPT. How 
this evidence is enacted in practice is fundamental to what happens next. 
 
I want to explore evidence more fully in my next project, to consider how this 
relates to practice. 
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PROJECT THREE (2010)  
 
HOW THE DISCOURSE AROUND EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE 
AND IMPLEMENTATION HAS COME TO DOMINATE A 
NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR CHANGE IN THE UK NHS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When the IAPT programme began, it was intended to be a process that would 
be developed co-operatively between national experts and locally informed 
partners. Inevitably, however, it was centrally driven, because of the culture 
of the NHS and because it was explicitly based on the implementation of 
evidence based practice. 
 
NICE was established in 2000 as the mechanism by which the NHS would 
try to ensure that treatments were based on what was proven, through 
research, to work effectively, rather than on what was the custom and 
practice of professional staff. This has since been a key bone of contention: 
does the evidence based on randomised controlled research trials trump that 
of what professionals feel works in practice for them, or indeed, what people 
using services think works for them? A major issue has been that, although 
NICE has published many clinical guidelines of what the evidence says 
works, these have not been taken up by professionals and by doctors in 
particular, in everyday practice. Although these issues apply across the NHS, 
the implications for psychological therapies were not really addressed until 
Gerald, a senior political figure, attempted to link economic policy to that of 
health investment and outcomes. This proved a convincing argument for 
government so IAPT has become one of the first evidence based programmes 
of change in England, with a heavy emphasis on targets, consistent standards, 
measurement and performance monitoring, to provide evidence to justify 
further investment. 
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THE IAPT PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT GROUP IN 2010  
The move to a broader range of NICE recommended therapies in the 
context of increasing local decision making and long term sustainability 
 
The key focus of the IAPT programme in early 2010 is to demonstrate that it 
is achieving the results that it predicted in order to make the argument for the 
continuation of the implementation process. Governance arrangements are 
changing, with funding being devolved to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), local 
commissioning organisations, at the same time as they are preparing to 
address the effects of the economic downturn by making deep cuts in 
expenditure. The Secretary of State announced in December 2009 that IAPT 
should remain an important area which PCTs should invest in to achieve 
equitable access across the country. He also said that there should be an 
increase in the choice of evidence based therapies, beyond CBT, which has 
been the key focus to date in IAPT services.  
 
Derek, an NA, is an international expert in CBT, both as a therapist and as a 
researcher. It is his influence that has impacted on Gerald, who persuaded the 
government to invest in IAPT. He is therefore in a very powerful position. 
The training programme that underpins IAPT has already delivered 1000 new 
CBT practitioners, which means that we are on target to achieve the 3600 
extra therapists if there is no deviation from current investment. As there is a 
risk that there will be such a deviation, with PCTs seeking to find ways of 
reducing expenditure, Derek wants to keep this focus on CBT clear so as not 
to give PCTs an opportunity to evade their commitment and find different 
ways to hit the target. Many of us have sympathy with this and see that there 
is a real risk of what is called in the NHS ‘rebadging’ i.e. calling something 
you have got already something else in order to achieve a government target, 
which can be thought of as ‘gaming’ (Seddon, 2008).  
 
To address these risks, a new policy document had been published (Realising 
the Benefits [RTB]), in which quality standards are outlined to guide 
commissioning in the coming years, including standards for non CBT 
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therapies and the numbers of staff required. I want to summarise some of the 
realities this raises for me and for the programme. 
 
The relative strengths of the non-CBT evidence based therapies 
 
I have taken the lead in addressing how the programme will offer the wider 
range of therapies that should be made available, in collaboration with Brian 
and Jack. Appendix two summarises the therapies for depression, 
recommended by NICE, published in RTB. These were drawn up after a 
great deal of discussion and not a little conflict in the NICE development 
groups (although I was not present and only heard this from Jack, the NA on 
Counselling and Psychotherapy); and discussed in PMG and related IAPT 
meetings.  
 
These additional therapies and the issues they raise for me are as follows: 
 
 Interpersonal Psychotherapy (IPT) is accorded the same level of 
effectiveness as CBT for treatment of depression. The evidence is drawn 
largely from studies carried out in the USA, so there are very few 
practitioners in the UK. IPT therapists are drawn from existing counsellors 
and practitioners. Interestingly, there is little dissent amongst PMG about the 
appropriateness of this therapy, because of the strength of the evidence. 
 Behavioural Couple Therapy is recommended where one partner has 
depression, associated with the partner, who is willing to participate in 
therapy. Jack and I met with senior people from two professional 
organisations that provide couple therapy across the country to explore how 
we could work together. Imagine my surprise to learn that the type of couple 
therapy that they train people for and deliver with clients is not that 
recommended by NICE, which is specific behavioural couple therapy. This 
therapy is based on work in the USA on approaches that were popular in the 
UK in the 1970’s. This is a dilemma then: there are hundreds of therapists 
working across England in ways that the evidence does not (yet) support. 
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Does this mean that they have no effect? Why do they not do what is 
apparently effective? This is the most contentious therapy in PMG. 
 The two remaining therapies are Counselling and Brief Dynamic 
Psychotherapy (BDT). They are recommended, however, only if the client 
has declined CBT, IPT or Behavioural Couple Therapy. Indeed, NICE 
recommends that when discussing options with the client, the therapist should 
point out that Counselling and BDT are less effective, in the interest of 
informed choice. I wonder how this can be conveyed positively to clients? 
 
So the last few months have seen the drawing up of specifications for these 
modalities using the same quality assurance approaches as for CBT: 
competence frameworks; national curricula and training manuals. After a 
tendering process, this work was taken on by the relevant professional bodies 
and experts, who are due to report back in spring 2010. Whilst this work is 
being developed, there are emerging late night emails expressing concern 
from Derek and Ricky about the potential nature of a national curriculum for 
each, stating that they expect the non-CBT therapies to be subject to the same 
rigorous procedures as the high intensity CBT training programme. The CBT 
curriculum was written by people who had experience in training therapists 
for the trials that figured in NICE guidance, which they consider an 
empirically aligned approach. A key concern, then, is that the people 
developing the work will not be appropriate experts in their field, or at least 
not by Derek’s standards. Jack, on the other hand, is involved in the 
development of one of these alternative therapies and is feeling more 
confident and powerful in his role at this time. So, specifying in detail what 
needs to be taught, directly drawn from the research trials, is at the heart of 
what is considered to be evidence based quality standards. 
 
The relative size of the non–CBT workforce 
 
A second issue that has been a topic of debate is the number of non-CBT 
therapists there should be in the broader IAPT service. There is a fear that 
because there are many counsellors already working in local communities 
that this broadening will give licence to ‘rebadge’ them as ‘IAPT compliant’ 
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counsellors. Derek has calculated that only between 8 - 16% of the therapists 
should be non-CBT therapists to cover the additional 4 modalities. This range 
has been derived from an algorithm based on aggregate findings from 
research trials. In defence of this approach, people, who have to negotiate 
with PCT commissioners, are generally very keen to have simple messages 
and clear outcome data as, increasingly, this is all that commissioners will be 
convinced by. This reflects the target culture of the NHS and the drive for 
commissioners to buy only services that are recommended to work. 
 
Articulating the arguments for sustainability 
 
As PMG struggles with these new therapies, it is also focussed on how the 
services and workforce will be sustained after 2011, when the national 
programme will be wound up. Much of this will depend on whether the 
predicted outcomes will have been achieved and therefore provide evidence 
that will support future investment. The key outcomes required are: 
 
1. 900,000 additional people will access therapy than would otherwise 
have done so: this figure is based on a set of assumptions that a maximum of 
25% of the population in need will require services at any one time. In order 
to contextualise this, the funding for IAPT was expected to cover about 8% 
of the population. There is therefore a large gap between prevalence 
(therefore potential need) and funded services, but I am left wondering about 
the legitimacy of these assumptions. 
 
2. Improved equity of access: currently there is a post code lottery and 
gaps for groups in terms of economic status, culture, ethnicity, age and so on. 
There are variable waiting times, although these are rarely more than two 
months, much shorter than other psychological therapy waiting times in the 
NHS, which can be more than a year. The RTB recommends the use of 
locally agreed waiting time quality standards (notice here the language is 
changing from ‘target’). NAs are ambivalent about this and wary that this 
could lead to ‘gaming’. 
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3. 50% of those receiving therapy should recover: this figure has been 
set, based on what Derek and Ricky say should be expected from the research 
trials. Key performance data are presented to PMG regularly; at a recent 
meeting, the recovery figures were reported as anything from -6% to 52%. 
How can this be so? The collection of data is through the use of rating scales 
at every session in order to capture those people who drop out before the 
agreed/anticipated number of contacts. A minimum number of two contacts 
are therefore required to feed the Key Performance Indicator for change/ 
recovery. The data quality is undoubtedly an issue; there may also be an issue 
that the measures are not meaningful to some therapists and therefore not 
completed with care. So, how data converts into evidence to feed back to 
commissioners is crucial for IAPT.  
 
4. An independent evaluation of the two demonstration sites is due to be 
completed in 2010. An early issue identified, which interests me, is that the 
changes in symptoms (or recovery) as measured by rating scales, which are 
the key guide for the therapist, are not always reflective of the views of the 
client. So, a drop of several points on the PHQ9 (the rating scale for 
depression) would not necessarily reflect that a person had not achieved one 
of their personal objectives, which was contributing to their mental distress. 
The issue then arises, whose evidence is important?  
 
Finally, at a recent meeting of PMG, Abe (NA for Primary Care) raised the 
issue of NICE guidance on Collaborative Care, which needs to be addressed. 
Ricky is unhappy with the NICE recommendation as it pre-empts his research 
on the concept in the UK, which is as yet two years away from publication. It 
was commented that it was politically necessary to address this and after all, 
science is iterative. This struck me as the only comment at PMG that opened 
up a potential conversation about uncertainty and the prevailing dogmatism 
about science. 
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REFLECTION ON THE THEMES OF EVIDENCE 
My initial focus for this project is on the nature of the evidence for CBT as 
the privileged therapy over others and the assumptions underpinning research 
on outcomes. To assist me in this, I am drawing on the work of Roth and 
Fonagy (2005), What Works for Whom?, which considers the issues of 
research methodology as well as the specifics of what is recommended in the 
literature for different groups. I will be considering the first aspect of their 
work and seeking to critique assumptions they make that are taken for 
granted in the scientific and clinical psychology communities. 
 
I have now more fully realised that evidence in IAPT is not solely concerned 
with academic research, but is also about data and measurement in the NHS 
management culture. I will therefore consider this issue initially through the 
work of Seddon (2008), Systems Thinking in the Public Sector, where he 
criticises government targets and appears to be suggesting that the solution is 
to be found in systems thinking. Although this may have much to offer and 
resonates with some aspects of complex responsive processes, I want to 
comment on his manifesto from this latter perspective. 
 
It is important for me to consider the fundamental assumptions behind both 
elements of evidence; concerning science and what it can tell us through 
research. Alvesson and Sköldberg state that 
 
(t)raditionally research has been conceived as the creation of true, 
objective knowledge, following a scientific method. From what 
appears or is presented as data, facts, the unequivocal imprints of 
‘reality’, it is possible to acquire a reasonably adequate basis for 
empirically grounded conclusions and, as a next step, for 
generalisations and theory building. (2009: 1) 
 
It is a feature of being human to try to understand and explain what goes on 
around us, to seek to gain some certainty or predict what may happen in the 
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future. Elias (1978) posits that theological and metaphysical modes of 
thought, which predated scientific interpretations, were taken as self-evident 
in their time, for instance a belief that the Earth rested motionless at the 
centre of the universe. We are now in a time where people take for granted 
assumptions about natural science in their everyday and professional lives. 
He summarises this as follows 
 
...scientific, ‘rational’ modes of thought prove themselves valid again 
and again in empirical research and in practical applications to the 
technicalities of everyday life. They seem so unmistakably the ‘right’ 
modes of thought that it must seem to the individual that they were a 
gift from nature, in the form of ‘commonsense’ or ‘reason’. (1978: 
44) 
 
He describes Comte as the originator not only of the term ’sociology’ but also 
of the term ‘positivism’; ‘positive’ in his terms was a synonym for 
‘scientific’. Positivism is the philosophy underpinning psychological therapy 
research as outlined next, which seems to be taken for granted in PMG. 
 
THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPIES 
 
Psychologists have been largely responsible for research into psychological 
therapies. Two leading academic applied psychologists, Roth and Fonagy, 
were commissioned by the Department of Health to provide a critical review 
of psychotherapy research, published in 1996 and revised in 2005 as What 
Works for Whom? Interestingly, Roth takes a non–partisan perspective, whilst 
Fonagy is psycho-dynamically rooted as Freud Memorial Professor of 
Psychoanalysis. This balance of backgrounds is reflected in the stance they 
take in their review. I want to address issues raised by their review as they 
relate to assumptions in IAPT. 
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The interface between research and clinical practice  
 
Efficacy as reported in research trials is not the same as clinical effectiveness 
in everyday practice. This is because, in order to demonstrate the impact of 
one intervention over another, research trials need to achieve a high level of 
internal validity. Roth & Fonagy state:  
 
This can be defined as the extent to which a causal relationship can be 
inferred among variables, or where the absence of a relationship 
implies the absence of a cause. If internal validity is low, statistical 
conclusional validity is compromised, and the results of the study 
would be hard to interpret. However, achieving internal validity 
requires the use of techniques rarely seen in everyday practice, 
examples of which would be studying highly selected, diagnostically 
homogenous patient populations; randomising the entry of these 
patients into treatments; and employing extensive monitoring of both 
patients’ progress and the types of therapy used by therapists. All of 
this poses a threat to external validity - the extent to which we can 
infer that the causal relationship can be generalised. (2005: 16-17) 
 
Criteria for efficacy include: 
 
 Replicated demonstration of superiority to a control condition or 
another treatment condition, or a single, high-quality randomised 
control trial 
 The availability of a clear description of the therapeutic method 
(preferably but not necessarily in the form of a treatment manual) of 
sufficient clarity to be usable as the basis for training 
 A clear description of the patient group to whom the treatment was 
applied. (Ibid.: 480) 
 
So, immediately, there is a tension between demonstrating efficacy i.e. some 
certainty about the likely impact of a therapy, and its applicability to natural 
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settings. Here, patients are varied, the range of interventions and monitoring 
is variable, therapists vary in their qualifications, experience and practice, and 
services may impose constraints, for instance on treatment session numbers, 
access to supervision and so on. This is where I feel I need open up 
discussion with Derek and Ricky to explore how they can feel so convinced 
about the rightness of their adherence to NICE in the full knowledge, which 
they will undoubtedly have, of the limitations of the transferability of 
research findings to practice. 
 
Roth and Fonagy also point out that, in seeking to identify homogeneous 
groups as subjects of study, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) is commonly used for classification purposes, as it has high 
reliability. This classifies people by diagnosis and, therefore, tests efficacy of 
treatment against these diagnoses. Where therapies do not identify people by 
diagnosis, such as in Counselling, or where research studies have not 
focussed on treatment for specific symptomatic conditions, the DSM 
diagnostic approach has proved highly problematic and has effectively 
excluded those perspectives from the evidence base. Critics therefore have 
described IAPT as ‘medicalising’ people. In the early days I was rather 
surprised by this accusation and was quick to refute it. On reflection, 
however, it is clear that this methodology, which has been drawn from 
medicine, and which has primacy in NICE, does indeed draw on assumptions 
about physical and biological causality and applies it to psychology. 
Furthermore, the utility of diagnosis must be questioned as it is now well 
established that people with the same initial diagnosis do not have the same 
patterns of outcomes, because the history of the condition and the current 
determinants are not addressed by that diagnosis. Equally, people who may 
not score on DSM, who have ‘sub-threshold’ presentations, are excluded 
even though they may be experiencing high levels of distress. The utility of 
diagnostic labelling for research purposes, therefore, is not reflected in its 
usefuless in clinical practice, where a broader assessment of need and impact 
would be appropriate. Interestingly, Roth & Fonagy commenting on the 
NICE Guideline on Depression (2004) write that: 
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(The diagnosis) ‘depression’ may be too heterogeneous in biological, 
psychological and social terms to enable clarity on which specific 
interventions, for which problem, for which person, and in what 
context, will be effective. (Ibid.: 487) 
 
IAPT’s first year data review, of 140,000 cases, showed that more than 40% 
had missing data on diagnosis, particularly on anxiety related conditions. 
This has led to speculation on whether the measures are insufficiently 
sensitive to pick these up (and there are a number of more condition specific 
measures being recommended to services to ameliorate this problem), 
whether therapists do not feel confident to diagnose or whether the ‘right’ 
people are not being referred. The sample size of this audit is reported to be 
unprecedented in the NHS and therefore a great success, which illustrates the 
huge value attributed to quantitative data by the DH and NHS. 
 
Evidence based practice and practice based evidence: when is evidence 
‘real’ evidence? 
 
NICE draws on research trials on the basis of a hierarchy of evidence. RCTs, 
together with their aggregation in systematic reviews and meta-analyses are 
the gold standard; followed by controlled trials without randomisation and 
experimental single-case designs; cohort studies (in which groups of patients 
are allocated to treatment); case-control studies (where patients with similar 
outcomes are grouped retrospectively to assess outcome differences); then, 
finally, various descriptive studies, professional opinion and expert 
committee reports. However, it is really only RCTs and meta-analyses that 
are considered to be convincing evidence in the scientifically focussed 
psychological community, and it is these that are mainly reported in Roth and 
Fonagy’s review. 
 
Where there is no such gold standard evidence, it is important to distinguish 
between therapies that have been shown to be ineffective and those where 
there is a relative absence of empirical data. The majority of therapies lie in 
the latter category and psychodynamic psychotherapy in particular is under-
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researched according to Roth and Fonagy. They address directly the tension 
in the psychotherapy community. 
 
Many of its practitioners continue to view psychoanalysis as 
incompatible with research, because its focus is on meaning, and 
narrative is not easily reduced to measures of symptoms or suffering 
(e.g. Whittle, 2000). It is easy to appreciate that this approach is less 
easy to manualise, or that adapting technique to conform to the rigor 
of a research trial represents a challenge. (Ibid.: 491) 
 
They go on to say that there are, nevertheless, examples where it has been 
possible to do this, suggesting therefore that there is “no inherent 
discontinuity” between the approach and empirical investigation. They gently 
criticise colleagues who disengage from research by saying “while an 
absence of evidence does not preclude the possibility of efficacy, the 
credibility of a treatment is much reduced if an evidential vacuum reflects the 
reluctance of its practitioners to explore its impact” (ibid.: 491). This 
statement reflects divisions between the cognitivists, the humanists and 
psychoanalysts in their ways of understanding and approach to working with 
people. It also illustrates the taken for granted view that this type of evidence 
has credibility above all. Roth and Fonagy do recognise, however, that there 
are good reasons why RCTs can be impractical, giving an example of 
Personal Construct Therapy, where diagnosis is eschewed, numbers are small 
and the preferred evaluation process is single case studies, using measures 
that detect shifts in process and meaning rather than symptomatic 
functioning. They comment 
 
(i)t follows that a demand that practice be based on evidence would 
be unhelpfully restrictive if that demand equates evidence only with 
randomised trials and neglects to note any specific issues that restrict 
the range of available methodologies. (Ibid.: 492) 
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This is what NICE has done, however, in taking RCTs as their benchmark, 
which has led to the domination of CBT in terms of efficacy in the world of 
psychotherapy. 
 
Translating research into practice 
 
One is tempted to question what real bearing research efficacy can have to 
clinical effectiveness in everyday practice, if the search for clarity of causal 
relationships is itself removing the variables which are present in everyday 
practice. The approach taken in IAPT so far has been to draw on the training 
manuals used in research trials to develop national curricula, thus intending 
to replicate the practice of expert therapists in IAPT training and clinical 
application. This is effectively trying to protocolise practice. It is interesting 
to note that experienced clinicians have commented that, in reviewing their 
practice against these protocols, they find they have deviated from them. The 
question is whether this is a good or a bad thing. Derek is clear that this is a 
bad thing, highlighting a study which looked at therapist variables and 
outcomes of treatment, which concluded that CBT therapists were more 
likely to avoid requiring clients to carry out homework where they were 
hostile. This could be seen as appropriate or as collusion in avoiding conflict. 
Roth and Fonagy comment on this issue and conclude, given the conflicting 
evidence on the subject, that 
 
(i)t needs to be remembered that most clinical practice is much more 
heterogeneous than any manual would credit, and that manuals 
themselves are essentially ideal prototypes that embody the principles 
of complex interventions that have taken many decades to evolve in 
the field. These facts are easily overlooked if the techniques 
embodied in a manual are reified as the way to practise a treatment, 
rather than a way in which it could be practised. Attempting to 
“legislate” the form in which a treatment is delivered runs the risk of 
ossification, and of stifling appropriate creativity. (Ibid.: 495) 
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The national curriculum for CBT has been reified in this way, in my view. It 
is a common complaint in IAPT services that people who present to services 
are not solely exhibiting anxiety and depression, but have other issues too, for 
example, the misuse of alcohol or drugs. This was excluded from eligibility 
criteria for IAPT because there was no research evidence to support 
therapeutic efficacy with people with that dual diagnosis. We therefore see 
the conflict arising again between what can be extracted from scientific 
research and how this appears rarefied from the complexities of people’s 
lives. This is where it is important that local solutions are developed and 
evaluated to develop knowledge and evidence from practice. 
 
Practitioners complain that IAPT’s evidence base is too rigid. Although there 
are obvious grounds for their complaints, this is often an echo of a yearning 
for the past where things were perceived to have been better. But is this so? 
What ‘evidence’ is there of this? Assertions of truths cannot be supported 
without evidence of some sort and it is not credible in my view to suggest 
otherwise. On the whole, the psychotherapy community has been poor at 
recording outcomes and therefore the judgement about what has worked for 
whom has been very subjective and often therapist driven. Clinicians, who 
are experts in their field have a tendency only to read research pertaining to 
their field and to “selectively disregard findings that would require of them 
substantial modification of their mode of work” (ibid.: 496). 
 
IAPT training is based on competences for specific application to anxiety and 
depression. This has the potential disadvantage of not preparing the 
practitioner for people presenting with more complex needs. Roth and 
Fonagy favour an approach that addresses a broader set of metacompetences, 
enabling the practitioner to understand the principles, learn new skills more 
quickly and to adapt techniques to match client need. This is not generally 
favoured by Derek and Ricky and has not translated overtly into IAPT 
practice. This same dilemma presented itself to me when I attended a meeting 
of university course directors who are delivering IAPT trainings. A new 
course lead asked whether she should expose her group of trainee CBT 
therapists to other modalities and to differing protocols or whether she should 
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simply stick to the most accepted CBT protocol. My response was that we 
were not seeking technicians that only know one trick, but they should be 
able to critique the evidence. Another, more experienced course lead, advised 
that it was wiser to stick to one approach so that the trainees become more 
competent and confident and can see positive results more quickly. We all 
found this a very powerful argument and I was left wondering if my criticism 
of the limitations of the evidence base in this project is in danger of throwing 
the practical baby out with the intellectual bathwater! 
 
In concluding this section on what the evidence says works for whom, in 
terms of demonstrated efficacy, it is clear that there are significant 
methodological issues that throw doubt on the replicability of behaviours 
from research trials into everyday clinical practice. Positivism has had many 
critics since the early 19
th
 century and has gone through various formulations 
including logical positivism and later logical empiricism. Its assumptions of 
linear, ‘if-then’ causality, the quantitative approach to establishing observable 
and statistically significant relationships and hence predictiveness are clearly 
exhibited in Roth and Fonagy’s review. In a comparison with qualitative 
methods, Ann Chih Lin comments “Positivists believe that generalisation is 
both the measure and the goal of causal research”, whilst “Interpretativist 
work draws upon notions of credibility and accuracy of description to 
establish validity.” (1998: 169). She argues that both are important: a 
positivist approach which can demonstrate probabilities of outcomes (the 
‘what’) and an interpretative approach that offers a mechanism for testing out 
assumptions about the ‘how’. 
 
The evidence base for psychological therapies is therefore based on 
assumptions drawn from physics and the natural sciences. This has been 
effectively disowned by many sociologists seeking to understand and 
interpret how groups of people in society interact together. Even Comte 
sought to distinguish the applicability of models for social processes from 
those for biology or psychology, and here is the key tension for me: is 
psychology a physical science or a social science? The research evidence 
treats it as the former, but the interaction between two or more people in 
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therapy, for me, means that it is essentially a social process. I will therefore 
turn to Mead for insights. 
 
A DIFFERENT WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THERAPY AS SOCIAL 
INTERACTION 
 
George Herbert Mead offered a different way of thinking about psychology 
and social interaction. “Philosophically, Mead was a pragmatist; 
scientifically, he was a social psychologist”, says Charles Morris in his 
introduction to Mind, Self & Society (1934: ix). He goes on “(t)he terms 
‘social’ and ‘psychologist’ have not long appeared together, nor in company 
with biological categories. Tradition has identified psychology with the study 
of the individual self and mind” (ibid.: xii). Mead himself said “(n)o very 
sharp line can be drawn between social psychology and individual 
psychology”. He went on to herald the important view of how the self 
emerges in the social context. 
 
If we abandon the conception of a substantive soul endowed with the 
self of the individual at birth, then we may regard the development of 
the individual’s self, and of his self-consciousness within the field of 
his experience, as the social psychologist’s special interest. (Ibid.: 1) 
 
This was a long time ago, but the issues that he discussed, continue to be 
relevant. Mead built on areas of agreement with J. B. Watson, who 
established the school of behaviourism, about the importance of behaviour or 
‘conduct’, and addressed areas which he saw as severe limitations in 
behavioural theory. Specifically, he considered that Watson “abstracted the 
individual’s segment of the act from the complete or ‘social’ act” (ibid.: xvi). 
Mead addressed language as a social phenomenon; he considered the private 
world of the individual; he described the ongoing interaction in the stimulus-
response of behaviours; and he asserted that the individual experience is 
crucial and cannot be reduced to physical phenomena. 
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What Mead articulated was the role of the gesture, and the vocal gesture in 
particular. It is the capacity of the human being to take the role of the “other” 
that enables the mind and the self to develop. “Mind....is the internalisation 
within the individual of the social process of communication in which 
meaning emerges” (ibid.: xxii). Moving away from a traditional perspective 
where the individual has primacy, and where mind and sense of self develop 
internally and then impact on others, Mead took the opposite view, which 
 
(s)tarts with an objective social process and works inwards through 
the importation of the social process of communication into the 
individual by the medium of the vocal gesture. (Ibid.: xxii) 
 
Man is therefore essentially a social being, born into ongoing relationships 
with others. His physical and neurological characteristics (the biological ‘I’) 
play into these interactions and enable him to use language symbolically and 
enable him “to be an object to (him) self” (ibid.: xxiii) and hence demonstrate 
consciousness (the ‘me’). This develops as the individual matures into the 
capacity to take what Mead described as the ‘role of the generalised other’ 
(ibid.: xxiv). The person influences and is influenced by his interactions. 
 
Indeed, every action of the individual at either the non-linguistic or 
linguistic levels of communication changes the social structure to 
some degree, slightly for the most part, greatly in the case of the 
genius and the leader. (Ibid.: xxv) 
 
We can see here the process of change and of socialisation of the individual 
so that he is able to reflect and direct his actions in anticipation of responses 
of others. This common activity, Mead described as ‘social universality’ 
(ibid.: xxviii), a synonym for objectivity. 
 
It is for the positivist the most important type of objectivity - some 
would say the only possible type. The individual transcends what is 
given to him alone when through communication he finds that his 
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experience is shared by others, that is, that his experience and the 
experiences of others fall under the same universal. (Ibid.: xxix) 
What is sought in positivistic science is ‘invariance’; a formula; a recipe or a 
rule. This is at the core of what is being sought in the extracted descriptions 
of behaviour from research trials, in IAPT. Charles Taylor (1995), in 
exploring rules, argues that “(w)hat on paper is a set of dictated exchanges 
under certainty, on the ground is lived in suspense and uncertainty” (1995: 
177). Rules, in the IAPT context, can be seen as knowledge translated into 
protocols and competences, which dictate practice in therapy. CBT involves 
the use of schemas to help the person reframe their problems and decide on 
goals. The success or otherwise of the therapy is seen as being mainly to do 
with the competence of the therapist. This could be described as technical 
ability (techne) as distinct from knowledge (episteme) as defined by Aristotle. 
The emphasis, in IAPT training, on competence acquisition is important in 
ensuring that people are clear about what is expected of their practice, until 
they can consolidate their skills and grow in confidence as a result. In 
therapy, however, judgement becomes important as well as technique; Taylor 
takes up Aristotle’s third category, the concept of phronesis. 
The person of real practical wisdom is less marked by the ability to 
formulate rules than by knowing how to act in each particular 
situation. There is a crucial ‘phronetic gap’ between the formula and 
its enactment, and this too is neglected by explanations that give 
primacy to the rule-as-represented. (Ibid.: 177) 
 
Taylor is recognising that rules have their place in helping to describe and 
understand what happens in everyday life, but that these abstractions from 
time and space cannot be seen as the sole causal factors. He appears to share 
Mead’s view that social interaction is circular or ‘asymmetrical’, i.e. that we 
engage with intention with another, but that there is no certainty that 
responses conform to this intention and therefore ongoing adjustment occurs, 
as in therapy. He argues that ‘rules are transformed through practice’ (ibid.: 
178), but states that ‘this reciprocity is what the intellectualist theory leaves 
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out’ (ibid.) and which in his view therefore distorts the whole process of 
understanding. Taylor argues that this has to be ‘embodied’ in our day to day 
practice, drawing on the work of Bourdieu, and concludes “rules can only 
function in our lives along with an inarticulate sense encoded in the body. It 
is this habitus (my italics) that “activates” the rules” (1995: 180). 
 
I take this to mean that knowledge or facts that natural sciences have sought 
to establish and which have been taken to explain social phenomena, have 
been shown to be inadequate in accounting for the way people go about their 
lives in practice. These social interactions are influenced by culture that gives 
meaning to these interactions; this could also be described as the ‘generalised 
other’ in Mead’s terms. What this means for me, in relation to evidence that 
underpins therapy in IAPT, is that currently this is based on an 
intellectualised and abstracted model of human behaviour, which relies on 
therapist behaviour that is protocolised and which could be described as rule 
governed. Deviation from this protocol is seen as poor practice rather than as 
what would be expected in the symbolic interactions that take place in 
therapy, which could lead to new and emerging behaviour. Mead was a 
scientist as well as a philosopher and he supported taking a scientific 
approach. However as a pragmatist, he believed that the value of the 
scientific hypothesis was that it should illuminate people’s real experience. 
For me, this means that evidence should resonate with me and not be 
abstracted to a point of scientific purity, at the expense of what is meaningful 
in practice. 
 
In this section on evidence as it relates to therapy, it is important to flag that 
one of Mead’s major contributions has been to an understanding of how the 
self arises in social interaction. This has informed significantly the 
development of therapeutic practice. Snyder, for instance, a psychotherapist 
working with couples, comments that “Mead perceived the primary aspect of 
human intelligence to be the capacity of the individual to ‘put himself in the 
place of another’ (Mead, 1934: 38). The implications of this for both 
individual and family psychotherapy and, in particular, its relevance to 
empathy and dialogue, are significant” (1994: 84). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Finally, in returning to the imponderable question about whether psychology 
is a natural or social science, it seems to me that there is a continuum of 
interaction between the physical and the social, where self-awareness or 
consciousness arises. Mead addressed how behaviourism could have its place 
in an ongoing process of social interaction. As our technical ability increases 
in the 21
st
 century to enable brain imaging, we can observe the anticipation of 
the brain (by the firing of neurons) in responding to stimuli before we are 
aware of them; illustrating that there is a continuous process in our ongoing 
interactions with others and with ourselves. Fonagy (2004) believes that 
improving understanding of our molecular biology will help in identifying 
biological/genetic vulnerability of children to adverse environmental factors, 
which will enable better targeted preventative interventions as well as 
psychosocial treatments. In this he seems to be seeking to overcome the 
traditional mind/body split and states “(f)uture psychotherapy research must 
entail the removal of the opposition between psychosocial and biological 
perspectives” (ibid.: 358). He even suggests that in the future, outcome 
measurements, as currently used, could be replaced by brain imaging, which 
can currently detect brain changes when two people interact. But this too 
could run the risk of atomising the ongoing process of human interaction if 
taken up in positivistic terms. Nevertheless it demonstrates the permeability 
of thinking that is possible if polarisation of positions can be avoided. I 
conclude, therefore, that it is not sufficient to treat psychological therapy as if 
it were a natural science, subject to efficient causality, with highly predictable 
outcomes. It is important, rather, to consider how it can be most helpful to 
people as it is applied locally. 
 
REFLECTIONS ON IMPLEMENTING IAPT IN A LOCAL SERVICE 
 
In wrestling with these ideas in the abstract, I often feel that I need to 
immerse myself in the daily interactions of people working in IAPT services 
to discuss their experience of the practicalities of local implementation. This 
opportunity arose recently, when a colleague asked me to co-facilitate a team 
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learning process to help them review their practice. I was curious to see how 
far the IAPT model has been taken up as a ‘blueprint’ in their service.  
 
The people in the room were a mix of counsellors and psychotherapists, who 
had been around for a long time, joined recently by newly qualified PWPs 
and High Intensity CBT therapists. When they felt able openly to express 
their views, it emerged that at the core of their conflictual feelings were their 
different ways of conceptualising the needs of their clients from their varied 
professional perspectives. There was no apparent animosity between 
members in the group, but there was strong concern about the complexity of 
the needs of the people entering their service; the narrow nature of the 
training of the new staff (CBT); the inappropriateness of the assessment 
scales; and what ideas they had hatched to reduce access by clients to manage 
their waiting lists. Their way of screening people was clearly not working and 
took up a lot of experienced practitioner time, but they were unwilling to 
support the PWPs to screen, as is recommended by IAPT, which had led to 
them developing long waiting lists. 
 
We talked about the evidence base and the collection of data and I reflected 
to them that there was a difficulty in translating efficacy from research trials 
into clinically effective practice. They fell on this recognition with gratitude. 
Their clinical lead, a consultant psychologist, went so far as to say that, in her 
view, the rating scales were ‘rubbish’. Although I had sympathy with this for 
the reasons outlined in the previous section, I was concerned that this might 
lead to further conflict and variable practice in the group. I found myself in 
an interesting intellectual and emotional position in these discussions. I felt 
more relaxed than I would have done a year ago because I had a better 
understanding both of the research evidence underpinning IAPT and its 
shortcomings and of the potential perverse nature of hitting their targets; I 
was therefore less defensive. However, I was also worried that the semi 
chaotic nature of their service was unlikely to enable them to give the best of 
themselves and hence to help their clients effectively. I felt myself reacting 
against their taken for granted view that the more experienced staff knew 
best. I was, however, also more aware of the Dreyfus ‘expert’ working into 
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the unknown and did not want to disrespect experienced professionals, whilst 
wanting to challenge them to encourage the new workforce. I therefore found 
myself in a paradoxical position. I reflected that Derek would feel no such 
ambivalence had he been there. I was able to confirm to myself that this was 
no blueprint. 
 
EVIDENCE AS IT IS USED IN PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT 
 
I wish now to shift my focus from the nature of evidence drawn from 
research trials to the evidence drawn from data collection and performance 
management of IAPT targets in the NHS. These targets include: hitting 
activity numbers: high targets were set in year one; waiting times: although 
there are no such IAPT national targets, some PCTs have imposed these 
locally; and recovery rates which are low in some areas, potentially 
undermining the whole purpose of the programme. Ways have been found in 
local services to deliver on targets, which are not in the spirit of the target; for 
instance, rapid assessment followed by a lengthy wait for treatment, which is 
a tried and tested ploy in other NHS sectors. The national implementation 
process, although captured in numerous policy documents, has been variously 
understood, taken up or even read. One unlooked for outcome of the focus on 
CBT has been that some PCTs have decommissioned whole counselling 
services, using IAPT as an excuse to reduce services. Although there is 
discernible progress in the development of new IAPT services, in line with 
the national guidelines, there is also evidence, revealed more in conversations 
than in formal returns, that the roll-out is not going entirely to plan and that 
the blueprint has not been replicated at local levels. 
 
Reflections on the assumptions behind evidence as it relates to the NHS. 
 
As a manager in the 1990’s, I found it difficult to influence professional 
practice to change in ways that service users said would make a difference to 
them. I was therefore pleased when the first National Service Framework for 
Mental Health was published in 1999, identifying targets and funding. The 
‘must dos’ did create opportunities to establish new services, such as Crisis 
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and Home Treatment Teams providing a real alternative to hospital 
admission, and it did result in changes in many places. I am struck, though, 
returning to work in a Trust ten years later, how some of these developments 
have occurred in a ‘countable’ form but not in practice. A former policy lead 
colleague described this as ‘hitting the target and missing the point’. I have to 
confess that I have been shocked by the paralysis that seems to have engulfed 
managers in making changes, which are patently required, because of a need 
to account to PCTs for delivering on targets. Lack of trust predominates: 
locally, between the commissioners and providers; within Trusts between 
clinicians and managers and nationally between central government and local 
commissioners. This target driven culture has had many unlooked for 
outcomes. 
 
A CRITIQUE OF THE IDEOLOGY UNDERPINNING THE TARGET AND 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT CULTURE OF THE NHS 
 
So where did it all go wrong? To consider this, I have chosen to take up the 
work of Seddon (2008), who published a critique of the public sector and a 
“manifesto” for a better way to address management through systems 
thinking, based on the work of Taiichi Ohno, the person behind the Toyota 
Production System (TPS). I will compare his approach with that of Ralph 
Stacey (2005, 2010) 
 
Seddon provides a sharp critique of the system reform regime, which has 
been adopted by successive governments since the 1980’s. He contextualises 
this to the economic position, changing since World War Two, when Keynes 
encouraged governments to intervene in the economy to increase public 
expenditure as a means to full employment. This became accepted wisdom 
until the early 1970s when a variety of unexpected world crises occurred, 
leading to economic stagnation and very high inflation, for which Keynesian 
economics was believed unable to account. This left the way open to different 
economic philosophies and specifically to monetarism. A key advocate, 
Milton Friedman, argued against public sector involvement to create 
employment, holding that the public sector should be treated like a free 
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market, allowed to run its self-correcting course, keeping government 
involvement to a minimum. Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister, brought 
monetarist policy into the heart of government by denationalising major 
industries such as British Gas. Where it was impractical to do this with public 
services such as the NHS, ‘quasi-markets’ were established. Seddon 
comments that this approach was underpinned by a belief that civil servants, 
managers and professionals were “essentially lazy and self-interested and 
needed to be ‘motivated’ by extrinsic forms of motivation: carrots and sticks” 
(ibid.: 4). This mirrors the perspective of Khurana (2007), who argued that 
the same economic changes led to a shift from managers being seen as 
professionals to entrepreunerial leaders, rewarded with shares and bonuses. 
One can see immediately how this attitude has undermined trust between 
stakeholders in the NHS. 
 
Public choice and consumer interest, based on game theory, became central 
to this thinking, on the assumption that the power to choose would act as a 
lever on service providers. In 1988, the government established the “internal 
market”, bringing in general management, separating commissioners from 
providers of services and establishing performance targets. Stacey (2005, 
2010), in a critique of public sector governance, shares some of these views 
about the origin of the internal market in the NHS. More specifically, 
however, he reflects that the nature of the figuration of power at that time was 
of professions working in a collegial manner, making their own decisions 
about the use of local resources resulting in considerable local variation. He 
states that the government took the view that “(t)he whole public sector was 
held to be inefficient, irresponsible, non-accountable for quality delivery and 
far from innovative. Unfavourable comparisons were made with the private 
sector” (2005: 2). Reflecting on my own experience at that time, I welcomed 
the advent of general management, not because of a belief in the private 
sector, far from it, but because I was seeking a way of exerting power over 
professionals, whom I perceived were acting to protect their own interests 
and not responding to the needs of people using services. I was not alone in 
this, so I think there were a number of influential factors operating at that 
time. 
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Targets and performance management frameworks have been elaborated 
since then, becoming formalised in ‘public service agreements’ (PSAs), 
which underpin NHS management today. Stacey describes this as an 
ideological shift in power 
 
…the particular form of power configuration which has emerged is 
sustained by a very different ideology to that which prevailed before. 
This is an ideology of efficiency, measurable quality and 
improvement. It is an ideology of managerial control to produce 
uniformity of service. It is an ideology of the market. (Ibid.: 3)  
 
Seddon argues that successive governments have blindly gone down this 
route with no evidence of its effectiveness. Indeed his whole argument is that 
targets have made services worse and wasted money. As targets have been 
shown to deliver the wrong things, there has been a central move to refine 
targets, which Seddon describes as making “the wrong thing righter” (ibid.: 
10), and to reduce the number of targets, “doing less of the wrong thing” 
(ibid.: 11). He describes how this “command and control” perspective has 
developed from the time of Adam Smith (1776) and argues that this is the 
model operating across the NHS and the rest of the public sector in England 
today.  
 
His manifesto, an alternative to this command and control way of doing 
things, is to adopt what he describes as a systems approach. He does not 
contextualise this within broader systems thinking literature, but confines it to 
the work based on Ohno (1988) and TPS. He acknowledges that it is not 
appropriate directly to apply a system from manufacturing to public services, 
but emphasises the importance of method. The starting point is to think of the 
capacity of the system, which is to undertake ‘value work’ so that customers 
can get what they want and only what they want first time, and ‘failure 
demand’ (ibid.: 52), the time and activity taken up in dealing with failures or 
getting things wrong first time, which is described as ‘waste’; if waste is 
reduced, this increases the capacity to deliver more value work. The 
important thing is that managers need to observe directly what is going on, 
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not rely on abstractions of reports or figures. The starting point must always 
be to understand demand and its predictability, to design the service to meet 
that demand, train staff according to the demand, develop measures 
appropriate to that design and make the worker the inspector; all of this is 
through a process he calls ‘check’ (ibid.: 77). This is essentially ‘lean 
thinking’, which has become popular in the NHS in recent years. He is 
critical, however, of those who utilise tools and techniques of lean, which 
focus on ‘end to end’ mapping, without reference to demand and system 
conditions and he accuses those people of being “toolhead(s)” (ibid.: 81). His 
focus therefore is about improving local processes. 
 
Macklis (2001) comments on a similar US approach to healthcare 
restructuring, aiming to improve safety. He states that an alternative to ‘top-
down re-engineering’ and ‘best practice mandates’, which he perceives to be 
‘rarely successful’ (2001: 1), would be local health initiatives, locally driven 
by people with credibility, the results of which would not necessarily be 
transferable or generalisable to other situations. Seddon refers to Ohno, who 
also warned against the much vaunted idea of ‘best practice’. 
 
He thought that it was a dangerous and misleading idea. ‘Best’ 
implies static, something ‘good’ that should be copied. He said that 
whenever you hear the word ‘best’, think ‘better’, because anything 
can be improved. Second, everything you need to know in order to 
make improvements will be found in your own system. If you go 
looking elsewhere, you will be looking in the wrong place. (2008: 
173) 
 
Groopman (2010), in a commentary on Obama’s health care reform 
proposals, reflects, as a clinician, how he had once contributed to 
“misconceived ‘best practice’ (2010: 2)”. This concerned a medical 
procedure for cancer patients which was recommended as a default option, 
and was subsequently found to benefit only a minority and increase risks for 
others. His review of the policy reform crossroads for the US healthcare 
system and the conflicting expert advice being received by the 
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administration, echo these different assumptions about human motivation, 
clinical judgement and science. He reports that Sunstein is advising that the 
President use a behavioural economic approach to ‘nudge’ people towards a 
different ‘default’ position (one which requires less effort to follow), being 
respectful to people making their own decisions. Orszag, another key advisor, 
promotes a different approach based on a lack of trust in doctors and 
administrators, suggesting that “(t)o alter providers’ behaviour, it is probably 
necessary to combine comparative effectiveness research with aggressive 
promulgation of standards and changes in financial and other incentives”, 
(ibid.: 1). Notice that there is a stark contrast in the view of human nature 
underpinning these two approaches.  
 
Seddon asserts that the view of human nature, by taking his systems 
approach, shifts from one that is pessimistic to one that believes in motivation 
as intrinsic. He explores the work on “public value” (2008: 162) originated 
by Moore (1995). Here, public service managers are re-valued as “explorers” 
with expertise and political know how, who should be exploited, seeing their 
motivation as public value much in the same way as private sector managers 
see shareholder value.  
 
Seddon reflects that evidence in the public sector is evidence of compliance 
to targets, not of efficacy, he does not however define efficacy from his 
perspective. Stacey commented earlier that the rhetoric of quality and cost 
effectiveness is hard to argue against, for to do so “amounts to challenging 
the dominant ideology and power figuration, so risking exclusion”. 
Furthermore, “thinking which supports the new (performance) model is so 
taken for granted, while an alternative way of thinking is not immediately 
apparent, that there seems no way out” (2005: 3). Seddon’s conclusion is that 
the current system has failed completely, and the only solution is “to get rid 
of the whole thing: to close it down and simply stop it” (2008: 193). Not 
surprisingly his views are not welcomed by the establishment and he has 
effectively been excluded. It is this dilemma that I feel with IAPT, in 
particular articulating what a realistic alternative might look like. He suggests 
that “stepping back from the regime would break the logjam at both political 
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and implementation level”. His own manifesto is to change the locus of 
control, but 
 
(t)o change the regime requires first a change in philosophy…To 
achieve that, we have to make public sector managers responsible. 
They have to be able to choose what to do, free from the obligation of 
compliance. (2008: 196) 
 
He concludes by saying that in contrast with current practice 
 
...the assumptions that I use are no less rational, but they are positive 
rather than negative: the new structures assume that people are 
motivated more by pride in their work than by money, that they are 
vocational - they want to serve - and they are capable of using their 
own ingenuity and initiative. It is also to assume that, in delivering 
services to consumers and citizens, cooperation will service our 
purposes better than competition. (Ibid.: 197) 
 
It is interesting to reflect on Seddon’s views as they resonate in part with my 
own experience of the perversion of targets in the current NHS. I have also 
had positive feedback about the use of Lean Rapid Improvement Workshops 
in redesigning processes in acute mental health inpatient settings, based on 
methods developed at the Virginia Mason Medical Centre in Seattle, referred 
to by Lee (2010). Seddon, however, is dogmatic in his certainty about the 
utility of systems thinking, which strikes me as unwise. He does not question 
the importance of rationality; his analysis does not take into account the 
different ways of power relating, in the NHS at least, where there are multi 
professional tensions; he appears to have no doubt that the public sector 
manager can stand outside the system in order to plan and implement a new 
philosophy; he appeals to the importance of evidence of efficacy but makes 
no reference to how this is obtained nor how it is distinguished from 
effectiveness. I am left thinking that his stance must be about practice based 
evidence as it is collected through measures developed locally and not in any 
way about evidence based practice drawn from research trials. Although he 
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seeks to distinguish Lean or TPS, as it relates to manufacturing, from how it 
relates to the public sector, he is not clear how he is differentiating the two. 
Finally, he has a touching faith in the positive nature of people in the 
workforce, who will be more motivated by vocation than by external or other 
rewards, which I believe to be a rather polarised view of the motivations of 
people at work. 
 
COMPLEX RESPONSIVE PROCESSES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BASED MANAGEMENT 
 
The two challenges facing IAPT are how to achieve change within short 
timescales and how to sustain them in the longer term. Change and stability 
are at the heart of organisations of any kind, whether in nature or in human 
action. The taken for granted position of Derek and others is that it is possible 
to prove efficacy of psychological therapies through scientific research 
studies, and of John, the programme lead, that targets, levers and 
performance management are unquestionably the way to roll out a national 
initiative. Their philosophical starting point is positivism and of linear or 
efficient causality. This has its roots in Newtonian mechanics, universal laws 
such as gravity, and natural scientific method, “by which humans come to 
know the reality of both stability and change through careful observation, 
formulating hypotheses and then testing them empirically” (Stacey, Griffin & 
Shaw, 2000: 22). The emphasis in psychological research is to find ways of 
establishing causal links and hence predictability in order to control human 
behaviour. As Stacey et al describe: 
 
This kind of hypothesis immediately focuses attention on cause and 
effect links having an ‘if-then’ structure applied to one part of the 
whole. The method involves isolating linear causal links, those of an 
efficient, or sufficient, kind. In other words the scientific method 
involved a reductionist approach in that attention was focused on 
parts of a phenomenon. Those parts were postulated to behave 
predictably according to efficient causality, while the interaction 
between them was accorded no significance. (Ibid.: 22) 
104 
 
 
The isolation of specific variables, such as a single diagnosis and a specific 
technique illustrates this way of controlling parts of the therapy process to 
achieve internal validity, as highlighted above by Roth and Fonagy. The 
results would hold good if replicated, irrespective of time and the focus is on 
getting the behaviour of the therapist right. 
 
Stacey et al question these assumptions and review types of causality to 
underpin their critique of systems thinking in organisations and how 
complexity theory has been taken up in systems thinking. They argue that, as 
ways of thinking derived from the natural sciences are applied to psychology 
and sociology, they bring with them taken for granted assumptions about 
causality that simply do not hold good for human beings. They are arguing 
for looking at what actually happens in organisations as opposed to what is 
supposed to happen, according to systems and complexity literature and have 
developed thinking on complex responsive processes of relating, to offer a 
different account. This has relevance for me in trying to understand how 
targets in the NHS can go so wrong and how linear explanations of human 
interaction in therapy can be critiqued effectively. 
 
Complex responsive processes of relating draw on analogies from the natural 
complexity sciences, concerned with phenomena that are characterised by 
nonlinear dynamics; the sciences of uncertainty. These include, for example, 
complex adaptive systems, where large numbers of interacting bodies, known 
as ‘agents’, adapt to each other, forming a system that adapts to its 
environment. Computer generated programmes have demonstrated that when 
large numbers of agents interact they form a pattern, which is said to be self-
organised and for which there is no blueprint. Many of these simulations 
follow simple rules however, which do not fit with humans who are 
conscious and reflective. Stacey comments that because humans are 
interdependent, they will enable and constrain one another, which means that 
there are differing, but ever present, power relationships, which Elias (1978) 
also describes. Stacey refers to Mead to articulate how consciousness and 
self-consciousness arise in communicative interaction and how meaning does 
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not lie in the gesture or word but “only in the gesture taken together with the 
response to it” (2005: 14). He comments 
 
Mead, then, was concerned with complex social acts in which many 
people are engaged in conversations through which they accomplish 
tasks of fitting in and conflicting with each other to realise their 
objectives and purposes. (Ibid.: 15) 
 
He makes the important point that individuals may act in relation to what is 
common to all (generalising) but respond somewhat differently in specific 
circumstances in any present time period (particularising). ‘Social objects’ 
are gestures with tendencies to act or respond in particular ways; ‘social 
control’ is bringing the act of the individual in line with the social object; all 
organisations are social objects in Mead’s terms. Mead also described a 
similar process between the general and the particular, drawing a distinction 
between ideology or ‘cult values’ and their functionalisation or enactment in 
specific situations. In my case we could describe implementing evidence 
based practice as a cult value in the NHS and its implementation in local 
services as functionalisation. Stacey comments 
 
(s)uch cult values present people with the image of an idealised future 
shorn of all constraints. If such values are applied directly to action, 
without allowing for variations contingent on a specific situation, then 
those undertaking such action form a cult in which they exclude all 
who do not comply. (Ibid.: 16) 
 
IAPT and its strong push to implement CBT has seemed cultish to those who 
have been excluded. By the same token, the variability in local 
implementation has been puzzling and frustrating to PMG. But this is not 
surprising as Stacey says, ‘(f)unctionalisation of cult values inevitably leads 
to conflict and the negotiation of compromises around such conflict’ (ibid.: 
16). Another way of thinking about this is described by Stacey in his most 
recent book (2010), where he distinguishes first and second order abstracting. 
First order abstracting refers to how we immerse ourselves in our 
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interactions, but also abstract from our experience, paradoxically, at the same 
time, by simplifying and categorising; so that we are reflecting and paying 
attention to what is happening as we are interacting. Second order abstracting 
describes how we need sometimes to talk, using maps and models, with less 
detail and often without reference to the people involved; this tends to be the 
dominant way of thinking in systems management. 
 
Stacey’s analysis of the NHS management culture identifies a number of cult 
values including performance and quality and describes how policy 
documents, such as RTB, are artefacts, “used as tools in the communicative 
interaction and power relating between members within the NHS” (2005: 
16).These artefacts capture the generalisations and idealisations of IAPT but 
they will “only have any meaning in the local interactions of all involved in 
each specific situation” (ibid.: 17). We have seen the different ways that 
groups of clinicians, commissioners and managers have implemented IAPT 
across England.  
 
Stacey goes on to suggest that the principles behind target setting and 
performance monitoring are derived from cybernetic systems thinking: 
effectively trying to design the NHS as a self-regulating system. This cannot 
be so as the taking up of the artefact of IAPT policy in so many local 
processes cannot possibly result in identical services, not least because of 
different understandings, different resources and conflicting professional 
views of what it does or should constitute. Nevertheless, there is an 
understanding of the importance of hitting targets, which can lead to 
avoidance, manipulation or even falsification. Stacey believes that current 
thinking treats the NHS as a homeostatic self-regulating system, akin to a 
giant central heating system, which is extremely naïve. This, I believe is what 
Seddon is also responding to in part. Where they diverge, I suggest, is that 
Seddon believes that if managers were empowered to stand outside the 
system, they could rationally lead the change process at a local level. 
Although he strongly implies that solutions must be locally determined, he 
believes that this can be planned and carried out rationally and 
systematically. He does not take into account conflict and power. He 
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continues to think in terms of planning before action with public value 
leadership from key managers. He postulates the need for adopting a (solely) 
positive view of the workforce, motivated by vocation. It is for the above 
reasons that I find his manifesto unconvincing. Complex responsive 
processes question these views in a way that resonates with my actual 
experience, but which leaves me uncertain about how I describe my usual 
way of viewing the world. I intend to explore further the theory of complex 
responsive processes to see if it can offer insights into the power and politics 
in IAPT. 
 
REFLECTIONS ON PMG IN SPRING 2010 
 
My feelings of being silenced and excluded in PMG, have curiously abated at 
this time. Why should this be? I think a number of factors are at work here. 
The impending end of the programme; the shift to Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs) leading the implementation process; the expansion of 
therapies beyond CBT; these all feel as though they have caused a shift in the 
power balance in PMG. More specifically, Derek and Gerald are less in 
evidence; there are fewer irritable late night emails; there is an 
acknowledgement, despite the publication of RTB, that there will be 
inevitable differences that are beyond the control of PMG. Perhaps this 
feeling, common to us all, has reduced the internal conflict. Jack is clearly 
trying to build his power base on the back of the new therapies. I have found 
this annoying as he, like Derek, is straying very much into my jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, as we have collaborated together a good deal, I feel less 
intimidated by him. Perhaps I have also begun to have more paradoxical 
detached involvement with PMG; I feel I have got a better understanding of 
the issues as they relate to evidence for the programme, so my confidence is 
improving. Interestingly, John has sought comfort in tighter project 
management to manage the uncertainty. He has employed someone steeped 
in Prince 2 methodology to produce a project plan of products, 
interdependencies, timelines and milestones. This person sent a first redraft 
of work I had given to him, which was completely incomprehensible. When 
this approach was described and sought approval for at the last PMG, I made 
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a point of being realistic and proportional about benefits of this approach. 
The DH mental health policy lead commented that he had spent a great deal 
of time developing such a project structure in his previous role, but before the 
project worker had time to brighten, he concluded that he had never followed 
it through… So, we see here the intention to act rationally again, the hope 
springing eternally to predict and control and the actual experience emerging 
differently in practice.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
I have found the importance of evidence to be very significant in its influence 
on developing the case for IAPT and for managing its implementation. I have 
been surprised that my initial preoccupation with the evidence from research 
trials for CBT and other therapies initially obscured my view of evidence as it 
is embedded in an NHS culture of performance management. The underlying 
assumptions behind both aspects of evidence arise from a belief in linear 
causality and positivism, drawn from the natural sciences. This is a taken for 
granted intellectualised view, which effectively silences dissenting views 
about the nature of this evidence. Science and scientifically developed 
evidence based practice are effectively cult values in everyday life and in the 
NHS. There is good reason for this. The history of the development of 
healthcare in the UK has been iterative and has been influenced as much by 
power and position as by effectiveness from the patient’s point of view. 
Much of what is carried out in the name of care in mental health services has 
occurred in this way. One of the biggest difficulties has been the lack of 
information about what works for whom, even on an individual basis. This is 
why critics of IAPT and of NICE are poorly placed to argue their corner as 
they cannot effectively point to evidence that what they do works. The 
question is, though, can the evidence from NICE effectively demonstrate that 
the efficacy from trials can be translated into clinical effectiveness?  
 
Psychology and psychological therapies hover in the tension between the 
natural and social sciences. The social sciences have largely moved away 
from positivism; and from quantitative to qualitative research methodology. 
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Whatever the methodologies and the nature of the evidence, there is a natural 
and continuing requirement to understand the complexities of our world, to 
predict what might occur and to try to control for what can be controlled. The 
tendency to date, certainly in the last 20 years in the NHS, has been to take a 
centralising, command and control position by making explicit targets, 
linking resources to them and monitoring activity (usually not outcomes). 
This approach has emerged from the internal market and its assumptions 
about professionals and managers. There are many instances of where this is 
perverse, Seddon wishes to tear it down and Stacey considers it to be naïve. 
There have, nevertheless, been significant advances during this period. 
Indeed, in IAPT, large numbers of people have been helped through therapy 
and significant numbers of staff have been trained and inspired, so it would 
be nonsense to suggest all this effort is wasted.  
 
As we move into the final financial year for IAPT the question of 
sustainability in the longer term is looming. My guess is that there will be a 
gradual blurring of what is commissioned by way of psychological therapies; 
probably some disinvestment and re-badging by commissioners and 
providers; newly trained and qualified staff in the workforce may, in their 
turn, influence local processes. IAPT could unravel. Commissioners need to 
have local conversations with providers about what can happen locally. More 
types of evidence need to be forthcoming, whatever the drawbacks on 
methodology. Jack is gloomy about this prospect, however, as funding bodies 
are disinclined to fund research that is not linked to diagnoses. But perhaps 
outcome monitoring from IAPT sites will help inform the process and 
develop evidence from practice. Whatever happens will probably be as much 
to do with who is pushing and where the power lies nationally and locally in 
the coming years. It is power therefore that I wish to explore in project four. 
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PROJECT FOUR (2010/2011) 
 
HOW POWER RELATIONS INFLUENCE THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF A THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The three year programme is due to finish in March 2011, so at the time of 
writing, consolidation and planning for sustainability beyond that time are 
key considerations. It is also the last opportunity to facilitate the inclusion of 
a wider range of evidence based therapies for depression, beyond CBT. Two 
NAs, Gerald and Jack, have undertaken a lot of political lobbying behind the 
scenes and John, the Programme Director, has prepared a case for continuing 
funding for what the new coalition government is now describing as ‘Talking 
Therapies’. Fortunately, confirmation of continuity of funding of £400 
million has been announced with the publication of the new mental health 
strategy, despite this being a time of serious funding cuts. This is on 
condition that access to psychological therapies will result in demonstrable 
reductions in the use of more expensive health services further down the line. 
In this context the following meetings took place: 
 
NARRATIVES EXPLORING THEMES OF POWER 
 
Narrative one 
As part of a recent meeting of the IAPT Education and Training group, which 
Brian (the Education &Training NA) and I chair, I led a discussion on how 
the NICE recommended and IAPT approved therapies, commonly referred to 
as ‘non CBT’, could be presented in a consistent way for commissioners and 
services nationally. The usually consensus seeking ‘four modalities’ 
representatives were disturbed on that day by disagreements about which of 
them might lead some technical and accreditation work. It became clear that 
there was an emerging distrust of a professor representative from a powerful 
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university, whom although being personally well respected, was seen as 
trying to direct all the work to his university and thus challenging their 
positions and autonomy. To make matters worse the IAPT Core Team had 
attended the meeting to observe Brian and I at work and although I tried to 
achieve consensus and agree actions, I was constantly thwarted in this. I left 
the meeting feeling exhausted and somewhat of a failure in the eyes of the 
Core Team. 
 
As luck would have it, the four modality representatives had suggested at a 
previous meeting that they would like to meet together as a group to discuss 
some of the detail of the work. I welcomed this suggestion as I felt there was 
much to do and their intention to collaborate, without facilitation, was 
encouraging. They therefore went off to have their meeting, whilst Brian and 
I went to a performance management meeting with the Core Team. Jack (the 
NA for Counselling and Psychotherapy), who has been directly involved in 
one of the modalities and had been in the previous meeting, took me to one 
side and said he was joining the four modalities and suggested that he 
therefore chair the meeting. My antennae were alerted at once: Jack was 
going to use his influence to drive outcomes that he favoured. I said that it 
was ok, as I felt I had no alternative, but explained that he needed to come 
back and brief me on the outcome and if NAs were going to be involved in 
their future meetings, I would chair them. 
 
Brian and I were then taken through an elaborate project plan by the Core 
Team. Since there had been significant turnover in the team, this was 
essentially a briefing to get them up to speed. However, there was a lot of 
questioning about how things had been approved in the past and about audit 
trails, with thinly disguised disapproval of the sloppiness of our programme 
to date. Some of the Core team came and went, and as we were in small glass 
offices, I noticed Jack going into a neighbouring office and talking to John. I 
knew instinctively that he was discussing actions that must have arisen in the 
four modality meeting and was getting agreement from John before talking to 
me and to Brian. I felt angry, stuck in a silly meeting, whilst Jack was 
manipulating processes in such a bare faced way. I was also furious that John 
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was agreeing to be briefed by Jack when he knew I was leading in this area. I 
was also concerned that he was doing this because he thought that more 
progress would be made if Jack were given his head, which was therefore a 
comment on my performance. On the way out after my meeting, Jack rushed 
up with a short resume of what had happened, an email about which he 
wanted to send out that evening and a date for the next meeting (which I 
could not make). I said I wanted to see the email before it went off and went 
to catch my train, where I pondered on a wholly unsatisfactory day which had 
left me feeling undermined and inadequate. 
 
That evening, Jack rang me to outline the content of the email before he sent 
it and it was just as worrying as I had predicted. We had a sharp exchange of 
words which resulted in me accusing him of being every bit as bad as Derek 
in how he was not working collaboratively and moving to manipulate events 
in his own interests. Since Jack dislikes Derek, this was quite an insult. I went 
to bed that night and continued to brood; I did not feel any relish for the cut 
and thrust of the politics of the programme. 
 
This experience was closely followed by: 
 
Narrative two 
 
The new coalition government moved quickly to freeze government 
spending, including the IAPT budget. This led to an emergency single issue 
(workforce) PMG being called, with an explicit aim of signing off the non 
CBT modality competence frameworks. The haste was because the 
competence frameworks needed to be published and launched at a national 
conference that Jack had organised in the hope that the new minister would 
attend. Before the meeting, I noticed Derek whispering to John in the corridor 
outside and then saw that Ivan, who was going to chair the meeting, had 
joined them. I walked up to them and asked, in a light tone, if this was where 
the decisions were being taken. This prompted Derek to say that having now 
read the competences, they were unsafe as they did not explicitly refer to 
depression, risk and outcome collection, that they were therefore dangerous 
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and he was going to close them down. As I did not know the competences off 
by heart, I was uncertain as to the veracity of his claim. In the meeting, the 
issue was discussed and Brian looked at the materials he had on his laptop 
and was able to throw some doubt on the absolute correctness of Derek’s 
views. In the event, we agreed that there needed to be a little more work done 
to check his issues and that the publication would be produced in draft for 
comment.  
 
Reflecting on my narratives 
 
When I worked in an NHS Trust in the early 1990’s, I was a member of a 
senior management team that met every Monday morning. The chief 
executive was bright and innovative, but easily seduced by novel ideas and he 
came under the influence of the new director of HR, who was generally 
agreed to be clever and manipulative. Most of the team were men and it was 
routine for them to take a comfort break together and to come back having 
agreed some action or other that should have been decided in the meeting. 
The dynamics of the team were difficult and worsened over time to such an 
extent that I came to dread those Monday meetings. I believe this was the 
time that I became more sensitive to and critical of office politics. I can see 
that my reaction to Derek’s behaviour has been coloured by experiences like 
this. I could have ignored it and just inwardly fumed but, since I knew he was 
talking about something to do with workforce, I felt justified in intervening. 
Although gender is an important issue in power relationships, and feminist 
authors such as McNay (1992), Diprose (1991), Bartky, (1990), Bordo (2003) 
have made critiques, for instance of Foucault whom I take up later, the 
feminist perspective is not one that I wish to explore in the DMan. This is not 
only because I do not feel it has been a major factor in my own career but 
also because it would deserve more space than this thesis will allow. 
 
I perceive that my anxiety is usually about being undermined, about having 
my jurisdiction encroached upon, about losing face and about not being in 
control. I rarely feel comfortable with PMG colleagues as I feel that I don’t 
quite fit and I take this now to relate to my identity as an ‘expert’ in 
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workforce in that group. I think that the reason I was so concerned about the 
professor’s outburst was that I have felt more secure in my identity with that 
group because it has felt like a continuation of the work I led in my previous 
workforce programme director role. In that role, where I consider myself to 
have been challenging whilst seeking to move towards consensus, I have 
generally felt valued, competent and able to achieve things. I believe that 
challenging ‘insiders’ or the status quo is of key importance for me. This was 
originally in relation to service users versus professionals, then from the 
perspective of non- medical to medical professionals and now in IAPT, it is 
more focussed on broader based therapies versus CBT. 
 
It is clear to me that the basis of good relationships is trust and respect; this 
holds good in personal as well as in professional relationships. I believe that 
this implies a reasonable balance in power relating, where people are 
effectively peers. I find, however, that I am not trusting people that I am 
currently working with. It is the uncomfortable feeling of the outsider. 
 
It has become obvious that the reason the IAPT programme runs as it does is 
because John considers that he can exercise more control by dealing with 
people individually and separately rather than as a team. He therefore has 
little difficulty in wheeling and dealing on issues irrespective of areas of 
responsibility; he is quite combative in his style with an air of ‘if it’s too hot, 
get out of the kitchen’. This is his way of exercising power with what is 
certainly a difficult set of people and relationships. I have shifted in the last 
fifteen months from being someone of equal standing to him to someone, 
who is a NA only, with less involvement in the day to day running of the 
programme. John has unquestioned faith in the use of project management 
methodologies, which focus on paperwork rather than on practice. This leads, 
in my view, to a level of abstraction, which may be necessary to report on 
quantitative progress, but which can become reified and divorced from the 
reality of everyday local decision making. I see just this happening in the 
Trust where I am working: clinicians failing to turn up for meetings as they 
want to discuss practical issues and not project milestones and risk registers. 
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I feel that power struggles are intrinsic to the everyday discussions and 
decision making processes of IAPT, even more than in other areas of my 
work in the past. 
 
Narrative three 
 
At the last PMG, the delayed and final drafts of the competence documents 
were discussed. They had been amended as Derek had taken exception to 
additional issues when I was on holiday. At the meeting itself, he began by 
praising the improved version with the exception of one issue which he 
described as guildification, restrictive practices or anti-new ways of working 
in the document. What he meant was that the specification that practitioners, 
who should be offered training for Couple Therapy for Depression, should be 
Couple therapists. His view was that they could equally be CBT therapists, a 
position he has held for some time and which has led him, in my view, to put 
barriers in the way of Couple therapists being the target group. As I have led 
on NWW nationally and I was aware of his barely hidden agenda, I was 
unable to remain silent and accused him of promoting practice restricted to 
CBT therapists. This led to an awkward silence in the room; Brian, in his best 
mediating manner, agreed with both of us. A member of the Core team 
suggested omitting the Couple Therapy section altogether from the 
document. After a pause, Derek said this was not his intention and Brian 
offered to add a form of words that would be acceptable to all. For a moment 
it felt that the power had shifted. 
 
Further Reflections 
 
Throughout my career, I believe my way of approaching my work in 
organisations has been to take a rational approach to change: to plan, consult, 
seek consensus based on human values of equality, develop an action plan 
and to implement those actions, usually with some means of monitoring. I 
have firmly believed that if professionals listened to views of people who 
have been on the receiving end of services, they would change their views, 
and not to do so must be related to their egotism and fear of losing their 
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power and status. My frustrations therefore have been those people who are 
not compliant or who are actively oppositional to what I have strongly 
believed is the ‘right thing’. I have experienced conflict as unpleasant, 
unhelpful and selfish. My perception is that those who have opposed me have 
largely been powerful, often because of their professional status. I have 
tended to see these people as possessing power by virtue of their social 
position rather than as experts and have, sometimes, been surprised when 
some have turned out to be decent human beings, with expertise.  
 
I am conscious that in my early training as a psychologist, I was influenced 
by the predominant view that ‘we’ as a developing profession, were superior 
to nurses and competitive with psychiatrists, eager to avoid being under their 
control. Taking and having control, over my life and working practice, may 
be a way of thinking about power. 
 
SUMMARY OF EMERGING THEMES OF POWER 
The emerging themes for me cluster around firstly, knowledge, evidence and 
expertise, influencing what constitutes the truth and therefore the rational 
underpinnings of the IAPT programme. Secondly, the inherent political 
struggle in day- to-day work: domination, conflict, manipulation and control, 
which give rise in me to feelings of shame and uncertainty about my 
professional identity and expertise. Finally, the way these perceptions and 
feelings arise in interaction with others and my own part in those interactions. 
I will therefore turn to authors to help me understand and evaluate my 
experiences. 
 
COMING TO UNDERSTAND POWER IN MAINSTREAM 
ORGANISATIONAL STUDIES. 
 
The body of knowledge on power emanates from a variety of fields, 
including philosophy, sociology, business and organisational studies. Clegg, 
Courpasson & Phillips (2006) observe that the complex literature on power 
and the implications for the study of organisations are still “largely 
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unexplored” (2006: 6). They believe that power is central to sociological 
theory and therefore to organisational theory and that ‘power relations’ 
should be the focus of analysis. They point out, however, that the content of 
management training in elite business schools (and elsewhere) is very 
focussed on technical and rational approaches. They seek to build the 
foundations for different theoretical understandings of power to inform better 
practices of power within organisations. The Administrative Science 
Quarterly (AQS), an important journal in US organisational studies, 
published a forum on power in 2002, where key authors contributed their 
perspectives. Greenwood and Hinings, for example, posited that they would 
 
…characterise a sociological approach to studying organisations as 
being concerned with who controls and the consequences of that 
control. The central question emanating from a business school, in 
contrast, leans more to understanding how to understand and thus 
design efficient and effective organisations. (2002: 411) 
 
Clegg et al interpret this position as counterposing power and efficiency, 
which they argue is wrong, as the two are inextricably linked and subject to 
processes of domination and organisational enslavement. Greenwood and 
Hinings reflect a rich seam of thought in management literature, 
incorporating a utilitarian approach to efficiency adopted by Taylor (1911), 
which was (and still is) exceptionally influential in the technical design of the 
workplace and workforce; and Functional Theory (Parsons, 1964), construing 
power as authority and therefore as legitimate influence. At the same time, 
power is described as being linked negatively to uncertainty, which would 
indicate a practice in need of reform. Taylor and Parsons emphasised rational 
and scientific approaches to management, which took no account of politics 
or of the hidden side of power and influence. My understanding of 
knowledge as evidence, as I outlined in project three, has led me to question 
the taken for granted nature of the positivistic scientific approach that 
underpins these writers. I wish to explore what I perceive to be the hidden 
influence of power as it impacts on IAPT. 
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Contingency theory (Hickson et al 1971; Hinings et al 1974) considers 
organisations from the perspective of standardisation and centralisation 
processes, which implies rather than specifies power issues. On the other 
hand, resource dependant theorists such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) 
address power specifically but also from a wholly rational perspective. To 
elaborate, Pfeffer (1992) diagnoses the key problem in organisations as the 
“incapacity of anyone except the highest-level managers to take action and 
get things accomplished” (1992: 10). He therefore expounds a seven step 
model, which includes: establishing goals; diagnosing inter-dependencies and 
influential people; discerning their views; identifying their power bases; 
identifying one’s own sources of influence; selecting preferred tactics; and 
choosing a course of action (ibid.: 29). Although tools and techniques have 
their place in helping structure understanding of social interaction, these 
systemic approaches do not resonate with my experience of predicting and 
managing the complex nature of interactions, particularly in the highly 
political arena of IAPT. 
 
Weber (1978) has been influential in articulating the importance of 
developing bureaucracy, a legal-rational approach in organisations, as a 
bulwark against arbitrary practices of those in charge with respect to their 
employees. He saw the relations of power (1978: 4) as a central aspect of all 
organised social life, and politics as the expression of resistance to the 
imposition of the will of others. He explicitly differentiated power (Macht) 
from domination (Herrschaft), which could be legitimate and was taken to 
mean Authority by people like Parsons (1964). Weber was pessimistic about 
the future of bureaucracy, however, because, whilst it would be subject to the 
rule of law, in his view, it could become an “iron cage of bondage” (1976: 
181), where rules, regulations and standardisation would constrict the life of 
the person. As van Krieken put it: “being modern means being disciplined by 
the state (and other organisational forms), by each other and by ourselves” 
(1990: 353). I will take this up later in the context of Elias’s criticism of 
Weber and Foucault’s concept of subjectification. 
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Lukes published a short, but influential essay Power: A Radical View in 
1974, where he posits that there are three models of power, all based on 
different moral assumptions. He describes them as one dimensional (liberal – 
Dahl, 1958), two dimensional (reformist - Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) and 
three dimensional, his own radical perspective. In summary, a one 
dimensional view of power, an empirical, ‘pluralist approach’ focusses on 
behaviour in making decisions over which there are conflicts of interest. A 
two dimensional approach broadens scope to look at intention including non-
decision making and potential as well as actual conflict of interest. His own 
contribution addresses control over the political agenda, latent conflict and 
subjective and real interests (as opposed to policy interests); he concludes 
that power “is at once value-laden, theoretical and empirical” (2005 [1974]: 
108). In his second edition, he recognises that these may be contradictory and 
proposes that there is a single generic concept of power, common to all cases 
which, in relation to both individuals and collectives, exhibits two distinct 
variants, the concepts of “power to” and “power over”(ibid.: 69). He outlines 
a conceptual map highlighting his view of the key elements to consider in the 
arena of “power to”, which include issue-scope (single vs. multiple); 
contextual range (context bound or transcending); intention and 
unintentional; active and inactive; together with the impact these may have 
on the interests, preferences or welfare of those concerned. He also examines 
in detail “power over” and specifically the concept of ‘domination’. In doing 
this, he takes up Weber (1978[1910]); Shapiro (2003); Scott (1990); Taylor 
(1984); Sen (2002); and Nussbaum (2000); In this, he explores issues of the 
legitimate and illegitimate use of domination, how this can be decided and by 
whom; the appropriateness of the term as it relates to normal interactions as 
opposed to extreme relationships, in slavery for example; identity and 
assumptions about (real) self and identities that are socially constructed. He 
concludes that the concept of power as domination is ‘essentially contested’ 
(ibid.: 124), which I take to mean that there are many perspectives that do not 
agree nor complement one another. Lukes spends a good deal of time in his 
later text critiquing the contribution of Foucault. He particularly questions 
whether 
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…after Foucault it no longer makes sense to speak, with Spinoza, of 
the very possibility of people being more or less free from others’ 
power to live as their own nature and judgement dictate? (2005: 107). 
 
He argues against this, but concludes his book equivocally, in my view, by 
stating that, as Spinoza observed, 
 
…in spite of all that political skill has been able to achieve in this 
field, it has never been completely successful; men have always found 
that individuals were full of their own ideas, and that opinions varied 
as much as taste. (Ibid.: 151) 
 
Other influential authors on power include Goffman (1961), Elias (1978); 
Critical Management thinkers (Fournier and Grey, 2000; Alvesson and 
Willmott, 1992), although Lukes does not mention them at all. Clegg et al 
(2006) comment that Critical Management thinkers like Alvesson (2002) and 
Willmott (1993), who critique an unquestioning belief in efficiency and 
‘value free’ methods, are still only marginal to business and organisational 
science curricula and in organisational literature generally. Clegg et al also 
discuss the importance of Foucault in his approach to thinking about power 
but he too is absent from mainstream management training. Their major 
proposition is that there has been a trend throughout the last century to see 
organisational science too narrowly, to position it in rationalistic traditions, 
for it to be ahistoric (not learning the lessons of history or not existing in 
context); to be amoral in the sense that the treatment of human beings, and 
focussing on coercive power without explicitly addressing power in its 
analysis. This perspective resonates with my experience, which I begin to 
articulate in projects two and three. They particularly draw attention to major 
world events, such as the Holocaust, and how we have failed to consider how 
such events could occur, despite their use of efficiency and bureaucracy. On 
this point, Arendt, (1970) wrote extensively about the Holocaust, exploring 
totalitarianism, which people robbed of their ability to struggle, the 
potentialities and limits of political action and the importance of individuals 
taking personal responsibility for politics as a plurality of citizens. She stated 
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“...each person’s aims are continually liable to be frustrated by other people’s 
initiatives, although power and stability can be generated by agreements 
between human beings” (Canovan, 1992: 277). Scott (1990) studied slavery, 
positing that generalisations could be made to practice in everyday 
organisational life. He argued for a clear distinction between the formal, 
‘public’ explanation and informal ‘hidden transcript’ of relationships, 
between what he called dominant and subordinated groups. Arendt and Scott 
do not feature in mainstream bibliographies. 
 
Clegg et al muse on the future understanding and practice of power in terms 
of the changing nature of globalisation, risk from terrorists and the 
uncertainty this brings to business and to society. In looking in detail at such 
case studies, they adopt Foucault’s genealogical analysis method (which I 
take up later), where what is taken for granted as the truth in one era can be 
transformed to a different truth in another. The importance of Foucault is 
clear from these later authors and will therefore be central to this project.  
 
Summing Up 
 
Mainstream conceptualisations of power have tended to take a rational 
approach to how power can be understood and managed. Large business 
schools do not tend to address power in their curricula as a significant issue 
nor do they tend to include authors who question such approaches and who 
are seeking to understand the unpredictability of everyday organisational life. 
 
COMING TO UNDERSTAND POWER IN MY OWN CAREER 
 
Building on the approach of Parsons, Habermas (1987), from the Frankfurt 
School, took an optimistic, rational approach to power and political change. 
He argued that using constitutional approaches or ‘communicative 
rationality’ is how change can be achieved. 
 
This communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch 
as it brings along with it the connotations of a non-coercively 
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unifying, consensus building force of a discourse in which the 
participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour 
of a rationally motivated agreement. (1987: 315) 
 
Similarly, Chomsky, in a debate with Foucault, is described by Rabinow as 
defending the position that ‘(o)ur political tasks can be coherently informed 
by the universals of reason and justice’ (1984: 5), thus articulating a 
rationalist approach to power and government.  
 
Having faced the challenges of changing NHS services, I have welcomed 
formal government policy documents, intended to change organisational and 
professional practice in the direction of valuing service users and carers, 
translated into national targets. For me, these documents have become 
ammunition that can be used to dictate to professionals what they cannot see 
the sense of doing of their own accord.  
 
Furthermore I have felt that teams, which form the operational unit of service 
delivery in the NHS, have the best knowledge of their problems and the 
potential solutions. I have therefore invested energy in working with teams to 
reach consensus to solve local problems. In this process however, I often 
experience frustration with nurses, for example, continuing to defer to 
doctors, even to those who are junior or clearly incompetent. Arendt (1970), 
Goffman (1961), Scott(1990) and Willmott, (2003) suggest that a move to 
deliver a single vision (such as NWW or IAPT) can lead to unlooked for 
outcomes in terms of silencing difference, which in some (extreme) 
circumstances can lead to totalitarian practice. At the same time as reflecting 
on what I take to be my rationalist approach however, I am aware that my 
views have been more complex than this. I have sought to empower other 
professions to challenge doctors, whom I have often seen as authoritarian or 
dominating. I have always felt that in challenging professionals, returning to 
the needs and rights of the service user is a way of unifying professional 
discord. 
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I am aware that my approach to service change has been underpinned by the 
principle of ‘equal value’ of citizens, irrespective of their differences. Indeed 
a key piece of work that I instigated was the production of the ‘Ten Essential 
Shared Capabilities Framework’ to underpin practice in the mental health 
workforce. One of the capabilities included the value of Practising Ethically: 
“acknowledging power differentials and minimising them wherever possible” 
(Hope, 2008: 15). When I have advocated this in public, I have noticed 
silence or disgruntlement among some professional staff, showing clearly 
that they do not share this value. Even more concerning to me have been 
bigoted and prejudiced comments from some service users. I notice that I 
have tended to idealise their position based on their shared experience of 
mental ill health and ignore their necessarily divergent values and views as 
human beings. So, I am coming to the view that there are conflicting values 
underpinning mental health policy and its implementation by people in 
practice, which cannot be resolved solely by consensus building. This has led 
me to consider other ways of thinking about power, based on the nature of 
human relating. 
 
POWER AS INTEGRAL TO HUMAN RELATING 
 
Elias (1978), unlike Parsons, wanted to explore how sociology could address 
more meaningfully the nature of society and avoid aping the natural sciences 
in their method of enquiry. He argued that society was not merely a set of 
individuals, whose responses could be aggregated to understand it, nor an 
abstract concept where people were not to be found at all, echoing the views 
of Follett (1918). He posited that the language used to describe issues was 
itself part of the problem in that terms such as the ’individual’ and ‘society’ 
tended to reify concepts and to abstract and obscure them. He sought rather to 
show how interactions between people or ‘figurations’ should be the focus of 
a study of power, which he did by using the analogy of games. Elias 
discussed the importance of interdependencies between people and the 
functions that they serve as they interact with one another. In considering 
these interplays, he talked about people “measuring their strength against 
each other” (1978: 73), which in itself is the exercise of power. He chose to 
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talk about “power ratios”, which are usually unequal “power balances” and 
commented that balances of power are not only relevant in relations between 
states but are also “an integral element of all human relationships” (ibid.: 74). 
Power is inherent in child-parent, manager-employee relationships and so on, 
in that each has a function for the other. This in turn means that they exercise 
constraints on each other, which could be thought of as legitimate authority. 
But there has, according to Elias, been a tendency to avoid acknowledgement 
of the subject of power in mainstream organisational theory (as I outline 
above) because of its negative connotations. Furthermore, power has been 
reified and treated as an ‘amulet’ possessed by one person and not by 
another, as if it were a “magico-mythical relic” (ibid.:74). Like Foucault, as I 
will discuss later, he comments that power is a structural characteristic of 
relationships and of itself is neither good nor bad. He poses common 
questions that underpin continuing struggles to establish any relationship, for 
example, who is more or less dependent, or in IAPT terms, who can steer the 
business in their own direction?  
 
Elias (1978) criticised Weber’s assumption that contemporary bureaucracy is 
a rational form of organisation and that the behaviour of its officials is 
equally rational. Specifically, he comments 
 
…bureaucracy tends to reduce complex social interdependencies to 
single administrative departments, each with its own strictly defined 
area of jurisdiction, and staffed by hierarchies of specialists and 
oligarchies of administrative chiefs who rarely think beyond their 
own areas of command. (1978: 31) 
 
This has resonance for me in that much of the current politics of IAPT are 
focussing on how further investment in the programme can be realised in a 
nationally dispersed field of competing priorities. Keeping a strong and 
uncompromising focus on prescribed standards to give clarity of model and 
process, as insisted upon by key IAPT NAs, is at odds with pragmatic tactics 
being exerted throughout the NHS. Commissioners and employers are 
required to make £20 billion savings, but are being allowed to reinvest this in 
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different services such as IAPT. At this time of economic stringency, this is 
recycling of investment not new investment. However, the deputy prime 
minister publically announced it as new funding. This led Ricky (an NA) to 
share his outrage at such dissimulation with the press, for which he was 
promptly and publically sacked. My interpretation of this situation is that 
IAPT, as a single programme and one that is seen as important and 
privileged, is (not unreasonably) fighting for its rightful place in 
prioritisation. This is not a corporate endeavour with the NHS to reach 
compromise given the impossible pressures being placed upon it, but rather 
an attempt to protect its jurisdiction. However, the IAPT position is a 
rationalist one, to seek to persuade through the soundness of argument. The 
announcement demonstrated the political manipulation of the message from 
government to the public. Whilst everyone in the NHS knew it not to be true, 
Ricky chose not to be silenced, but blowing the whistle was not politically 
acceptable. The Department of Health, a supreme bureaucracy publically 
reflecting the view of the current government, took action, demonstrating that 
power does determine what is accepted as truth, at least officially. 
 
Elias’s analysis of games helps illustrate the growing complexity of 
interactions as more people become involved. Starting with a single dyad, as 
the number of people grow, the number of possible relationships grows 
exponentially; for example, two people can only form two possible 
relationships; 3 people: 9 possible relationships; and 10 people: 5110 
relationships. The sheer numbers are staggering and nicely illustrate the 
complexity of possible relationships and interdependencies even in a 
relatively small group. PMG has approximately 15 members and there are 
rarely fewer than 10 people present at any meeting. Elias highlights that as 
the numbers increase, the power balances shift. Where there is a more even 
power ratio between participants, there becomes increasing uncertainty about 
the outcome. In thinking about the relative power balances in groups, Elias 
comments that a single dominant member can be constrained by weaker 
members if they co-operate to do so. By the same token, if the group has 
internal tensions, as in the IAPT NA group for example, their power to 
change the direction of the group is more limited. This resonates with me, as 
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in PMG meetings, the conversation is dominated by Derek and John, with 
interjections from others; typically, the conclusions are checked by the chair 
with them to see if they are acceptable. Elias’s attention to the use of 
language, however, highlights how it is all too easy to fall into assuming that 
power is an entity, which resides within people. I am coming to think that I 
view Derek in this way. As Elias says: “In thought we hold them responsible 
for the constraints to which we feel ourselves subject” (ibid.: 94). Elias 
emphasises that the ‘intertwining’ of people’s actions, may result in “social 
consequences which no-one has planned” (ibid.: 95). This opens up the 
possibility of the emergence of novelty; it also highlights the difficulty of 
scientific prediction and reveals the impossibility of achieving explanations 
of figurations through “reducing them to their individual components 
(individual people) as in psychological or biological forms of explanation” 
(ibid.: 97). This is highly relevant to my critique of evidence in IAPT. But as 
Elias says, we have developed habits of thought because “we have all been 
reared in traditions which lead us to expect to find an explanation for every 
apparently inexplicable event in a single cause” (ibid.: 99). 
 
Elias and Scotson (1994) studied an English community where the process of 
power relating, which he described as ‘inclusion and exclusion’, could be 
clearly observed. This community, anonymised as Winston Parva, consisted 
of two similar social groups, distinct only by virtue of the length of time that 
each had been established in that location. Those who had moved there first 
were the ‘established’ and the newcomers were the ‘outsiders’. In their 
detailed qualitative study, Elias and Scotson found that the established group 
felt itself to be superior in terms of its values and behaviour and that the 
newcomers were accordingly less lawful, poorer achievers and so on. They 
concluded that the established wanted to maintain their order and status 
whilst the newcomers wanted to improve theirs, leading to conflict and to 
excluding practices. As there was no difference in class, colour or income 
levels, they posited that this practice was based on power ratios rather than on 
specific characteristics of people, sustained through occupying politically 
important positions in the community. 
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How might this be relevant to my thinking about IAPT? Power differentials 
have been exhibited by the dominance of CBT over other therapeutic 
modalities. This has shifted a little in IAPT in the third year of the 
programme, and certainly the time that Brian and I have devoted to 
developing therapies additional to CBT has been significant. Although 
expanding choice of therapy has been a key focus of our reports to PMG in 
recent months, this ‘airtime’ becomes less impressive when I consider that 
the number of training places that will be provided for these additional 
therapies. This will amount to a total of around 300 places at a cost of 
approximately £500,000, in comparison with CBT with 3600 places 
(including funded posts) at a cost of around £170 million. One can see how 
this is seen as a ‘fob off’ for the workforce and professional bodies who are 
not CBT based. This issue has led to conflict throughout the therapy world, 
although there have been efforts from counsellors and psychotherapists to co-
operate in the hope of future inclusion of their approaches in IAPT. The 
territory of evidence based therapies has been a particular battleground, with 
CBT therapists and their advocates creating, so it appears to me, a sense of 
their own superiority. This has a clear feel of an insider (CBT) outsider 
(everyone else) dichotomy. Being outsiders in these terms, the non CBT 
groups have not helped themselves by falling out with each other over 
evidence and regulation. The United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy 
(UKCP) elected their president on the ticket of opposing regulation and the 
governmental policy commitment to NICE based evidence. This internal 
conflict has served only to increase the power imbalance between therapies 
and policy makers. Elias and Scotson’s reflections on Winston Parva seem 
pertinent in terms of the stigmatising processes that I can see happening to 
CBT protagonists with respect to their non CBT counterparts. 
 
(T)hey fight for their superiority, their status and power, their 
standards and beliefs, and they use in that situation …humiliating 
gossip, stigmatising beliefs about the whole group modelled on 
observations of its worst section, degrading code words and, as far as 
possible, exclusion from all chances of power”. (1994: 158) 
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Elias comments that power as a subject has been neglected because the social 
phenomena to which it refers are very complex. When it is addressed it is 
often oversimplified, whereas it is in fact “polymorphous” (1978: 92) and is 
inextricably linked with emotions because of the conflict inherent in this 
social interweaving. He argues that it is for this reason that power should be 
“understood unequivocally as a structural characteristic of a 
relationship…neither good nor bad… We depend on others; others depend on 
us” (1978: 93). Elias (1991) comments that no matter how powerful one 
person may be they cannot single-handedly achieve change. Using an 
example of an emperor of an agrarian feudal society, seeking to transform his 
country, he says “(h)e is tied to the tensions between bondsmen and feudal 
lords on the one hand and between competing feudal lords and the central 
ruler on the other’(1991: 50). I see a parallel here in the Trust where I am 
working, where directives from the Board, passionately supported and 
articulated by the CEO, are frequently ignored by clinicians and teams.  
 
Elias spent much of his life reflecting on what he described as The Civilising 
Process (1994 [1939]) of history, a particular feature of which was how “the 
self-constraint apparatus becomes stronger relative to external constraints” 
(Goudsblom & Mennell, 1998: 238) as part of human development and 
relationships. For me this echoes a strong theme in Foucault of how power 
relationships are sustained through ‘subjectification’. Elias, however, was not 
a political activist and his analysis of issues was academic, despite being 
personally affected by World War II, which significantly constrained his 
career. Foucault, in contrast, was passionate about the issues he addressed in 
his work and politically active as a result. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FOUCAULT 
 
I will now turn to Foucault as a key author because, as McHoul and Grace 
assert in their overview of his work, Foucault’s retheorisation of the concept 
of power is of “critical importance (and) cannot be overstated” (1993: 57). 
Although he was not interested in offering a theory of power, he wanted to 
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find a different way of looking at how power relating was enabled or 
constrained at specific times and in different places. Foucault states 
 
...power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a 
supplementary structure over and above ‘society’ whose radical 
effacement one could perhaps dream of. To live in society is, in any 
event, to live in such a way that some can act on the actions of others. 
A society without power relations can only be an abstraction’. (1994a: 
343) 
 
Foucault considers that the point of political struggle is ‘to alter power 
relations’ (Rabinow, 1984: 6). 
 
In reading Foucault, it is firstly important to understand his terminology, and 
specifically his use of the term ‘discourse’. McHoul & Grace state: ‘Foucault 
is the first major writer to pose the question of power in relation to discourse’ 
(1993: 22). They take this to mean that 
 
(i)n any given historical period we can write, speak or think about a 
given social object or practice (madness, for example) only in certain 
specific ways and not others. (Ibid.: 31) 
 
Foucault himself, in discussing method (1994a), describes how his interest 
lies not in seeking truths or universals, but in opening up areas of question 
and by making propositions that others can engage with. Rabinow suggests 
that ‘his consistent response is to historicise grand abstractions’ (1984: 4). 
His main interest is not in ‘what’ or even ‘why’ but ‘how’ things occur, and 
not in institutions or theories but in ‘practices’ (1994a: 224-225) with the aim 
of grasping what makes these acceptable at the time. His method therefore is 
to analyse a regime of practices that could include: places where things are 
said, rules that are imposed, reasons given, the planned and the taken for 
granted and the interconnection between them all. He developed his thinking 
over time in this respect, which I will explore later. 
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More specifically, McHoul & Grace suggest Foucault is thinking of discourse 
in terms of bodies of knowledge linked to the concept of disciplines and 
consider that disciplines should be taken in two ways: 
 
(A)s referring to scholarly disciplines such as science, medicine, 
psychiatry, sociology and so on; and as referring to disciplinary 
institutions of social control such as the prison, the school, the 
hospital, the confessional and so on. Fundamentally, then, Foucault’s 
idea of discourse shows the historically specific relations between 
disciplines (defined as bodies of knowledge) and disciplinary 
practices (forms of social control and social possibility). (1993: 26) 
 
Rabinow describes Foucault as a ‘founder of discursivity’ (1984: 26). He 
compares him with Kuhn (1970: 1987), who formulated the 
phenomenological evolutionary scheme for the natural sciences, as sharing a 
‘systematic ability to comprehend exactly those phenomena of “shared 
practices” …which constitute scientific activity’ (1984: 26) and an ability to 
move beyond them. Comparing with Weber, he comments ‘(b)oth see a form 
of critical historicism as the only road to preserving reason and the 
obligation…to forge an ascetic ethic of scientific and political responsibility’ 
(ibid.: 27). Gordon, in his introduction to Foucault’s works on Power, 
describes him as neither a philosopher nor a political theorist but someone 
interested in finding new and more effective political ways of seeing, 
particularly concerning the relationship between power and knowledge; 
quoting Foucault himself, 
 
…the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of 
knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information… The 
exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and conversely, 
knowledge induces effects of power. (1994a: xv-xvi) 
 
It is this seeking of ‘knowledges’(sic) that underpin his method of discourse, 
in order to question techniques of power that may have been portrayed with 
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‘apparent neutrality and political invisibility’ (ibid.: xv) and to extend ‘our 
capacity for suspicion, or at least for vigilance and doubt’ (ibid.: xvii). 
 
In selecting areas of practice in the human sciences, most notably in madness, 
punishment and sexuality and exploring them from a variety of perspectives, 
he is seeking to lay bare taken for granted assumptions but not to come up 
with answers or a general theory for the future. It is to this that he attributes 
the irritation he evoked in his critics, saying clearly that ‘(t)he effect is 
intentional’ because he wants professionals to ‘no longer know what to do’ 
(ibid.: 235) and to question and potentially change their practice. In his final 
lecture in 1973 on psychiatric power, he states that he is not interested in 
developing an historical sequel to his work but is interested in its political 
effects on subjects - prisoners, patients and the like. 
 
It is perhaps this method of discourse that I am seeking to explore in relation 
to the DMan generally and to my exploration of power in IAPT in particular. 
I am questioning and thereby coming to understand not only the far and 
recent past but also the present conditions which enable and constrain what 
can be said about the development of psychological therapies. 
 
Mental Health as a context for considering Power 
 
Foucault is important in my field of study because of his work on mental 
illness, described in Madness and Civilisation (1961), in which he traces the 
concept of madness over the centuries. The reason he did this was that he 
wanted to consider how language, practice and government influenced what 
could and did occur with respect to people who were seen as mad. He looks 
at three key elements: dividing practices, normalisation and subjection, which 
I began to explore in projects one and two. I am interested though, that 
Foucault, in reflecting later on this work and talking about power specifically, 
says: 
 
When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was 
talking about in Madness and Civilisation…but power? Yet I am 
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perfectly aware that I scarcely used the word and never had such a 
field of analyses at my disposal. (1994a: 117) 
 
He went on to say that he felt this was because there was no interest at that 
time from colleagues on the Right or the Left in the issue of power, except to 
condemn it as it was perceived to exist in the other ‘camp’ i.e. as 
totalitarianism or class domination respectively. Furthermore, when he 
expounded the view that he wanted to study how power was exercised 
concretely in medicine and psychiatry, these areas were criticised as not 
sufficiently scientific. His perspective on power changed in 1968, as a result 
of the student uprisings. He concluded that he had been too timid and that his 
thinking had been constrained by the context in which he had found himself 
only a few years before. This is what makes history and an understanding of 
context vital in understanding abstract issues such as Power and Truth. 
Diffuseness of meaning and abstraction do not further understanding, so he 
was critical of Structuralism as a prevailing mode of thinking at the time, 
which sought generalisable meaning behind the superficial surface of 
experience. He was, however, also critical of Hermeneutics, which posited 
that interpretation was the most vital and that human experience could 
transcend anything. Foucault sought to manoeuvre between the two in that he 
felt it was possible to draw some general themes from specific experiences 
and that there were limits placed on human thinking by historical contexts.  
 
Goldstein (1984) compared Foucault’s approach to disciplines with that of 
other sociologists to the development of professions. Essentially positive 
about his contribution, he described Foucault as taking an archaeological 
approach to history, which sought to “ ‘defamiliarise’ the phenomena of man, 
society and culture” (Hayden White, 1973: 50), in a way that also highlighted 
the relative instability of objects of discourse (Goldstein, 1984: 172). Rather 
than taking disciplines as occupational groups, Foucault related disciplines 
more to the “ordinary population which is willy-nilly on the receiving end” 
(ibid.: 175) and as “methods, which made possible the meticulous control of 
the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces 
and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, (which) might be called 
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disciplines” (Foucault, 1977: 137). Those who administer to this population 
are professionals in the traditional sense and Graham concludes that 
“(p)rofessionalism, as rewritten by Foucault, becomes a ‘new ‘microphysics’ 
of power, indeed the quintessentially modern mode of wielding power” 
(ibid.: 176), which includes a conflation of social power-wielding activity 
and knowledge. 
 
Dividing Practices 
 
Foucault’s key focus in his early work was on total institutions as they 
evolved into the 20
th
 century. Today, they have all but closed (I am working 
in the last one in England) and services are now delivered largely in or near 
people’s own homes in the community. This, for me underlines the veracity 
of Foucault’s view that what we consider to be truth or thinkable at any given 
time is affected by our context. Similarly, Goffman, in Asylums (1961), 
delivering a sharp critique of the nature of total institutions, described 
hospitals and the medical profession as generally harmful to the patient; but 
concluded: 
 
Nor in citing the limitations of the service model do I mean to claim 
that I can suggest some better way of handling persons called mental 
patients. Mental hospitals are not found in our society because 
supervisors, psychiatrists, and attendants want jobs; mental hospitals 
are found because there is a market for them. If all the mental 
hospitals in a given region were emptied and closed down today, 
tomorrow relatives, police, and judges would raise a clamour for new 
ones; and these true clients of the mental hospital would demand an 
institution to satisfy their needs. (1961:334) 
 
Fifty years on, we can see how he much he was constrained by the limited 
thinking at that time. Now we have more effective interventions, public 
attitudes have altered so that living next door to a person with a mental health 
problem can be considered to be no different from any neighbour and, most 
importantly, we have a different narrative, articulated by people with lived 
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experience, resulting in a (slight) shift in the power of the patient. Foucault 
later rejected his focus on the institution per se and began to focus on power 
relating between the psychiatrist (and his staff) and the patient. 
 
Today, IAPT is an example of a dividing practice as it is a different model of 
service delivery, which has challenged the current established order of 
provision of psychological therapies. IAPT’s distinct stepped-care service 
model has been imposed across England based on specific standards of 
staffing, training, supervision and practice. As a result it has displaced 
existing services and excluded those that do not conform to those standards, 
most notably counselling services. Indeed, some have been decommissioned 
as a result and some counsellors themselves sent on IAPT courses, against 
their wishes. This process has inherently separated and set different values on 
CBT from other therapies and therapists. The new policy, extending wider 
therapies to broader groups, promoted by an influential collaboration between 
the third sector and professional bodies, only now begins to challenge this 
privileged position of CBT within IAPT. 
 
Normalisation.  
 
The second key theme of Normalisation focusses on classification, to identify 
how individuals differ from the norm, for instance, in terms of conditions, IQ 
and so forth. Ironically, Foucault comments that this led to greater 
individualisation (of differentness) as well as to totalisation, a blanket 
response to all as if they were the same (1994a: 332). This has been reflected 
in the practice of psychiatrists as the profession has developed historically. It 
has also been an accusation against IAPT by its dissenters, who see the 
medical categorisation of people with anxiety and depression and its ‘one size 
fits all solution’ (Lee, 2010) of CBT as a ‘simplistic worldview’ (Woolfolk & 
Richardson, 2008). 
 
The use of standardised measures to assess depression and anxiety, used at 
every session, forms the basis of IAPT outcome measurement and the data 
collected are seen as vital in evaluating the success of IAPT. ‘Recovery’ has 
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been defined as a reduction in symptoms to a level below ‘caseness’, which is 
the cut-off between what is considered normal and abnormal for the 
population. As Recovery rates stay stubbornly below 50%, (the rate predicted 
from the research literature and therefore the target) the data are being 
examined more carefully, and ‘improvement’ is now being talked about as an 
alternative measure. These ways of categorising the patient population and 
describing the nature of their change on what were recently called ‘objective’ 
measures can be seen as normalising principles in Foucauldian terms. Of 
particular interest is the shift in language about what constitutes success to 
avoid the political fall-out if results are disappointing. This re-interpretation 
of the evidence could be seen modifying forms of evidence and therefore 
what we consider to be the truth in IAPT. 
 
Subjectification 
 
Foucault emphasises the importance of his third theme of subjection or 
subjectification because his “objective…has been to create a history of the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” 
(1994a: 326). 
 
Foucault was fascinated by the Panopticon, the concept developed by 
Bentham, a physical space, where the subject could be observed at all times; 
so, even if not being watched, the subject came to behave as if they were and 
became self- disciplined. The Panopticon became the basis for the design of 
prisons and concentration camps, and Foucault was interested in what gave 
rise to such ways of thinking. He went on to compare this spatial model with 
the relationship that madmen had with their doctors, where, he posited, that 
they came to adopt their identity as interpreted to them by the physician, who 
performed the role of father and judge with an intention of improving their 
moral behaviour. It is likely that Parsons would have portrayed the authority 
of the doctor as benign and the docility of the subject as a rational 
acquiescence, although we have seen the unfortunate results when such 
power goes unchecked. Interestingly, Spinelli (2001) suggests that CBT 
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largely ignores the power imbalance in the therapeutic relationship and insists 
on the authority of the therapist to interpret the model for the client. 
 
Foucault attributes two meanings to the term ‘subject’. 
 
(S)ubject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self- knowledge. Both meanings 
suggest a power that subjugates and makes subject to. (1994a: 331) 
 
McHoul and Grace put it slightly differently. 
 
‘Subjection’ refers to particular, historically located, disciplinary 
processes and concepts which enable us to consider ourselves as 
individual subjects and which constrain us from thinking otherwise. 
These processes …are what allow the subject to “tell the truth about 
itself” (Foucault, 1990: 38). Therefore they come before any views 
we might have about ‘what we are’. In a phrase: changes in public 
ideas precede changes in private individuals, not vice versa. (1993: 3-
4) 
 
In other words, our identity is formed through our social interactions, which 
develops an argument that is similar to Mead’s position on the development 
of self and mind (1934). What is important in relation to power however is 
that the subject is then part of the mechanism of power, and serves to sustain 
power relating, even where they occupy a subordinate role.  
  
In his lectures on Psychiatric Power (2003 [1973/4]), Foucault reflects that 
his focus in 1961 on the history of madness , his archaeological method, and 
his views on violence, the institution and the transferability of the concept of 
the family into the asylum, were “rusty locks” (ibid.: 14), that needed to be 
renewed. In a further wide ranging analysis concerning 18
th
 and 19
th
 century 
practices and informed by the more recent anti-psychiatry movement, he puts 
forward a different conceptualisation of power, which is not confined by 
spatial analogies (such as institutions) but an analysis of the dispositifs of 
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power. Here, he questions ‘to what extent can an apparatus of power produce 
statements, discourses and consequently, all forms of representation that may 
then derive from it’ (ibid.: 13). The translation of dipositifs as ‘apparatuses’ 
of power has been disputed as it can conjure up an image of a system or state 
machinery, thus leading to potential reification, whereas Foucault was trying 
to describe: ‘a configuration or arrangement of elements and forces, practices 
and discourses, power and knowledge, that is both strategic and technical’ 
(ibid.: xxiii). This way of thinking led him to explore the nature of the power 
of the psychiatrist specifically, together with that of supervisors, servants and 
the patient. Foucault distinguishes between sovereign power and disciplinary 
power, and says the latter could also be described as Panoptican power, 
which is silent in its actions and takes a ‘total hold…of the individual’s body, 
actions, time and behaviour’ (ibid.: 46). He suggests this resulted in two 
differing perspectives of the individual: the juridical (or rational) individual 
(ideological, with rights and freedoms) and the disciplinary individual (the 
subjected body). Although Foucault is describing disciplinary power in 
specific areas he is positing that this is a feature of current society in that we 
are all being subjectified in our power relating and to suggest that we, as 
individuals, could be freed or ‘desubjectified’ (ibid.: 57) from such 
oppressions is a nonsense, the stance that Lukes (above) criticises (2005: 
107). This suggests to me a similar position to Mead in that we are formed by 
and forming social relationships continually and to think of ourselves as 
independent and outside of this is equally untenable. 
 
Foucault discusses a shift in the perception of the mad person from being 
wrong in their judgement of what constitutes reality and therefore for 
intervention to be one of correction of faulty judgement, to one where the 
mad person was seen as wilfully convinced of their own correctness. This 
latter perspective pointed to intervention as a struggle between the 
psychiatrist and the patient, the former aiming to subdue the will of the 
patient to his greater knowledge and expertise. Foucault, however, makes 
repeated reference to the lack of a coherent body of psychiatric knowledge in 
terms of diagnosis and treatments (which I draw attention to in project two) 
and therefore he suggests the psychiatrist came to impose his will (or 
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disciplinary power) over the patient, directly and through institutional 
routines, to effect change in the individual. The data concerning cures are 
anecdotal and are drawn from case notes of significant psychiatrists of the 
period, including Pinel, Esquirol and Charcot, in true Foucauldian method. 
 
I am left wondering how all of us are made subjects in our own worlds, as 
well as being people who can dominate or have authority. Self-silencing in a 
context like PMG is a form of subjectification, where to question the truth of 
evidence is to be seen as incorrect, wilful or irrational. However, in narratives 
two and three, I was conscious of the dominating voice of Derek and of the 
resistance that I felt to being over-ruled and effectively losing the battle. In 
directly accusing him of supporting restrictive practices, I felt that I was 
standing up to him, as few others do. When he backed down somewhat, I had 
a sense of achievement. This was for me a clear example of resistance against 
domination. 
 
HOW FAR IS POWER DETERMINED BY KNOWLEDGE AND 
EXPERTISE? 
 
I reflect on professionalism, competence and expertise in project two and 
conclude that IAPT is dominated by professionals perceived as experts in 
their field by virtue of their academic and clinical achievements. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986) describe the “proficient” and “expert practitioner” as going 
beyond observable competences or recognisable rule governed behaviour to 
demonstrate intuitive practice and clinical judgement. This concept can serve 
to mystify expertise, however, and to emphasise the power and authority of 
the expert. In IAPT, three NAs are university professors and respected 
educators, researchers and practitioners and would describe themselves as 
(expert) evidence based scientist practitioners, which elevates their status in 
the programme. As Foucault concludes, towards the end of his analysis on 
power: 
 
In the history of the West since the 18
th
 century, the appearance of 
philosophers, men of science, intellectuals, professors, laboratories 
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etc., is directly correlated with this extension of the standpoint of 
scientific truth and corresponds precisely to the rarefaction of those 
who can know a truth that is now present everywhere and at every 
moment. (Ibid.: 247)  
 
Flyvbjerg, in developing his argument for making social science matter, 
draws on the work of Dreyfus, who traces back the origin of what constitutes 
theory to Socrates (2001: 38-9), in order to test out how far phronetic social 
science could claim to be a science. Dreyfus identified six defining elements 
of (predictive) theory, which include being: Explicit; Universal; Abstract; 
Discrete; Systematic; Complete and Predictive. He concludes that if social 
sciences adopted these principles, using decontextualized (my italics) 
features, ‘predictions, though often correct, will not be reliable’ (1982: 8). 
Flyvbjerg also draws on Bourdieu (1977: 1990) and his argument of ‘the 
decisive role of timing and tempo for human expertise’ (2001: 41), to support 
his argument to move away from scientism to what he calls phronetic social 
science. The purpose of this is 
 
…not to develop theory, but to contribute to society’s practical 
rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and 
what is desirable according to diverse sets of values and interest. 
(Ibid.: 167) 
 
I take this to mean that there is a different way that expertise can be 
conceptualised, building on Dreyfus’s ‘expert’ with tacit knowledge, made 
understandable by context, which in its turn can be utilised technically and 
ethically. 
 
Goffman (1961), quoting Sullivan, said “(a)s defined in this culture, the 
expert is one who derives his income and status, one or both, from the use of 
unusually exact or adequate information about his particular field, in the 
service of others” (ibid.: 287). In addition, he argues that “the server’s 
(doctor’s) work has to do with a rational competence, and behind this a belief 
in rationalism, empiricism, and mechanism” (ibid.: 287). 
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How relevant is this analysis today? Many people would think that this goes 
without saying. As part of the work I am undertaking in an NHS Trust, I 
observe on a regular basis, the interaction between psychiatrists and nurses as 
one of master and pupil, irrespective of the seniority and expertise of the 
nurse. The ‘magical quality’ of ‘clinical experience’ (ibid.: 322) is still 
accorded a value by which the final word is left to the doctor. This suggests 
that there are some generalisations that can be made across time and place 
and that cultures of power-relating survive across generations, particularly in 
professions. I would like, therefore, to take up further in my synopsis how the 
views of Foucault and Dreyfus illuminate my understanding of expertise and 
power.  
 
DOES POWER DETERMINE TRUTH? 
 
Philosophers since Plato have sought eternal truths that hold good 
irrespective of place and time. Descartes took as his goal the establishment of 
a universal system of physics expressed in mathematical form, which 
triggered a series of scientific enquiries that was, as Dewey later commented, 
a ‘quest for certainty’ (Toulmin, 2001: 32). This culminated in Newton 
publishing his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy in 1687. 
Toulmin suggests that the ensuing period in history led to a split in what 
constituted human reason, where natural philosophers or ‘exact scientists’ 
sought rational theories and deductions, whilst humanists used the term 
reason to mean reasonable practices that were grounded in personal and 
social practices. He argues for reasonableness rather than rationality and 
proposes that at the heart of the debate about rationality is a presumed link 
between rational thought and scientific method, which is universal and 
invariable. “In brief, a fully rational method would comprise universal, self-
evident rules from which we deviated only at the risk of irrationality” (ibid.: 
84). This, I suggest, may be taken to be a ‘truth’ for many in the scientific 
sector and certainly for key players in the IAPT programme. But in social 
sciences, this positivistic stance has lost credibility with many, so how can 
these beliefs about what constitutes truth be sustained? 
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Foucault (1994a) takes a different position from the rationalists and is clear 
that truth is not a universal absolute but is determined by society. 
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth - 
that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; 
the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements; the means by which they are sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of the 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. (Ibid.: 131) 
 
Graham, in a lecture on discourse analysis, reflects that: ‘The critical 
relationship to truth enabled by a Foucauldian problematisation does not 
mean that there is no truth – it means that truth is always contingent and 
subject to scrutiny’(2008: 4). Foucault (2004a: 131) himself suggests that the 
political economy of truth is centred on a number of principles: scientific 
discourse and the institutions that produce it (e.g. NICE and relevant 
universities); on “the demand for truth as much for economic production as 
for political power” (the rationale for IAPT is not only intended to reduce 
suffering but to reduce costs to the exchequer); it is the object of diffusion, 
for example, through education (such as the cascading of training places for 
CBT across England); it is produced under the control of political and 
economic apparatuses (such as the Department of Health and NHS); it 
encompasses ideological struggle (NICE recommended therapies: CBT 
versus others). All in all, it is easy to see the direct application of these traits 
of truth, as he posits, throughout the IAPT programme.  
 
So why does NICE recommended evidence dominate IAPT as a truth that 
cannot be questioned? If Foucault is correct, this is, at least in part, because 
of the influence and therefore power of the ‘specific intellectual’ in this case 
in the form of Derek. This points to his role occupying a privileged position 
linked to ‘the general functioning of an apparatus of truth’ (1994a.: 131), by 
which Foucault means ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and 
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the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’ 
(ibid.:132). What I understand Foucault to mean here is, that the criteria for 
what constitutes truth is determined by people in certain privileged positions 
and therefore it is not so much about science and ideology per se but about 
power. This echoes Flyvbjerg’s analysis of the administration of the Aalborg 
project (1998). It also seems to be related to subjectification, the issue of the 
professional who defines what constitutes meaning for the patient (or subject) 
where s/he provides the explanatory framework to enable, but also constrain, 
the person or subject to understand their own problem. Foucault considers 
that power relating can only occur where there is the opportunity to resist and 
Arendt (1992) argued that conflict is essential to democracy.  
 
Clearly in IAPT, there is a distinct difference between the public face of the 
programme as depicted in formal documents, interpretations of data and 
ministerial speeches and the conflicts and manoeuvrings that occur on a daily 
basis, locally and nationally. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Geertz (1995) complains about the meaninglessness of abstract 
representations of power as domination, which leave us: ‘with hardly 
anything to say but that big fish eat little fish, the weak go to the wall, power 
tends to corrupt, uneasy lies the head, and master and man need one another 
to exist: the dim banalities of theory’ (1995: 40). Mainstream organisational 
literature favours the rational and systemic discourses and pays little heed to 
authors offering a different perspective. I have therefore sought to show how 
some 20
th
 century philosophers, sociologists and thinkers, Foucault in 
particular, offer a different discourse with an analysis of power in a practical, 
historical context. This can offer insights not only to past practices but can 
also inform sense-making of current practices of power relating. For me, this 
means that power is integral to human relationships of every kind and is not a 
characteristic of an individual. I perceive I have been attributing power in this 
way, however, and since I do not believe this at all in personal relationships, I 
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think I have been equating power with status and real or presumed 
professional expertise.   
 
I have been clear from the outset of the DMan that power is a major issue in 
my career. Power as a concept is rather abstract to deal with and it has been 
helpful to consider Elias and Foucault in terms of how power can be judged 
through an analysis of local interactions, which enable and constrain what is 
possible at any given time. This has been important in considering my own 
work in IAPT: how daily struggles between people influence how policy is 
formulated, defining what is considered to be the right, based on what is 
considered to be the incontrovertible truth of evidence based practice. The 
issues that have surfaced for me, in considering power, relate to my sense of 
professional identity, which I am coming to feel relates to some uncertainty 
about my expertise, being more generalised and managerial rather than 
specialised and clinical. The latter is clearly more valued and dominant in 
PMG. I think that my rather petty assertions of wanting to chair meetings 
within my jurisdiction emerge from a need to be in control to avoid this 
domination and the resultant humiliation. 
 
I realise with some force, having read Foucault, Elias, Arendt and others, that 
my habitual professional style has been one of seeking consensus through 
formal processes. I have never been inclined to seek to manipulate people 
outside of meetings and have tended to take the moral high-ground over of 
others who do. I realise, reflecting on Habermas and the broader rationalist 
position, that this is hopelessly naïve. On reflection, I think I have 
unconsciously used organised meetings as ways of holding conversations 
rather than as formal ratification processes, and this has enabled, sometimes, 
new and creative solutions to problems to emerge. This way of working is 
more difficult in IAPT, however, as there is a dominating, strongly held 
conviction about what has to happen and a small inner circle that leads this, 
resulting in me and others feeling outsiders. In this context it seems easy to 
become subject to such domination and hence to undergo subjectification in 
Foucault’s terms. As power is immanent in the interactions in PMG, 
underpinned by clinical and academic expertise that is esteemed, I have come 
144 
 
to realise that the possession of power is not an individual characteristic, but 
the product of those interactions. I realise that I and others, (the outsiders) are 
playing our part in maintaining this process. Hence, my relationship with 
Derek and other members of PMG is not one solely based on personalities, it 
is also how we co-create the patterns of conflict and manipulation. This is a 
significant movement in my thinking, although it does not prevent intensely 
visceral experience in moments of interaction. 
 
I have always felt that the clear value of doing the right thing by people who 
use services, which I suppose is what is truth for me, should be persuasive in 
itself. I now see this cannot be so, and I am astonished that I have been able 
to achieve anything in my career. I feel, however, it is important to have a 
clear ethical position and belief about what one is trying to achieve. I think I 
have perceived power as Parsons would have depicted it: as positive where I 
have been able to influence processes but negative where I have found a lack 
of co-operation in professionals, who are therefore fair game to reform. I 
have tended to blame people, both in IAPT and in other settings, based on my 
deeply felt beliefs, but this does not seem a sustainable way of understanding 
what is going on between us as intensely social beings. 
 
So I am left reflecting what else may be going on and what I have drawn 
from the authors I have cited. The issue of conflict and its necessity to 
prevent a totalising process, where everything becomes the same, is new and 
challenging to me. This is because I perceive asymmetry of power-relating in 
teams and the continuing dominating voice of the psychiatrist in specialist 
mental health services, which could be seen as a mirror of PMG. As I am 
currently working with a variety of professional staff in a Trust, I do see more 
clearly the need for the emancipation of the non-medical workforce to help 
them avoid making themselves subjects in the process of power relating.   
 
I have never considered myself to be an expert in terms of skills and 
knowledge, but I have felt that behaving humanely and with humility is of the 
utmost importance; it is this way of relating that I have valued and 
championed. But on reflection, have I done this with professional colleagues? 
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This understanding of bodies of knowledge and expertise and their bearing on 
power is what I want to develop further in my synopsis. 
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SYNOPSIS & CRITICAL APPRAISAL  
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time 
 
                    T. S. Eliot 1944: 4 
PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of the synopsis is to review my thinking as it has developed 
through four projects. It is intended to enable me explore whether the themes 
of professionalism, evidence and power, which I drew out from my first 
project, have proved to be at the core of the question that has sustained my 
research enquiry. It also allows me to consider, in more detail, aspects that I 
believe need further inquiry in order to develop and defend my argument. To 
this end I have drawn, to a limited degree, on new authors to support my 
thinking on identified themes. Finally, the synopsis provides the platform on 
which to present and defend my argument. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
I have come to the DMan programme after a long career in the National 
Health Service. This has meant that I have seen organisations and practices 
emerge and metamorphasise over time, presenting situations which are at 
once both familiar and different. Issues that appeared incontrovertible to me 
in the past have become less so as I have read and reflected on my 
experience. Research within the DMan has been about taking my experience 
seriously in order to come to a better understanding of what is and has been 
going on in my working life. I am putting forward this thesis as written 
documentation of this movement in my thought.  
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I have worked as a clinician and a manager in specialist mental health 
services, which has led me to question the training and practice of 
professionals. This interest in workforce issues resulted in me leading a 
national workforce programme in mental health. One aspect of this work 
included advising on the workforce elements of the national programme to 
increase access to psychological therapies (IAPT). It is the involvement in 
this programme that I have used as the basis of my thesis. 
 
The DMan approach to research has enabled me to tease out how this 
national programme has been influenced by an overriding belief in science as 
a good thing. Scientific method generates evidence that is seen as 
incontrovertible. Management science, despite having little evidence base 
according to these criteria, has a significant impact on the management of 
such a programme. The main proponents of science have had a stronger 
voice, by virtue of their specialist expertise and association with academic 
research, practice and teaching. The interactions in a management group 
exercise disciplinary power and enable and constrain what can and cannot be 
said, resulting in the identity of group members being felt as ‘insiders’ or 
‘outsiders’. The working of the IAPT programme management group (PMG) 
is an example of what many of us experience at work and in our 
relationships. I am positing that the insights that I have gained through my 
reading and reflections are generalizable to other managers and practitioners 
working together to achieve what are understood to be common goals. 
 
I argue that the current idealisation of science, informing the discourse on 
evidence, is based on assumptions of linear and rational causality; that this 
can only offer a partial solution not only because of the differences between 
research efficacy and clinical effectiveness in practice but also because such 
evidence only claims to help a percentage of clients. I take up complex 
responsive processes of relating as a way of thinking, based on Stacey et al 
(2000, 2001, 2007), which in turn draws on the complexity sciences. These 
take seriously unpredictability and uncertainty to offer a different way of 
thinking about research method in my thesis. 
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I explore taken for granted assumptions about developing the professional 
workforce and about the use of competences. I problematize the position 
taken by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) on their conceptual discontinuity 
between competent and expert practitioners and I posit that evidence based 
practice can only be accounted for by observable rule governed, competence 
based processes. I argue that expert practice develops in non-linear ways, 
which cannot be prescribed in an explicit manual, and which therefore is 
simply not available as a blueprint to follow. I therefore conclude that the 
card of evidence and the hand of science have been overplayed. 
 
I present the evidence of narrative accounts and argue that this ideology has 
prevailed in IAPT, in a difficult to contest and silencing manner, through the 
power relating of specific players or intellectuals, (Foucault, 1994a), who 
have sought to narrowly define what constitutes evidence and therefore the 
truth. This silencing and the taking up of the idealised notion of science could 
also be described in Mead’s (1932b) terms as a cult value. By the same token, 
the functionalization of IAPT in local services, and the implementation of 
evidence based medicine generally, is influenced by professional 
perspectives, expertise and identities of those involved locally.  
 
Furthermore, I argue that both clinicians and managers as NHS professionals 
generally have differing allegiances and identity: clinicians to their 
professions and managers to the corporate goals of their organisation. This 
has historically formed a gulf between managers and clinicians, which has 
come to define the politics of everyday life in the NHS. The evidence base 
for clinical interventions is limited and evidence for management approaches 
even thinner, (Stacey, 2010) yet particular ideologies of management science, 
e.g. performance management, are thoroughly embedded in the public sector. 
This suggests that its influence is one based on ideology (whether market or 
equality focussed) and on disciplinary power, rather than on science. 
 
I conclude that whatever rational arguments and processes are marshalled 
centrally, they will inevitably be taken up differently in implementation, 
which is by definition local and context dependent. 
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I will now summarise the key themes and issues that have arisen for me 
through my four projects. 
 
PROJECT SUMMARIES AND THEMES 
 
PROJECT ONE: PROFESSIONALISM, EVIDENCE AND POWER: 
INFLUENCING CHANGE PROCESSES IN MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES IN THE NHS. 
This project focussed on my main area of work to date, which has been in 
secondary, specialist mental health services. Ironically, I make only slight 
reference to the IAPT programme.  
My training and work as a psychologist focussed extensively on science and 
its relationship to human behaviour. Skinner (1953) was a key influence on 
my thinking and practice, in his searching for fundamental laws that could 
predict behaviour. My disillusionment with the adequacy of a behavioural 
perspective to account for the complexities of organisations and to offer ways 
of thinking about alternatives led me to refocus on values and human rights 
issues. This took me away from thinking scientifically. The growth of a 
cognitivist approach in psychology, which led to the development of CBT, 
took place in mental health about the same time and had no impact on me. 
This is a factor that I now realise has influenced my work in IAPT. The 
whole area of what constitutes scientific evidence and method was a key 
issue for me early on and emerges as a key theme in this project. 
The role of professions and the nature of their inter-relationship, particularly 
the status and influence of the doctor both individually and as a multi-
disciplinary team member has had a burning relevance to me, which has 
significantly affected my ways of viewing the world. 
My view of power as something ‘wielded by clinicians’ now reveals to me 
that I have had a negative and reified view of power, which I feel particularly 
keenly in IAPT PMG. As I reflect, however, on the work undertaken by the 
programme I led on NWW, it is clear that I, together with colleagues, 
150 
 
exploited the weak position of psychiatrists in early 2003 to take steps to 
limit their future span of control. This was a way of exercising intention 
which could also be seen as manipulating events and setting an agenda, 
which was political and not so different from IAPT processes. The difference 
is perhaps that my position of influence is different. I describe how evidence 
is selectively used to attack or defend personal positions and am persuaded 
by Flyvbjerg’s (1998) position of power determining knowledge, which he 
takes from Foucault (1994a). 
There is a striking consistency in the themes that I identify at the outset of the 
DMan and how they have remained with me, those of professionalism, 
evidence and power and how they impact on the delivery of a national 
programme of policy change. 
PROJECT TWO: HOW ISSUES OF PROFESSIONALISM ARE 
SUSTAINING AND CHALLENGING THE POWER RELATIONS IN 
A NATIONAL NHS PROGRAMME 
 
As I introduce fully, for the first time, IAPT PMG, I outline the structure and 
nature of the national advisors (NAs). Here I note that I distinguish between 
those NAs, who have specific expertise in psychological therapies and others 
who have been inherited, including me. I have therefore immediately placed 
myself outside what I am defining as the expert group. As all NAs are 
professional advisors, this suggests that there is a hierarchy of authority 
within the group that relates to power and authority. 
 
I highlight key aspects of professionalism, which I have drawn from the 
literature, which include: 
 
1. Having specialist knowledge and skills; the more esoteric and abstract 
the body of knowledge, the more highly qualified and respected the 
profession.  
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2. Exercising discretionary judgement, variously described as 
‘intuition’, having the ability to make inferences, ‘metacompetences’, clinical 
judgement and expertise. 
3. Having control over one’s own work, including control of what 
constitutes knowledge, entry to and expulsion from professional bodies 
4. Having a privileged economic and social status, including being 
culture carriers of ethical standards. 
 
As I have observed the fallibility of professionals, I find this a highly 
idealised set of principles, but I perceive that they are implicitly assumed to 
apply to those NAs in PMG, who are a combination of researchers and 
clinicians. Science and specialist knowledge derived from research trials are 
the source of their authority. In contrast, those of us with more generalist 
experience, such as in NHS management or in general medical practice, are 
not specialists. We are, rather, experienced in managing service change with 
its diversity of views and practice, and pragmatic in negotiating solutions. In 
voicing these realities as we see them, however, we are seen as over-
complicating matters and not being fully supportive of NICE guidance and its 
direct application through a prescriptive national approach (which may be 
described as a blueprint). Whilst frustrated with such oversimplification, I do 
not believe that huge variability in practices and services is helpful either, so 
I am partly persuaded by the argument. In any case, I do not have an 
alternative blueprint. 
 
Interestingly, on re-reading project two, I see that I mention the NAs for 
service users and carers only once and never again refer to them. How can 
this be? I have been driven by the focus on improving services for people on 
the receiving end my whole life. I notice that I have felt critical of those NAs 
for not being critical and questioning, which is what I would have expected 
from service users in the past. Indeed, one NA has already stated the benefits 
of receiving CBT personally, so improving access to CBT is the major 
challenge as they see it. Furthermore, CBT is intended to be carried out 
collaboratively between the therapist and client, therefore there appears to be 
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less overt asymmetric power relating than I observe in specialist mental 
health services. However, the voices of these NAs are not sought out. 
 
I review the role of the doctor, of psychologists as scientist practitioners and 
of psychological therapists more generally and conclude that the role of 
doctor has little influence in IAPT, unlike in specialist mental health services. 
Less predictably, I find that I am reconsidering the role of management as a 
profession and realise that I am ambivalent about owning the professional 
identity of a manager. I conclude that there is still something of the 
psychological scientific practitioner in me as I work as a manager and in 
IAPT. Reflecting more fully on my position as a manager, however, I realise 
I have not taken up what it has meant for me to focus on workforce as an area 
of specialisation, I will therefore consider this under management as a 
profession. Perhaps it is not surprising then that I find myself without a very 
coherent voice in PMG: I feel this relates to permeable jurisdictions of 
professionalism, specialist versus generalist bodies of knowledge as well as a 
privileged interpretation of what constitutes evidence. These factors have 
resulted in me and some other NAs silencing ourselves. 
 
Finally, I discuss competences and capabilities and how I have turned to them 
as a way of getting away from professional boundaries. I was and am now 
even more uncertain about these. Although I take up Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) more fully, I feel I do not get to grips with their distinction between 
calculative and deliberative rationality. I will therefore explore more fully the 
key themes about management as a profession; and the assumptions behind 
professionals as experts. 
 
PROJECT THREE: HOW THE DISCOURSE AROUND EVIDENCE-
BASED PRACTICE AND IMPLEMENTATION HAS COME TO 
DOMINATE A NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR CHANGE IN THE 
UK NHS 
 
Project three gave me the opportunity to consider the nature of the evidence 
put forward by NICE on which IAPT is based and promoted. I take up Roth 
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and Fonagy (2005) as key authors on evidence in relation to psychological 
therapies. On reflection, I am struck by their temperate tone as they critique 
assumptions about vital issues such as the contested nature of the diagnosis of 
depression. They point to the potentially reductionist approach of translating 
procedures into the propositional language (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001) of 
manuals if they are taken as the way of practising therapy rather than as a 
way. They highlight the need therefore for flexibility both of method and type 
of therapy delivery. This is in sharp contrast to the way that CBT is 
proselytised in policy and implementation. Nevertheless, Roth and Fonagy, I 
would suggest, recognise the political nature of the debate. They do not 
question the basis of mainstream scientific method, the need for evidence nor 
the demand for the production of competences, in which they have been very 
instrumental. The perspectives provided by G. H. Mead (1934) and Charles 
Taylor (1995) offer an alternative way of thinking about therapy as human 
interaction and the importance of phronesis, that is, linking context and 
practical knowing, which takes me back to the theme of clinical judgement 
and intuition.  
 
The aspect I raise concerning measures of recovery not fully reflecting the 
experience of service users in an IAPT evaluation, highlights the issue I point 
to in project two, where the service user and carer voice is muted in IAPT. 
 
What surprises me most in project three is how I have overlooked the 
evidence associated with performance management in the NHS. Both clinical 
research trials and this type of management thinking are based on positivism. 
My relatively unreflective acceptance of this management approach, seems to 
mirror my poorly articulated sense of my own identity as a manager. How 
different approaches make divergent assumptions about human nature is 
something I will explore in thinking about managerialism. 
 
The key themes from project three are therefore method and managerialism. 
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PROJECT FOUR: HOW POWER RELATIONS INFLUENCE THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL PROGRAMME TO 
IMPROVE ACCESS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPIES. 
 
All my work to date has pointed to power being a major factor influencing 
how the NHS and IAPT have been developed and managed. In the context of 
a new global belief in evidence based medicine, the National Institute of 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established in England in 2000 to 
identify what treatments had evidence to support their efficacy and therefore 
what should be commissioned and delivered in practice. This direction, 
embedded in NHS performance management and public sector agreements, 
was utilised to make the argument for the funding of the IAPT programme. 
As NICE guidance on treating anxiety and depression recommended CBT as 
the therapy of first choice, the scene was set for the focus and locus of power 
relating in PMG and more widely amongst the professions, commissioners, 
service, and education providers. The nature of the power relating has been 
different in those contexts, but PMG has been the main context of my 
enquiry. I have been enabled to make sense of my experience through 
considering how power has been enacted in practice rather than in the 
abstract; by drawing on the work of Elias and Foucault. 
 
How power determines what is considered to be knowledge (or evidence), 
truth (or evidence) and expertise (or professionalism) has proved fascinating 
and problematic at the same time. I understand this to be because of the 
different assumptions that underpin approaches to philosophy, science and 
sociology which I will also address under method. Within this, the role of the 
‘specific intellectual’, bringing to bear his specialist body of knowledge or 
research, as described by Foucault (1994a), adds complexity to the issue of 
expertise, which I will take up as a theme. 
 
In summary, the themes I will take up will be method and expertise from 
project four. 
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OVERVIEW OF THEMES. 
 
This short reappraisal of my projects has highlighted the need to re-examine 
the following themes: management as a profession, including what I 
understand is meant by managerialism; expertise as a way of thinking about 
professionalism, learning and practice, power and its relationship to evidence 
and knowledge; and how this influences my understanding of method. 
 
REAPPRAISING MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 
 
I have not identified myself as a professional manager. This insight has been 
important as it has uncovered much that I have taken for granted in my 
practice.  
 
Clarke and Newman (1997) posit that there were two underpinning aspects of 
the NHS, established in 1948. Firstly, bureaucratic administration, a rational 
approach ‘to promote the efficient and impartial administration of public 
businesses of all kinds’ (1997: 5) concerned with stability and predictability, 
based on Weberian principles. Secondly, professionalism which, in contrast, 
stressed ‘the indeterminacy of the social world as necessitating the 
intervention of expert judgement’ (ibid.: 6). Furthermore, ‘(p)rofessionalism 
lays claim to an irreducible autonomy - the space within which  professional 
judgement can be exercised and must be trusted’(ibid.: 6). They describe this 
combination of perspectives as ‘bureau-professionalism’ (ibid.: 8), which 
offered an idealised representation of the welfare state, where all stakeholders 
were committed to the value of ‘public interest’ and the ‘public good’. 
 
This positive philosophy came to be questioned as a result of the changes in 
the world economy in the 1970’s impacting on political thinking and 
economic policy making (Seddon, 2008). The so-called neutrality of bureau-
professionalism was also brought into question by increasing public 
awareness of social factors such as gender, disability and race equalities and 
the slowness in responding to these issues by the (particularly medical) 
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professions. This was exactly my experience. Furthermore the uneasy 
alliance of bureaucracy and professionalism was not proving to be effective 
in managing budgets. Hoggett comments 
  
…it was precisely because human services were so difficult to 
rationalise, that, if costs were to be kept under some kind of control, 
the need to rationalise them was so great. But the attempt to control 
professional service workers in this way was almost doomed to 
failure, given the discrepancy between bureaucratic and professional 
modes of control. (1994: 42-3) 
. 
Policy shifted in Britain to introduce quasi-markets into the public sector, in 
what Pollitt calls a ‘neo-Taylorist’ form of managerialism.  
 
The central thrust, endlessly reiterated in official documents, is to set 
clear targets, to develop performance indicators to measure the 
achievement of those targets, and to single out, by means of merit 
awards, those individuals who get “results”. (1993: 56) 
 
The Griffiths report (1988), commissioned by the Conservative government, 
heralded the importance of managing increasing demand for treatment and 
argued for the need for general management in the NHS, based on 
commercial principles. I remember making an alliance with an ambitious 
dentist, who wished to become a manager and leader, and how we looked 
forward with eager anticipation to the Griffiths report. We felt this would 
enable us to drive forward changes that would empower service users and 
challenge professionals. Not long after, he became the chief executive of one 
of the first NHS Trusts, and I went to work for him in the mental health 
sector to close the local psychiatric institution. 
 
I think my distrust has been of clinicians, not of management. Management 
as a profession blossomed in the NHS, following the Griffiths report, with a 
huge growth in MBAs and consultancies, leading Clarke and Newman to 
argue that this growth enhanced the status of managers. This appears at first 
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sight to be in contrast with Khurana (2007), who described the profession of 
managers in the private sector, as descending from ‘higher aims’ of 
professionalism in the first part of the 20
th
 century to the entrepreneurial and 
essentially self-interested position of ‘hired hands’ in the latter half of the 
century. Perhaps the difference lies in the perception that the demise of the 
bureaucrat in favour of the manager in the UK NHS, was a shift from 
administrators who enacted clinical decisions, to general managers who 
challenged professional practice, through a motivation to improve services 
for the public good.  Certainly, as NHS managers are not shareholders, the 
power relationship is different in the public sector. I certainly saw myself as a 
challenger of professional practice. Clarke & Newman describe concepts 
such as moving from being controlling to empowering and from hierarchies 
to flat structures (1997: 49). This was the language that I used on a regular 
basis in the absolute certainty of the rightness of my own beliefs. Managerial 
‘discourse of change’ (ibid.: 50) spawned language which made it difficult to 
argue against: ‘change’ as a good thing and terms like ‘efficiency’, 
‘productivity’, ‘cost effectiveness’ and ‘ user-centredness’ were all difficult 
to counter without appearing destructive. 
 
Professional culture and identity are linked and, as I describe in project two, 
the identification of professionals is first and foremost with their own 
profession rather than with their employer. This attitude is contrary to 
managerialism, the mission of which was ‘to create a homogeneous and 
shared culture which would bind all workers to the pursuit of corporate 
objectives’ (ibid.: 62). I have rarely come across managers relating to each 
other as professionals in the way that clinicians do, perhaps because in the 
NHS most have trained as clinicians. Modernisation, a managerialist concept, 
has played a major role in the NHS and other public services in the last 
decade; stressing the importance of giving up parochial loyalties in favour of 
the corporate culture. This was the raison d’ȇtre of new ways of working 
(NWW), which I led for six years.  
 
Willmott (1993) critiques the idea of ‘corporate culture’, advocated by Peters 
and Waterman (1982), which aspired to win the hearts and minds of 
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employees through persuading them to sign up to and reach consensus on a 
set of values devised by management. He argues that in going beyond the 
requirement for employees to just do the job, management was aiming to 
influence the affective domain of the workforce to identify with the product 
and with the organisation. In doing so, Peters and Waterman (and others) 
were denying the identity and individual values of the workforce. In 2003, 
Willmott revisits this critique and reflects “(f)rom an employee standpoint, 
efforts to ‘strengthen culture’ may (therefore) be experienced and resisted as 
unacceptably manipulative and intrusive upon their sense of identity and 
dignity” (2003: 76). He considers that there is a growing realisation that 
imposing values on the workforce to achieve culture change is naïve. He 
points out, however, that, although there has been a move towards focussing 
on the team or work group, nevertheless the original intention is the same. 
This is to encourage identification by employees with values and priorities set 
by management to play the game in a type of double bind. Stacey (2011), in 
an analysis of leadership, suggests that those who resist such coercive 
persuasion (Schein, 1961) or disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) may resort 
to hidden transcripts and to the arts of resistance (Scott, 1990). 
 
Willmott’s analysis of managerial approaches to culture resonates with me in 
that both winning hearts and minds from a top down perspective and the 
bottom up involvement of key professionals and teams, have figured in my 
change management style. The clear articulation of values has proved a 
continuing frustration for me and led to the production of the Ten Essential 
Shared Capabilities: A framework for the whole of the mental health 
workforce (2004). I have sought to persuade professionals of the importance 
of valuing service user experience, the importance of evidence, team working 
and so on. The paradoxical nature of these processes are evident from 
Willmott’s analysis, as are the dangers of totalisation (and in extreme 
circumstances of totalitarianism), in seeking to avoid conflict. It is interesting 
to note that Willmott’s work has been influenced by Foucault and others, 
whom he describes as poststructuralists, in recognising the importance of 
subjectification, identity and disciplinary power in understanding how 
organisations develop. Furthermore, he states that “(o)rganisations, of course, 
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can do nothing. Only their members are capable of acting…” (2003:83). In 
some respects, therefore, Willmott has shared perspectives with complex 
responsive processes, recognising the importance of local interaction, but he 
does not question the assumptions of the corporate culture theories he 
critiques in terms of being able to manage cultural processes. 
 
Eighteen years on, it is interesting to reflect that managerial discourse has 
taken even stronger hold in the public sector, particularly ownership 
 
…of missions and targets, budgets and responsibility for results - has 
been one of the sought after effects of the managerial revolution, 
constructing commitment and motivation among the staff in the 
pursuit of corporate objectives. (Clarke and Newman, 1993: 427-441) 
 
This could aptly summarise the rationale for IAPT at PMG level. There has 
been what I perceive to be a conflation of this managerialist performance 
perspective with the evidence based practice model drawn from cognitive 
behavioural research; resulting in a coercive argument which it is difficult to 
resist. 
 
REFLECTION ON MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 
  
What I was not aware of, when the quasi-market NHS was established, was 
the emerging impact of performance management of national targets on local 
behaviour. I remember feeling perplexed at how these new managerial 
imperatives, such as waiting time targets, were being managed in order to 
avoid financial penalties, rather than to address service improvements. This is 
what I explore further in reading Stacey (2010) and Seddon (2008) in project 
three. 
 
My work with the professions on NWW was entirely ‘to bring the 
professionals on board’ (Pollitt, 1993: 95), to build their alliance with service 
users and with the organisation rather than with their professional colleagues 
and professional bodies. This deeper exploration of managerialism illustrates 
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clearly what a profound effect it has had on me. Although never formally 
owning the identity of a manager per se, I have believed and expressed all the 
sentiments identified above. Whilst I do not condemn myself for this, it helps 
me to reflect how much I have been drawn into this discourse. I also find it 
fascinating to reflect on how two distinct influences have converged in 
managerialism i.e. the rise in monetarism (Friedman in Seddon, 2008: 2) and 
the impact of equalities and human rights legislation. Perhaps a common 
factor is the focus on consumerism, empowering the customer to get the best 
service or product. This is linked with some scepticism about professionals, 
seen as self- interested rather than interested in the public good. However, I 
suggest there is a different starting point from a human rights perspective, 
which is not so much about individuals but about the groups to which they 
belong and any associated stigma. Foucault’s concept of normalisation is 
directly relevant here, in that society has devised many ways of classifying 
people according to how they compare to a norm. The purpose has been to 
develop dividing practices to deal with stigmatised individuals and groups in 
ways that society thinks fitting at the time. Segregation of education for 
people of different races, religion and learning difficulties are all cases in 
point. Although many overtly discriminatory practices are now illegal in the 
UK, they keep emerging covertly, arising from unconscious values, about 
groups with which a person may be identified. Rational legal approaches, 
although necessary, are not sufficient to overcome the attitudes and values 
that may be implicit in professional practice. This is the distinction that 
Foucault makes between sovereign and disciplinary power, which is what I 
have detected in professional groups and have sought to challenge. 
 
I reflected in project two, that I was still unconsciously identifying with 
psychologists as a profession and with their scientist practitioner stance, 
using this way of thinking to guide my management actions. Reflecting 
further, although I acknowledge a certain admiration of the  profession (in 
comparison with others), I can now see that the twin influences of human 
rights and managerialism have been the strongest influences on my practice. 
But this clearly points to the fact that my skills are now generalist and 
managerial rather than specialist and clinical. I wish now to turn briefly to the 
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work that I have undertaken on workforce development, to consider how far 
this too is a managerial role. 
 
CONSIDERING WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AS PART OF A 
MANAGERIAL ROLE 
 
My role as a manager in the NHS led me to question the professional 
workforce. Following an ostensibly successful service re-organisation, I 
discovered that I had had no impact on the (unhelpful) nature of the doctor-
patient relationship. The problem then became how to shift professional 
attitudes and practice to become more person-centred. My first port of call 
was to consider the role of education and training and how to prepare 
practitioners from the outset to be fit for practice. This meant thinking about 
initial training and the nature of curricula. These are widely diverse for each 
profession and can be different in how they are taught even within 
disciplines. Furthermore, all trainees in health and social care professions 
must have supervised placements, so the beliefs and practices of supervisors, 
as well as the milieu of the workplace, have a profound impact on their 
learning. As these contexts will vary enormously, even specific curricula, will 
be taken up slightly differently in practice. Immediately then we can see the 
difficulty of trying to achieve consistency in learning experience and 
outcomes except at quite an abstract level (e.g. qualifications).  
 
I came to realise that education and training could only be part of any process 
of improvement. This has led me to be resistant to IAPT being portrayed as a 
training initiative. Workforce planning, which is intended to assess and 
predict the numbers of staff required in the NHS, was something that I 
needed to understand. Essentially this requires reasonable forecasting of what 
services will be required for the population and therefore commissioned, 
often over a five year period. It requires translating demand into numbers and 
types of staff required, an understanding of the current workforce profile 
(numbers likely to retire, working part-time) and the potential supply of any 
new workforce. The product of this exercise is supposed to be a workforce 
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plan that will inform the number of training places that should be 
commissioned on an annual basis. 
 
What I have found is that this process is perplexing to organisations, resulting 
in predictions, based on what they did the year before. This, of course, is an 
inherently conservative process as it does not challenge numbers, skills mix 
and traditional practice nor the advent of new technologies. The publication 
of the Mental Health National Service Framework (1999) led to the 
establishment of the national workforce programme, of which I was the 
director. Over the ensuing six years, we produced ‘how to’ workforce 
planning guides, supported local pilots; focussed on values based training and 
worked with all professional bodies to develop NWW. This included 
changing professional practice, extending traditional roles and developing 
new roles for people who were not traditional professionals. As far as I can 
judge, all of these initiatives have had variable and limited effects.  
 
My learning from this experience has been how challenging it is to influence 
this multi-faceted process. The unpredictability of the future in terms of 
needs and resources and the apparently irresistible force that draws people 
back to what they have always done (particularly professional roles) are real 
challenges. I do not consider that there is a specialist body of workforce 
knowledge from which accurate predictions can be made. There are, of 
course, specialist workforce organisations set up to assist in this endeavour 
by developing toolkits and models to aid trend analysis. There is also an 
elegant IAPT workforce model, with which I am closely associated. 
Nevertheless, I have come to believe that workforce planning and 
development is a well- intentioned, rational approach, but that the 
unpredictability of the future and the complex factors involved make it fatally 
flawed. This complexity has led people, in my experience, to disavow any 
expertise in it and endow it with a magico-mythical quality. I judge that this 
body of generalist knowledge does not have a strong (traditional) evidence 
base; furthermore, it is only of interest to professions insofar as it increases 
their numbers. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I conclude that workforce development is a management role. I am generally 
expected to be a workforce expert and although I have expertise in workforce 
(and in management) this is generalist expertise, in a subject for which there 
is little underpinning evidence as it is generally understood. Stacey highlights 
that “there is no comprehensive, reliable scientific evidence for currently 
dominant management prescriptions” (2010: 19). He states that this is due to 
an erroneous reliance on the sciences of certainty for method, which could be 
addressed more appropriately if organisations were conceptualised as 
“patterns of nonlinear interactions between people” (ibid.: 20). 
 
I will now turn to my second theme: expertise as it has emerged from 
professionalism, and its implications for thinking about evidence. 
 
COMING TO PROBLEMATISE EVIDENCE THROUGH 
THE CONCEPT OF EXPERTISE 
 
I have come to think that professionalism is synonymous with expertise. 
Professionals, particularly those who have risen to senior roles in their 
careers, are expected by the public to be experts in their subject. 
Professionals expect this of themselves and to receive the status associated 
with this expertise. I would like to consider more fully the thinking that 
underpins competences and the implications this has for the understanding of 
expertise and evidence. 
 
The limits of calculative rationality 
 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus developed their concept of novice to expert in 1986. To 
contextualise, their argument was developed to counter the emerging belief at 
that time that the growth of Artificial Intelligence (AI) would eventually 
replace human reasoning. Hubert Dreyfus, a philosopher, concluded, 
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however, that problem solving, by computers could never address the 
unpredictable. With his brother, a computer specialist, he states that 
 
…digital computer language systematically excludes three 
fundamental human forms of processing (fringe consciousness, 
essence/ accident discrimination, and ambiguity tolerance). (Ibid.: 9) 
 
Since this book was published, there have been exciting breakthroughs using 
computer modelling to develop Chaos theory and Complex Adaptive 
Systems. Here, computers have been shown to be able to demonstrate 
emergence of patterns which can be unpredictable through following simple 
rules (Reynolds, 1987). Nevertheless, the fact remains that rules need to be 
explicit to enable computers to function (Stacey, 2007: 254). The explicitness 
of rule governed behaviour and how this only partly reflects the actual human 
experience of developing and exercising skills in real life became the basis of 
the Dreyfus novice to expert work. 
 
They argue that rules are important in early learning and practice. The novice 
acquires skills based on facts that are ‘context free’ (ibid.: 21). The advanced 
beginner begins to apply these in practice, becoming exposed to situational 
factors. The competent practitioner, with more practical experience, is able to 
carry out fairly complex sequences of activities in a specific context but may 
have difficulties when faced with competing priorities. All in all, these skills 
remain at the level of conscious decision making. This process is exactly that 
used in the IAPT national training programme.  
 
They go on to argue that there are two further levels: proficiency and 
expertise, which are based on intuition, defining these as “understanding that 
effortlessly occurs upon seeing similarities with previous experiences” (ibid.: 
28). The proficient performer will be deeply involved in their task and 
respond to factors that may be difficult to identify, such as situational cues; or 
they may be using “holistic similarity recognition”, by which they mean an 
intuitive ability to respond to the pattern without deconstructing it into its 
constituent parts or rules. A common example is that of driving a car. The 
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difference between the proficient and the expert practitioner is that the 
“expert’s skill has become so much a part of him that he need be no more 
aware of it than he is of his own body” (ibid.: 30). Dreyfus & Dreyfus 
summarise their argument as follows: 
 
What should stand out is the progression from the analytic behaviour 
of the detached subject, consciously decomposing his environment 
into recognisable elements, and following abstract rules, to involved 
skilled behaviour based on an accumulation of concrete experiences 
and the unconscious recognition of new situations as similar to whole 
remembered ones. (Ibid.: 35) 
 
They distinguish, then, between the first three stages which they describe as 
calculative rationality (linear causality), much the same as would be used in 
artificial intelligence; and the expert stage as arational, which they describe 
as deliberative rationality. They argue that at an expert level, “if learning is to 
occur, some part of the mind must remain aloof and detached” (ibid.: 40). 
This may be seen as a similar concept to first order abstraction (Stacey, 2010) 
or the paradox of involved detachment from the perspective of Elias (1978). 
 
What can explain this apparent discontinuity or leap from a rational to an 
arational process? Dreyfus and Dreyfus do not offer a clear explanation about 
how this might happen in practice, so I will consider this more fully. 
 
Accounting for the concept of expertise as deliberative rationality 
 
Clinical judgement is a term used in medicine and in psychological therapies; 
I judge it to mean the same as ‘intuition’ in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s terms. 
There is a similar conceptual leap in IAPT. A key part of the work has been 
to produce competence maps to underpin training and practice. Each map not 
only contains basic and specific observable competences but also 
‘metacompetences’, examples of which include ‘capacity to use clinical 
judgement when implementing treatment models; capacity to adapt 
interventions in response to client feedback’ (Roth & Pilling, 2007: 12). 
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Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest that deliberative rationality can account for 
intuition, but it is not clear how they explain this. They draw on Aristotle’s 
concept of contextual judgement, although not naming it as phronesis, but 
appear still to locate the process within the individual expert capable of 
‘detached and rational’ thinking (1986: 167). I will now explore two ways of 
thinking about expert practice, drawn from the complexity sciences, 
addressing a continuum within and between bodies. 
 
Physical and neurological underpinnings of expertise 
 
Turning first to a potential physiological source of understanding, Harth 
(1993) explores how the brain and the mind can be understood without 
reverting to dualism. He argues that “a single brain, unlike a computer, is 
continuously changing its characteristics in response to its contact with the 
rest of the world” (1993: 102-103). He outlines mechanisms that assist in 
pattern recognition in the brain and suggests that important factors will 
include “the raw sense data that are received, expectations based on 
preceding events, stored knowledge, and random fluctuations” (ibid.: 143). 
One can see immediately the similarity here between this position and the 
process that Dreyfus & Dreyfus suggest is underpinning expert practice. 
 
But what understanding of causality is being assumed here? Harth is clear 
that the brain is subject to non-linear causality in the sense that: “there is no 
limit to the smallness of events that can trigger a sequence of thoughts” 
(ibid.: 146-7). He goes on: “strange and awesome things happen in the non-
linear world, such as bootstrap processes (self-referencing) in which 
something appears to arise out of nothing. Totally new phenomena may 
occur”. He argues that time as a linear concept has no real meaning in 
understanding the brain and the mind: “Consciousness is not a point in time. 
It straddles broad sections of the past and reaches out into the future” (ibid.: 
144-5). His argument is based on the rapid and multiple neural responses in 
the brain that make them impossible to disaggregate. He argues that 
consciousness, the self-awareness of a phenomenon, occurs in the brainstem, 
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not in the cerebral cortex. He also argues that a vast amount of activity occurs 
of which the person is unaware; this has been demonstrated elsewhere 
through the use of MRI scanning. This could support the Dreyfus view of 
intuition, where an expert may find it difficult to articulate what (s)he has 
done, arguing, in any event, that this may be post hoc reasoning. 
 
A social interpretation of expertise  
 
Turning to the social context and to Mead (1934), he proposed that the self 
arises in social interaction. The child is born into a relationship with its 
mother and from the earliest stage is interacting physically and emotionally to 
form a bond with her. It is clear that there are predisposing capabilities in the 
infant to recognise configurations of the human face to enable recognition 
and attachment to take place. The way that this will play out will, however, 
depend on the quality and frequency of those interactions. He argued against 
the traditional view that the individual is presumed to have primacy, where 
mind and a sense of self develop internally and then impact on others. 
Instead, to reiterate, mind 
 
…starts with an objective social process and works inward through 
the importation of the social process of communication into the 
individual by the medium of the vocal gesture. (Ibid.: xxii) 
 
So, man’s physical and neurological characteristics (the biological ‘I’) play 
into these interactions and enable him to use language symbolically and 
enable him ‘to be an object to (him) self’ (ibid.: xxiii) and hence demonstrate 
consciousness (the ‘me’). The person influences and is influenced by his 
interactions. In the process of socialisation, the individual is able to reflect 
and direct his actions in anticipation of responses of others. This also holds 
true for actions in relation to non-linguistic or inanimate aspects of the 
context. Mead’s view is therefore that the self and mind arise through social 
interaction and the psychological is social and not individualistic. (1934: 
224). 
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So where does this leave us? I find Mead convincing as he describes the 
social nature of human development. There are interactions occurring 
between people continuously, whether in day to day conversation, in formal 
learning or therapeutic settings. For some there are explicit rules, for others 
there are ways of doing things which are implicit and difficult to describe 
precisely, as they are highly contextualised and complex. Taylor (1995), like 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, takes up Aristotle’s concept of phronesis: 
The person of real practical wisdom is less marked by the ability to 
formulate rules than by knowing how to act in each particular 
situation. There is a crucial “phronetic gap” between the formula and 
its enactment, and this too is neglected by explanations that give 
primacy to the rule-as-represented. (1995: 177) 
 
Taylor shares Mead’s view that social interaction is circular in that we 
engage with intention with another, but that there is no certainty that 
responses will conform to this intention, so that ongoing adjustment occurs, 
as in therapy. Mead described taking the attitude of the other (empathy) as 
being deeply human. This idea of empathy has significantly influenced the 
development of therapies.  
 
A contested area is how far the outcome of therapy is related to the technique 
(rules), to ‘therapist variables’ or to the nature of the relationship (e.g. 
Castonguay & Grosse, 2005). IAPT (based on CBT) favours techniques of 
the therapist, but other professionals and researchers consider the therapeutic 
relationship most important. Taylor argues that “rules are transformed 
through practice” (ibid.: 178). I take this to mean that causal relationships or 
rules identified through research trials have been shown to be inadequate in 
accounting for social interaction, beyond early stages of skills development. 
Taylor, drawing on the work of Bourdieu (1980) describes the importance of 
‘habitus’ in providing a (cultural) context, which is difficult to articulate. He 
argues that rules or representations (which may also be described as 
cognitions) are formulations, which ‘are only islands in the sea of our 
unformulated practical grasp of the world’ (1995: 170). An individualistic (or 
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monological) perspective will not do in understanding practice which is 
essentially social (or dialogical) (ibid.: 171). This reflects the stance taken by 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus, but offers a way of understanding what may be 
occurring using social rather than what I would argue are individualised 
accounts. It appears to me to be clear that there is a continuum of interaction 
between the physical and the social. As new brain imaging technology 
develops, we are able to see the anticipation of the brain responding to 
stimuli before we are aware of them; illustrating that there is a continuous 
interaction with others and within ourselves, which may not be conscious. 
The danger is to locate this process solely within the individual, developing 
mental models of the outside environment, on which (s)he can deliberate and 
intervene rationally: this is a cognitivist position. More persuasive, I suggest, 
is that there is on-going interaction between bodies (understood to include the 
brain and not separating mind and brain) in a given context, which is a social 
process. In the past, I have tended to think of expertise as being primarily 
individually rather than socially determined, but I no longer consider this to 
be the case. 
 
My initial reaction to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ categorisation of the levels of 
skill acquisition was mixed. I recognised that competences make sense for 
early skill development. I had been concerned, however, that they run the 
danger of being both atomistic and reductionist if taken out of context. I 
therefore recognised the authors’ description of this process as one of 
calculative rationality. I felt, however, that their account of deliberative 
rationality was a leap to intuition, which was not plausible in the way they 
argued it. I consider, however, reflecting on the complexity sciences, 
including Harth’s perspective on brain complexity and the argument for 
ongoing complex responsive processes that there is an alternative basis for 
accepting such an interpretation. 
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REFLECTING FURTHER ON EXPERTISE IN IAPT 
 
I find it interesting to reflect on what this means for the position that we 
have taken in IAPT. We have developed competence frameworks and 
taught skills based on those competences, within published national 
curricula. We have, further, ensured that trainees, once they have learned 
the theoretical basis of the model, are enabled to practise their developing 
skills and competences, initially in role play with actors and then with real 
service users under supervision. It is only the requirement for trainees to 
sit in and observe experienced therapists, which seems to offer an 
opportunity for learning in more tacit ways. It should be remembered 
however that the dominant discourse in IAPT is one of cognitivism, 
which assumes that  
(c)ognitive behavioural treatments aim to help the patient change 
his or her problem behaviour directly. Although a good 
therapeutic relationship can be important in cognitive behaviour 
therapy it is not regarded as the main vehicle of change. The 
approach is best regarded as an educational and problem solving 
one, with the therapist using his or her specialist knowledge to 
guide the patient towards a solution to his/her problems… (There 
is an) emphasis on the systematic assessment of change using 
scientifically derived assessment measures and carefully evaluated 
techniques. (Marzillier & Hall 1999: 39) 
 
It is therefore assumed that everything is describable and measurable. But the 
development of expertise has not been explicitly addressed. The introduction 
of the concept of ‘metacompetences’, which describe higher level skills, 
begins to describe what is termed ‘clinical judgement’, but without any 
theorisation of how these may come about. 
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Summing up Dreyfus and Dreyfus: Problematising expertise and 
evidence. 
 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus do not take into account covert influences on practice, 
such as status and power, nor do they address the importance of social 
interaction in the process of learning, preferring to focus on the learning of 
skills and behaviours of individuals. Indeed, Harth, as a physicist, more fully 
highlights the importance of the social in shaping the individual. Expertise is 
generally ascribed to the individual and assumes a monological view of the 
world. It thus tends to become reified as a concept. It has proved difficult to 
explain how experienced practitioners can act into uncertainty. I have sought 
to draw on thinking based on the complexity sciences to answer this 
difficulty. I suggest now that expertise is a skill that arises in social relating.  
 
The concept of the expert as working through intuition problematizes the 
concept of evidence, which, by definition, must be measurable and 
predictive, relating logically only to rule governed behaviour. Intuition and 
expert practice are not rule governed and logically cannot be described as 
evidence based in the currently accepted discourse. 
 
MOVING TO POWER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of the expert has become important to me in thinking about 
power. I had not considered this fully at the outset of my thesis due to my 
scepticism about professionals. As I have researched the assumptions behind 
scientific method and the extraction of evidence from positivistic, cognitivist 
perspectives, I have become more inclined to view power as an over-riding 
and immanent influence in IAPT. Specialist expertise in IAPT, based on a 
belief in scientific evidence, is perceived to be located in specific individuals. 
The context of PMG enables dialogue between people adhering to this way of 
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thinking and constrains people with more generalist expertise and different 
ways of thinking. Working expertly in such a context is not confined to 
particular individuals, but I will argue that it is power relating that influences 
what emerges in practice. 
 
POWER AND STATUS OF THE EXPERT AS SCIENTIST. 
 
As I observe in project four, in IAPT, three NAs are professors and would 
describe themselves as (expert) evidence based scientist practitioners. I argue 
this elevates their status in the programme. Gordon describes how Foucault 
does not disavow natural science (1994a: xvii). His interest is, rather, how 
truth and knowledge are valued because of their ‘reliable instrumental 
efficacy’. I take this to mean how they can influence policy and practice. He 
comments that knowledges (sic) such as psychiatry (in which I would include 
psychological therapies) will never have the status of the physical and natural 
sciences, but does not criticise them for that (ibid: xviii).  
 
In considering the changing role of the intellectual in France, Foucault 
considers that the role of the ‘universal’ intellectual as a thinker has lost 
credibility and that the role of the ‘specific intellectual’ has emerged to 
replace it. He suggests that this has emerged with the atomic scientist, who 
has not only had to defend his scientific body of knowledge but also the 
political implications of this knowledge. More generally, he posits that the 
specific intellectual is “a savant or expert” (ibid.: 128), whose role began to 
develop post Darwin. “At all events, biology and physics were to a privileged 
degree the zones of formation of this new personage…” (ibid.: 129). In 
arguing that each society has its own “regime of truth”, he suggests that the 
specific intellectual influences by bringing to bear his body of knowledge or 
research on “the general functioning of the apparatuses of truth” (ibid.: 131): 
this increases the importance and influence of this intellectual. He describes 
how political conflict can occur concerning what is defined as truth, wherein 
“the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated 
and specific effects of power attached to the true” (ibid.: 132).                                                                                         
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This suggests to me that the specific intellectual is influential, that (s)he may 
have a body of scientific knowledge that is important, but that the most 
significant characteristic is the power to influence what is considered to be 
truth. I find that this characterisation fits well with my perception of PMG. 
There is circularity about truth being determined through scientifically 
validated evidence, articulated by specialist or specific experts, who in turn 
have a high status based on their research practice and who influence what is 
issued as policy. Issues of variable implementation are identified as errors to 
be corrected, including those who articulate those issues. 
 
Foucault, on the other hand, also proposes that the intellectual’s role “is to 
overturn whatever we believe to be self-evident and to dissipate what we take 
for granted; it is not to shape the political will of others or to tell them what 
they ought to do”. He asks: ‘(b)y what right would he do so?’ (1994b: 676). 
This is an important question and echoes Elias’s view that scientists should 
be ‘destroyers of myths’ (1978: 52). There are points in time when what is 
accepted knowledge and practice, for instance psychoanalysis, is challenged, 
in this case by cognitivist research evidence. Now, however, we see 
proponents of cognitivism seeking to silence questioners; defending evidence 
based practice to the exclusion of other approaches, which may work for 
some people. Scientists are human beings after all and are subject to 
socialisation, subjectivisation and the current discourses. Veyne states that 
 
(t)his whole setup (dispositif) forms both science as an object and 
individuals who will only recognise truth in whatever is said in 
conformity with the rules of an exact science. (2010: 87) 
 
So experts, accorded status through their knowledge, cannot be the objective 
scientists they are so often (self) portrayed to be, as they cannot stand outside 
social processes. They are drawn in, influence and are in turn influenced by 
the interactions in the scientific and therapeutic communities. This, for me, is 
not acknowledged in IAPT; a positivist view of science is promoted as 
disciplinary power. 
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I will turn now to method to illustrate how natural sciences and their 
presumed objectivity cannot stand outside of social and historical processes. 
 
METHOD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I intend to show in this section how the method that I have taken up in the 
DMan, which is based on a reflexive use of narrative, has been influenced by 
the use of discourse by Foucault and by the theoretical assumptions that arise 
from the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating. A key 
theme throughout my thesis has been the differing traditions arising from 
Plato and from Aristotle, which can be characterised as rationalist and 
humanistic approaches respectively in philosophy and in the philosophy of 
science. The dominance of rationalism and its success in underpinning an 
understanding of the natural sciences has had a lasting influence on the 
human and social sciences. I will argue that the research method I have used 
does not rely on rationalist assumptions, but rather is informed by the 
complexity sciences.  
 
APPROACHING METHOD REFLEXIVELY 
 
FOUCAULT’S DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
 
Veyne states “(t)he originality of Foucault’s research is that it works on truth 
in the context of time’ (2010: 14). Using the analogy that every era has “its 
own fishbowl”, Veyne states that discourse dictates what may be taken for 
granted as the truth, (for example that Jupiter was considered a god in 
antiquity), which will be overtaken by new beliefs or truths. Foucault 
questioned “how is it that in a particular period one can say one thing but 
another is never said?” (1994b: 787). From one period to another, different 
truths emerge and every thinker wants to be the one to “bring the age of error 
to an end” (2010: 15). However, Veyne (and Foucault) question: ‘(i)s it any 
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safer to believe in human rights than it was to believe in the god Jupiter?’ 
(ibid.: 85). Today this seems a frivolous question because “(w)e are sure our 
convictions are true”(ibid). I have reflected on how I have held the 
foundationalist view that if only professionals could see issues from the 
service users’ perspective then all would be well, as the truth would be 
revealed to them. I recall being disgusted when psychiatrists commented that 
the concept of ‘an ordinary life’ (1981) for people with disabilities was ‘just 
another fad’. I realise that I would not have held this view 50 years before 
and different views may be taken by others 50 years hence. 
 
Foucault’s method in interrogating how it is that truths come to be accepted 
historically is based on the assumption that the “object, in all its materiality, 
cannot be separated from the formal frameworks through which we come to 
know it”, frameworks that Foucault calls “discourse” ‘(2010: 6) or discursive 
practices. Discourse is precise description of individual differences; not 
general ideas. Foucault holds that generalities led historians and others to be 
selective in their analysis and ignore small things which might question their 
hypotheses. Foucault does not believe in universals or ‘isms’ (Veyne, 1971: 
172) and seeks to understand what was going on in any given period by 
examining differences in concrete practices: the “principle of singularity that 
causes history to be a series of ruptures” (1994b: 580). By reducing large 
concepts or ‘kernel(s)’ (1971: 159) to ordinary experience and historicising 
them “then, in the place that was previously occupied by the big thing-that-
goes-without-saying, there appears a strange little “period” object that has 
never been seen before” (1971: 159). I suggest that the undisputed nature of a 
scientific approach and the evidence it yields for human behaviour in the 
form of psychological therapies is just one of those kernels.  
  
Through his career, Foucault’s method shifted from a detached 
archaeological approach that sought to provide rules for an objective analysis 
of discourse to one, which incorporated this approach as a technique, but took 
up “genealogy as a method of diagnosing and grasping the significance of 
social practices from within them” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 103). They 
describe his method as neither structuralist (which he was accused of early in 
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his career) nor entirely hermeneutics, but as ‘interpretive analytics’ (ibid.: 
133). Here, he was deliberately avoiding theorising in order to address both 
the object and the subject and how they could be understood in the sciences 
of man (as opposed to the natural sciences). His three areas of research, 
mental illness, prisons and sexuality, all form part of the human or ‘doubtful 
sciences’ (ibid.: 116) forming a context in which he considered how it was 
that practices were made possible historically. Dreyfus and Rabinow describe 
this as a ‘history of the present’, which is not an attempt to write a true 
history, but rather a pragmatically oriented historical interpretation. In doing 
this, he is seeking to bring alive the human experience and to defamiliarise 
(or see anew, see below) the reader with the practices influencing that 
experience, in order to bring them to a new and better understanding. It has 
been Foucault’s interpretive analysis of mental illness which has drawn me 
in, and this contextualisation that has resonated with my experience. 
 
His archaeological technique requires the careful analysis of materials of the 
day: data, events and phenomena documented and cross referenced, including 
small details, prior to any hermeneutic interpretation. Flyvbjerg describes this 
process as describing practices as events and suggests that the researcher is 
essentially removing her/himself: ‘to allow him or her to disinterestedly 
inspect’ (2001: 135) the material. This splitting of the two processes could be 
problematic if it implies that it is possible for the researcher to stand outside 
and therefore not influence or be influenced by the process, however, it could 
be understood as Elias’s paradoxical involved detachment. Foucault is clear 
that he wants to unearth from records of the past how it was possible for 
practices to occur. It is important to be able to evidence what is being 
described, with an interpretation, for it to be understood by others. 
Nevertheless the key point is ‘the primacy of context’ (Rabinow and Sullivan 
1987:8), an understanding of which can be drawn from ‘a feel for the game’, 
as Bourdieu describes it (1990: 9). Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that this is 
phronetic in nature. It is also what can or cannot be perceived at any given 
period of history. 
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Different “discourses” respond to different questions. Each time, we 
apprehend a reality that is no longer the same (Veyne, 2010: 55). 
 
REFLECTING ON TIME 
 
I began this synopsis with a quote from the Four Quartets (1944) because 
Eliot’s portrayal of time has resonance for me, as I have experienced a 
continuous process of trying to make sense anew of situations and 
relationships as they have played out repeatedly. This is very much part of 
Foucault’s discursive practices and is perhaps the essence of the research 
method in the DMan programme. I would characterise these components as: 
describing my experience in the context where it is happening (in the ‘living 
present’), detaching myself from it in order to consider it reflexively, taking 
up authors who might throw light on the themes and comparing their 
perspectives in order to triangulate my understanding and inform what 
emerges as my argument. I then return to where I started and seeking to 
understand it as a differently thinking person and “know the place for the first 
time”. 
 
What has informed this process of seeing familiar things as novel has been 
Mead’s argument, in The Philosophy of the Present (1932a). He develops a 
critique of science based on Newtonian principles, and embraces the theory 
of relativity, addressing how it can be thought about in relation to human 
beings. This requires us to make a radical reappraisal of the nature of time 
and to question the assumptions behind science that there exists an objective 
reality, both in the past or to be revealed in the future. He posits that reality 
can only be found in the ‘living present’ and that the past (event) is not just 
an antecedent to (or cause of) the present, but that the past is both 
‘irrevocable and ‘revocable’ (ibid.: 120). I take this to mean that the past 
cannot be changed as an event experienced at the time, but that it can change 
in the light of re-interpretation from the present perspective. Similarly the 
future cannot be predicted fully based on the past and the present, but 
behaving with intention will influence processes and people, who in turn will 
respond, which will give rise to a changing understanding in a new present. 
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Interestingly, Mead argues that novelty can occur in the present, which 
cannot be accounted for based on the past, however 
 
(w)e speak of life and consciousness as emergent but our rationalistic 
natures will never be satisfied until we have conceived a universe 
within which they arise inevitably out of that which preceded them. 
(Ibid.: 126) 
 
Mead portrays the scientist as seeking rationality in the universe. 
 
He is simply occupied in finding rational order and stretching this 
back, that he may previse the future. It is here that his given world 
functions. If he can fit his hypothesis into this world and if it 
anticipates that which occurs, it then becomes an account of what has 
happened. If it breaks down, another hypothesis replaces it and 
another past replaces that which the first hypothesis implied. (Ibid.: 
125) 
 
Reflexivity relies on an ability to engage with the present, which changes 
moment by moment, to be paradoxically deeply involved, but able to monitor 
and be aware of what is happening and to be able to give an account of the 
inter (and intra) actions. It is here that I would like to discuss the importance 
of narrative as an important means of enabling reflexivity. 
 
THE USE OF NARRATIVE  
 
We have already seen that ‘how’ is Foucault’s (1994a: 224) most important 
question in trying to understand how some things can be discussed and others 
cannot. McIntyre observes that history is vital to understanding the past 
because humans are ‘story-telling’ animals (1984 [1981]: 215). ‘What am I to 
do?’ he suggests, can only be answered, if we can answer the prior question, 
of ‘what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ In an analysis similar to that 
of Mead (1932), he argues that we become who we are through learning from 
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others from the outset, passed on through stories and myth. Flyvbjerg puts it 
like this 
 
(n)arrative enquiries do not - indeed they could not - start from 
explicit theoretical assumptions. Instead, they begin with an interest 
in a particular phenomenon that is best understood narratively. 
Narrative inquiries then develop descriptions and interpretations of 
the phenomenon from the perspective of the participants, researchers 
and others. (2001: 137) 
 
Bruner (1986) discusses two ways of ordering experience: the logico-
scientific and narrative modes of thought, which although complementary are 
not reducible to one another, because they imply different assumptions of 
causality (1986: 11-12). Tsoukas and Hatch (2001) take these distinctions and 
explore the implications for method in relation to complexity theory. They 
favour a narrative approach, arguing that “a narrator communicates and 
captures nuances of event, relationship, and purpose that are dropped in the 
abstraction process that permits categorisation and correlation in the logico-
scientific mode” (ibid.: 998). 
 
What I believe the method of narrative and reflection in the DMan 
programme achieves is an opportunity to look at a given context and really to 
try to understand it. In describing the work of PMG and the actors within it, I 
have not been making up a story nor seeking to offer an objective account of 
the facts, but, as White puts it, producing: “narrative discourse…(which) 
works up the material in perception and reflection, fashions it and creates 
something new” (1987: 178). I believe that I have (inadvertently) adopted a 
Foucauldian approach in the DMan programme. I hope that I will have 
defamiliarised the reader with processes and interactions that have influenced 
how the IAPT programme has been developed and implemented. 
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CONTEXTUALISING THE DMAN METHOD WITHIN BROADER 
APPROACHES TO RESEARCH 
 
QUALITATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Qualitative research methods are now well accepted in the fields of 
management and organisation and becoming more so in clinical fields like 
nursing. They take as their starting point the perspective of the subjects 
studied. Denzin & Lincoln comment “...qualitative researchers study things in 
their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in 
terms of the meanings people bring to them” (2005:3). Reflexivity is an 
important underpinning theme, meaning that serious attention is paid to how 
linguistic, social, political, and theoretical elements are drawn together in the 
process of knowledge development, whilst empirical material is constructed, 
interpreted and written. Empirical material in this context means 
interpretations of ‘reality’, which is reflected upon carefully. Alvesson & 
Sköldberg describe the research process as constituting a “(re)construction of 
the social reality” (2000:10). They argue that empirical work must be linked 
closely with philosophical positions, because “(i)nterplay between 
philosophical ideas and empirical work marks high-quality research” (ibid.: 
10). They conclude that “both ‘recipe book research’ and ‘theorising in a 
vacuum’ should be replaced by reflective activities (or) reflexive 
interpretation” (ibid.: 316). I take this to mean that that although they are 
critical of positivistic methods, they are not convinced by the polar opposite 
of post modernism and that there can be benefits from what they describe as 
being ‘provisionally rational’.  
 
My IAPT colleague, with whom I have shared my work, asked me if I was 
familiar with ethnomethodology, as it struck him that this was the method 
that I was following. Garfinkel first wrote about the concept in 1967 when he 
was seeking to study features of everyday life in a practical setting. He 
coined the phrase ‘ethnomethodology’ in 1974, when working on a project to 
research how jurors arrive at decisions. The term drew on Phenomenology, 
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which was critical of natural science having distanced itself from everyday 
life. Garfinkel went on to posit that raw experience was not chaotic, and that 
members of groups develop procedural behaviours, methods and practices 
and carried out ‘experimental breaches’ to surface how social practices are 
subject to rules that are not generally visible. Heritage (1984) describes 
Garfinkel’s theory of action as being a new departure (from Parsons for 
instance) stressing “that action is through and through a temporal affair that 
is reflexibly accountable” (1984: 308). Drawing on the framework developed 
by Schutz (1962, 1967 [1932]), Garfinkel wanted to explore 
 
…how men, isolated yet simultaneously in an odd communion, go 
about the business of constructing, testing, maintaining, altering, 
validating, questioning, defining an order together. (1952: 114) 
 
He criticised social scientific formulations of objectively rational courses of 
action as drawing attention away from the ‘reasonableness of action’ (1967: 
ix) in a similar way to that argued by Toulmin (2001). 
 
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES: THE DOMINANCE OF NATURAL 
SCIENCE ASSUMPTIONS IN IAPT 
 
Ironically, through the IAPT programme, I have found myself immersed in 
traditional quantitative research, based on positivism. Although this approach 
has many critics, I have argued that its’ influence persists (see p 183). In 
summary, its’ basis can be  
 
…conceived as the creation of true, objective knowledge, following a 
scientific method. From what appears, or is presented as data, facts, 
the unequivocal imprints of ‘reality’, it is possible to acquire a 
reasonably adequate basis for empirically grounded conclusions and, 
as a next step, for generalisations and theory building. (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 2009: 1) 
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I describe how IAPT is dominated by CBT. Alford and Beck (1997), 
considered to be experts within the CBT community, seek to persuade 
doubters from other therapeutic modalities of the integrative power of 
cognitive therapy. A key argument they put forward is the robustness of their 
theoretical, scientific framework, drawing on Popper (1959), whose 
definition of a rigorous theoretical system is one that is ‘axiomatized’, where 
 
(t)he axioms must be free from contradiction; they must be 
independent, so that axiomatic statements are not deducible from 
others within the system; the axioms must be sufficient to permit the 
deduction of all statements belonging to the theory; and, finally, the 
axioms must be necessary for derivation of the statements belonging 
to the theory. (1997: 15) 
 
They go on to list ten formal axioms of cognitive therapy and posit that, as 
thought is cognition and as all therapies rely on thinking, cognitive theory is 
the ‘theory of theories’(ibid.: 44). Their tone is eminently reasonable as they 
seek to address the common criticisms of CBT, but they do not question their 
individualistic and rationalist assumptions, based on positivism and the 
natural sciences.  
 
I want to turn now to the paradoxical assumptions between the natural and 
human social sciences. 
 
TOLERATING PARADOX ACROSS NATURAL AND HUMAN 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
A key issue in my research has been whether the research evidence posited 
for psychology and psychological therapies can reasonably be drawn from 
the natural sciences, i.e. is psychology a natural or a social science? Drawing 
on the work of Mead (1934), I have concluded that social psychology, and 
clinical psychology, is a social science as it is entirely about the interaction 
between human beings. Logically, therefore, it should lend itself more to 
qualitative than quantitative approaches. But reflecting more deeply, I believe 
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that such polarisation is not helpful as it implies a total rejection of 
quantitative approaches. At a recent conference on counselling and 
psychotherapy (not CBT), I was struck by the pains each speaker took to 
accept evidence based practice drawn from RCTs, whilst advocating the 
development of evidence from practice and how this could be more 
effectively supported. My interpretation was that there is not only an 
acceptance of the reality that CBT works for some people, (so why criticise 
it?), but also the acceptance that the current political culture exercises 
disciplinary power, which will not accept as valid any approach that does not 
make this accommodation. 
 
In project three, I conclude that there is a major difficulty between what is 
shown to be efficacious from the research evidence and what is shown to be 
effective in practice. In essence this highlights the two opposing 
methodologies. Firstly, the natural science approach which seeks to achieve 
generalisable rules, extracted from large scale, quantitative, controlled studies 
with decontextualised subjects, indicating probabilities. Secondly, the 
developing social science approach within the context of day to day 
therapeutic practice, where variables cannot be removed and must be worked 
with. Flyvbjerg describes this as the ‘deadly paradox of social theory’ (2001: 
38) and concludes that 
 
…a theory which makes possible explanation and prediction, requires 
that the concrete context of everyday human activity be excluded, but 
this very exclusion of context makes explanation and prediction 
impossible. (2001: 40) 
 
Although the positivist approaches of the natural sciences are still very 
influential and underpin what constitutes evidence for NICE and for IAPT, 
this is not relevant to the method of the DMan. Toulmin (2001), reflecting on 
how rationality has come to dominate the history and philosophy of science, 
at the expense of ‘reasonableness’, states that, rather like form should follow 
function, method should follow the area of research investigation. 
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One aspect of the standard view of ‘rationality’ is the assumption that 
a single method can turn any field of enquiry into a ‘hard science’ like 
physics. A more balanced view will allow any field of investigation to 
devise methods to match its problems, so that historical, clinical, and 
participatory disciplines are all free to go their own way. (2001: 83) 
 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2011), speaking from a constructionist, post- 
modernist perspective, offer a root metaphor for thinking about good social 
science as mystery (2011: 63). They critique current inductivist and 
deductivist approaches for separating theory from data, trusting in data to 
inform theory and downplaying the subjectivity of the researcher (e.g. Freese, 
1980; Glaser & Strauss, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). They comment that 
although the critique of (neo) positivism is enormous, “…this does not stop 
the majority of researchers from doing normal science more or less as if 
nothing has happened” (2011: 7); this is a key issue in considering what 
should and what does happen in research practice. In IAPT, for example, it is 
the RCT evidence that is focussed upon and the practice based evidence that 
has not been taken up in any significant way. They re-iterate the concept that 
data are inextricably linked with theory (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Kuhn, 
1970) and therefore that empirical material should be opened up rather than 
constricted in research work (ibid.: 14). They propose a “constructionist” 
approach, where data are constructed rather than collected (ibid.: 24), and 
comment that even where there may be a high level of consensus among 
researchers about “received truth…there may be good reasons to look 
seriously and sceptically at the assumptions and construction processes 
involved in the production and reproduction of this truth” (ibid.: 25). They 
suggest that although sharing work with a community of researchers is an 
excellent discipline in testing argument, it can also constrict discourse to the 
received wisdom of that research community. This is what I argue in relation 
to the assumptions behind NICE, which excludes non RCT evidence.  
 
Alvesson & Kärreman, in promoting the importance of exploring issues that 
are not predicted or may be “breakdowns in understanding”, suggest five 
principles that can assist in opening up research questions and exploring 
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further what strikes researchers as interesting, where past understanding has 
been found to be inadequate (Weick, 1989: 525). 
 
1. (De) fragmentation (avoiding premature ordering and treating 
variation seriously). 
2. Defamiliarisation (interpreting social phenomena in novel ways 
compared to dominant distinctions). 
3. Problematisation (systematic questioning of received wisdom and 
offering a constructive (re) formulation of research questions). 
4.  Broad scholarship (extending the researcher’s interpretive repertoire 
to encourage rethinking).  
5. Reflexive critique (openness to values and to limitations of 
understandings to critique perspectives, including of one’s favoured 
discourse) (2011: 41).  
 
They recognise that such an approach is high risk for most researchers, so 
will not be taken up widely. They therefore suggest three types of exploration 
of ‘breakdowns’ (ibid.: 115): focussed, sensitive or considering. What they 
are suggesting is that researchers can choose firstly, to focus on mystery or 
breakdown, secondly, to follow a more conventional route with more 
openness to surprises, or finally, to carry out controlled and focussed studies 
but be aware that unpredictable results (e.g. Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1985) may 
lead to recommendations for further research (as usually happens). I consider 
that Alvesson and Kärreman, whilst offering a different way of approaching 
research method that takes account of the lack of predictiveness of theory and 
the limitations of empirical data, are nonetheless still assuming that the 
researcher and the research community can be detached observers and 
deliberately choose their approach. I would argue that the DMan method 
encourages all the above five principles, but rejects assumptions about such 
autonomy. 
 
186 
 
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING METHOD IN COMPLEX 
RESPONSIVE PROCESSES 
 
In common with many qualitative research approaches, the starting point for 
method, in DMan research, is one that has at its core taking experience 
seriously. This experience is borne of the view, in terms of complex 
responsive processes, that there is no split between the individual and the 
social, so everything, including the mind, emerges in local social interaction. 
Although there may be artefacts, idealisations or ‘cult values’ (Mead 1932b), 
such as national policy or organisational vision statements, these are 
particularised in local micro interactions. This means they get taken up in 
different ways which makes it impossible to predict with accuracy what will 
occur as a result. This therefore makes the process of implementation 
uncertain, which is at odds with the conventional discourse, which is based 
on the natural sciences of certainty. There are three underpinning 
assumptions of causality in natural sciences, firstly, efficient, demonstrable 
(if-then) causality, which underpins RCTs, rational causality, where the 
autonomous individual can choose rational goals, as in a cognitivist 
perspective and finally formative causality, emerging from concepts from 
evolutionary theory, where the end is already enfolded, such as in the growth 
of organisms. In contrast it is the common experience of people in everyday 
life that things rarely turn out as planned (the best laid plans), but there 
persists a belief that thought comes before action, that people can stand 
outside of their social environment in an objective manner and that it is 
possible to be value free in undertaking research.  
 
Complex responsive processes of relating draw on the complexity sciences as 
an analogy, which are the sciences of uncertainty. Here, change can emerge, 
where there can be amplification of small differences and where patterns can 
be produced that cannot be forecast in advance. Indeed a key feature is that 
there is no blueprint and no grand plan. There is only self-organisation, where 
patterns emerge, so there is no need to think of any causal agency outside of 
human interaction itself. Paradoxically, people and interactions are forming 
and being formed at the same time, which can lead to both predictable and 
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unpredictable effects. This may be described as non-linear transformative 
causality (Stacey & Griffin, 2005). There is a focus on temporal rather than 
spatial metaphors in describing our experience, this means that there is no 
‘whole’, no levels of differentiation between the individual, the group, the 
organisation or society. This is challenging to current organisational and 
research ways of thinking. 
 
In research method, the natural sciences are trying to do something different 
in isolating causal factors and behaviours that anyone can pick up to 
replicate, falsify or verify. This makes no sense in terms of local social 
interactions. Generalisability, a key requirement in the natural sciences, 
means, in complex responsive processes, pulling out (or illustrating) issues 
that resonate with one’s peers more generally. My reading of narratives 
written by people working in similar situations to me (Stacey 2007), for 
example, drew me to consider different ways of approaching organisational 
change and led to me applying to join the DMan research programme. In 
adopting a narrative about experience of particular social interactions, as part 
of this research method, the outcome is uncertain and emerging, in contrast 
with more conventional case studies that are carefully crafted and have a 
beginning, middle and end. There is a paradoxical perspective in that, as 
social beings, we are immersed in the ‘game’ of everyday life, which is what 
we pay attention to in our narratives, but to make sense of this experience we 
must detach ourselves to reflect on our experience, in what Elias (1978) 
described as paradoxical ‘detached involvement’. Stacey (2010) differentiates 
first and second order abstraction, meaning that our reflection, including 
categorisation and interpretation of our experiences, is first order i.e. it is 
close to the reality of what is going on. Second order abstraction is necessary 
where higher level abstraction is required, for instance where a policy 
department may need a population overview, where individuals are not 
relevant. Finally, complex responsive processes has as its basis human 
interaction with its inherent paradoxical co-operation and conflict, which 
brings with it inevitable emotion and power relating. 
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TAKING UP THE DMAN METHOD 
 
The DMan research process uses human interaction as its basis, both in terms 
of using current work-based experience and in active discussion with DMan 
colleagues. The process for me has been challenging. 
 
Project one gave me freedom to be biographical, helping me to pay attention 
to values and assumptions that have been influencing my practice. Moving to 
project two, however, I had to learn the discipline of exploring assumptions 
in my narrative by reading relevant authors and then contrasting them with 
complexity perspectives. This was a new intellectual challenge and it forced 
me to critique ways of thinking which I had held and honed over years. I 
found it hard to make connections between authors and my experience; and I 
felt exposed by my lack of grasp of concepts, which led on many occasions to 
me silencing myself in DMan group meetings. It has taken time to appreciate 
that group meetings are, in effect, a microcosm of everyday life, as we 
interact into the unknown with one another. The challenge is to find meaning 
in the DMan social interaction, which can throw light on my interactions at 
work. An important insight for me is that I have become acutely aware of 
people who do not talk in groups (including myself in IAPT), feeling more 
curiosity about their lack of participation and less frustration with them (and 
myself) than I have done previously.  
 
To keep focussed on each of my research projects, I have found it important 
to return to the themes and questions in my narrative at every step. I have had 
to wrestle with the balance between the ‘story’ in the narrative, recognition of 
my emotions and the intellectual rigour of study. Initially, I found it difficult 
to write in the first person, as third person objectivity was de rigueur in my 
psychology training. The DMan process is the reverse: it has a deep focus on 
the social self, recognising the importance that emotion, arising from 
existential anxiety, inevitably plays in the social processes of everyday work. 
This is how I experience research in the DMan community, where exploring 
new ways of thinking with others can be exposing, affecting my sense of 
identity, sometimes in a transformative way. 
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Reflecting on this, I know that some of my IAPT colleagues would not 
consider the qualitative approach adopted in the DMan to be scientifically 
robust. Toulmin & Gustavsen comment on the prevailing emphasis on ‘hard 
science’ and the scepticism about qualitative research by saying “It may be 
OK in its own way, but don’t call it ‘research’ let alone ‘science’” (1996: 
203). Would another recognise my narrative and analysis as a reasonable 
account of what goes on in IAPT or do I have a distorted view? Does it 
matter if I do? This leads me to the important issue of ethics. 
 
          ETHICS 
 
Foucault comments, in an interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow on the 
genealogy of ethics, that “…it’s not at all necessary to relate ethical problems 
to scientific knowledge” (1982: 236). He would consider the traditional 
approach to seeking informed consent for research purposes to be part of 
current discourse that is subject to sovereign and disciplinary power. Gaining 
informed consent at the outset of a research project is a requirement of every 
university as part of their formal (sovereign) research protocols. The DMan 
research method focusses on the process of social relating, in my case in a 
management group. It clearly points to the fact that who is involved in social 
relating and in what way cannot be prejudged, so seeking consent is a live 
issue throughout the research period. Furthermore, I had no hypothesis that I 
was testing, nor variables that I was seeking to control, therefore it was 
unclear to what participants might be consenting. . The ethical implications 
have become clearer as my work has unfolded. As I have gradually explored, 
in turn, professionalism, evidence and power in the workings of a small 
group, there have been points where the assumptions and values of 
participants have come into conflict; for example with the slow development 
of the four modalities additional to CBT. I have sought to understand this in 
terms of assumptions about the nature of evidence and the operation of 
disciplinary power in the group. This has therefore inevitably resulted in 
some personalisation in my narrative and reflections. I have sought to address 
this, because IAPT is a high profile national programme by using 
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pseudonyms to protect identities. I have also stayed in dialogue with key 
people with whom I work, by discussing it with my line managers. Most 
importantly me for me, I have shared projects and my final thesis draft with a 
colleague in IAPT who attends the PMG, which is the focus of my narrative. 
He reports that my narrative and reflections resonate with his experience and 
that he considers that I am fair in my analysis. This is important as I feel 
uncomfortable writing about others without their prior knowledge and 
permission. Equally I could be vulnerable in my role if my narrative were 
made public too early. I have therefore sought and had approval for an 
embargo on publication of my work until 2013. 
 
Recent events in IAPT have shown the impracticality of seeking prior 
approval from those involved. Informal conversations have been recounted 
about which NAs should be included and excluded (me) in the future 
programme. This underlines the messy reality of researching interactions of 
people with different beliefs, identities and power relating. From this 
perspective, “the ethics of what one does as a researcher…is contingent upon 
the situation and the emerging and on-going negotiation with those with 
whom one is interacting” (Griffin, 2002: 216). For Foucault, ethics are 
“ultimately an interpretation to be judged in terms of its resonance with other 
thinkers and actors and its results” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 264). 
 
            SUMMING UP METHOD. 
 
I have sought to argue that the way research method is currently understood 
in NHS policy is constrained by what is accepted as truth, based on 
assumptions about time and causality taken from the natural sciences. 
Qualitative approaches, favoured in organisational and sociological research, 
in contrast to positivism, hold that context, interpretation and meaning are 
crucial. Nonetheless, as I have attempted to point out, many qualitative 
approaches are equally based on rationalist assumptions. The DMan, based 
on a reflexive use of narrative, argues a different position on time and non-
linear causality arising from the theory of complex responsive processes of 
relating. I have taken up the DMan method as a way of understanding and 
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questioning my taken for granted assumptions about my experience. I believe 
this has led me to develop a deeper understanding of the processes at work 
and of my own role within them. 
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MY CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE. 
 
EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE 
  
I believe I have contributed to knowledge and practice by problematising 
how evidence is equated with rule governed and observable behaviour. RCTs 
are the gold standard of research method accepted by NICE. They are based 
on assumptions from the natural sciences, including linear (if-then) causality 
or what Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) describe as calculative rationality. This 
assumes that components of behaviour can be isolated, observed, controlled 
for, recorded and measured, which I describe as rule governed behaviour. 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus acknowledge that this can only account for performance 
up to what they describe as the level of the competent practitioner. In IAPT, 
competences have been extracted from manuals used in trials to describe the 
behaviour of expert trial therapists. These competences now underpin explicit 
curricula and learning materials and form the basis of accreditation. Hence 
evidence based education and training has been prescribed to develop a 
workforce which, in turn, can deliver evidence based therapies.  
 
But this leads to a problematic: how do competent, rule governed 
practitioners develop proficiency and expertise? Dreyfus & Dreyfus state that 
this is through deliberative rationality, which is essentially ineffable. If it 
cannot be described, as they and others acknowledge, how can it be captured 
and measured as evidence? This is, of course, not to say that proficiency and 
expertise do not develop; they clearly do. They do so, however, in ways that 
are much more difficult to account for, relating more to experience drawn 
from a large variety of therapeutic interactions with service users. I have 
sought to account for Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s proposed deliberative rationality 
as a way of understanding this discontinuity, by drawing on complexity 
theory based on nonlinear causality. From a complex responsive processes 
perspective, this would be described as transformative teleology (Stacey, 
Griffin & Shaw 2000: 51). Therapy is a form of interaction and as such the 
interpretation of the therapist and service user of what is being addressed will 
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lead to an intense and iterative conversation. I suggest that this will inevitably 
lead to some variability and deviance from the prescribed approaches in 
evidence based medicine and practice. As practice is constantly changing in 
the therapeutic relationship to take account of this inter relating, novelty 
arises, which can be creative or destructive. I suggest this cannot logically be 
described as evidence based in the taken for granted, rule governed way that 
is currently proselytised in the NHS generally and in IAPT in particular.  
 
I have demonstrated how evidence drawn from natural science methodology 
and applied to human interactions, can offer only a partial means of 
understanding and supporting people with psychological problems. I have 
shown how such evidence has generally been taken as authoritative because 
of an unquestioning belief in science in society. I have further shown how 
evidence on CBT has dominated the agenda of a national programme, not so 
much because of the efficacy of the research but because of the nature of 
disciplinary power in that context, which has constrained what can be 
considered as evidence and truth by key players in the group. I have shown 
that the power and importance of evidence has been promulgated by 
professional experts; defining what constitutes the knowledge base, the 
methodology and what the scientific community considers acceptable. Whilst 
this promotes rigour, it also restricts perspectives and can exclude others, 
who do not share assumptions of objectivity and universal laws. This conflict 
continues to play out in day to day politics and local practices.  
 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
 
In seeking to understand the discourse of current organisational change in the 
NHS, I have shown that managerialist arguments about modernisation, 
effectiveness and efficiency are difficult to argue against as they seem 
profoundly rational. I have argued for them too, but now realise they are 
simply not the whole story as they are presented. I have come to believe that 
a managerialist approach, exhorting adoption of a corporate culture and 
shared values (Willmott 2003) and the frequently articulated need to  win the 
hearts and minds of professional dissenters to enter into a corporate 
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consensus, has a slim chance of success. This is because professional (and 
personal) identity is deeply embedded and resistant to what can be perceived 
as bureaucratic and political motivations of the state and of employing 
organisations. The current domination of the political agenda, not only in the 
IAPT, but everywhere in the NHS, is about how services should be 
prioritised and made more efficient. This is driven by the latest policy 
imperative Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP), which is 
predicated on NICE guidance. This NHS performance management process 
is entirely driven by assumptions in management science which are 
ideological and for which there is little evidence (Stacey, 2010). The nature 
of any such evidence would, however, equally need to be critiqued.  
 
MY PERSONAL JOURNEY OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
My personal understanding of organisational change has altered during the 
process of undertaking this thesis. It has illustrated for me the importance of 
conflict, silencing and disciplinary power in influencing how decisions get 
made and how actions are often (not) implemented as intended. Conflict is 
usually portrayed as negative, and I too have sought to avoid it in the past and 
to seek rational discussion to reach consensus. I have, however, come to 
appreciate that conflict in the form of people taking different points of view, 
which can be robustly debated and shape what emerges, can be highly 
productive. In contrast, where conflict or difference in views is overtly 
discouraged or silenced this constricts debate and leads to feelings of 
inclusion and exclusion and associated behaviours. This process has taken 
place in IAPT, I believe, and has resulted in reduced opportunities for 
potentially creative thinking.  
 
I have also come to believe, however, that I and others, have not only been 
subjected to this way of thinking, but we have also disciplined ourselves to 
protect our own (professional) positions and identity. I have outlined how I 
have been self- silencing in IAPT and seen others do the same. This has been 
a powerful message: disciplinary power is immanent in our interactions, it is 
not invested in one person; people have power because others allow it (unless 
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we are in a totalitarian state). I have felt like an outsider in IAPT and felt a 
heavy constraint in trying to influence it. This is partly because I believe in its 
benefit in comparison with a traditional medical approach. It is also partly 
because articulating a different approach to evidence based practice and 
promoting practice based evidence is potentially exposing: I perceive that I 
have, therefore, co-created the situation. This analysis has enabled me to 
think differently about what has been happening; and the enabling constraints 
of the changing context will inevitably influence what happens from now on, 
in an unpredictable way. Like Foucault, perhaps, I have problematized how 
the context of IAPT has made it possible for CBT to dominate the agenda and 
sought to defamiliarise it, without providing theoretical or practical solutions. 
 
Finally, I am struck how I have sought to find the answer to how service 
users can get a service that they value, to correct the errors of the past to 
achieve an agreed (universal) solution. I have come to see that this 
foundationalist position is similar to that taken by scientific experts in IAPT 
and to those exercising psychiatric power. I am now actively questioning my 
own assumptions and therefore changing my everyday practice, where the 
context enables it.  
 
I am, of course, a person of my time, and although I have seen issues re-
emerge over 30 years, they are never identical when I review them in context. 
This suggests to me that Foucault’s method of interpretive analytics is 
plausible as method in helping me make sense of this research and to “know 
the place for the first time”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
As I began this thesis, I was sceptical of much of the work carried out by 
mental health professionals (particularly psychiatrists). I felt that the way 
they conceptualised the experience of people in biological and medical terms 
either did not help or was only part of a solution. I observed that the 
psychological and social needs of people as human beings, essential as part of 
recovery, were regularly left unaddressed. I found this incomprehensible, but 
have come to understand that the authority of the doctor is one that is socially 
constructed and that is has been particularly powerful in psychiatry because 
the framework for understanding human mental distress has been medically 
conceived and imposed on patients to interpret their problems. Foucault’s 
analysis of psychiatric power raises questions about how it is possible for the 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship to develop in institutional settings. 
Ultimately, this is in terms of disciplinary power. This pattern of power 
relating persisted after institutions closed essentially because it is human 
relating that is key, irrespective of the space in which it occurs. What is most 
persuasive is that the means of understanding mental illness, the truth if you 
will, has been prescribed by the medical profession, based on its status and 
long authority in society rather than on its effectiveness in promoting the 
recovery. I recognise afresh that power therefore determines what can be 
considered to be the truth. 
 
The advent of IAPT heralded a new departure from the grip of a medically 
dominated understanding of mental health. Its location in primary care has 
separated it from the influence of psychiatry. Its claim, to be scientifically 
valid and economically effective, through the implementation of evidence 
based psychological therapies, has been persuasive in securing significant 
funding. Psychologists, professional rivals of psychiatrists, have dominated 
the programme, nationally and locally, because they have largely been 
responsible for developing the clinical and academic research and specifically 
that relating to CBT. The assumptions behind the evidence are based on the 
natural sciences with associated rationalist beliefs resulting in a nationally 
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prescribed process, effectively seen as a blueprint for services and the 
workforce. Although widely welcomed, the dominance of CBT has 
increasingly become a cause of concern for those clients whom CBT cannot 
help (a significant but unknown number), and for those professionals who 
practise other therapies (and who claim effective outcomes). This has led to a 
muted debate, which has been dominated by specific experts, who argue that 
everything must be based on scientific research. Ironically, for me, the nature 
of the discussion has come to have a similar flavour to that of psychiatric 
power: the means of judging what is scientific is provided by those who 
undertake that research, and challenges to science are seen as irrational. In 
the context of a management group, this has clearly emerged as disciplinary 
power, resulting in self-silencing, which in Foucault’s terms is 
subjectification.  
 
I have argued that evidence, both in terms of RCTs and through data 
produced through NHS performance management processes, is taken for 
granted. I have concluded that IAPT cannot be solely based on evidence 
drawn from trials, translated into competences and taught to a new 
workforce. This is part of the picture but cannot offer a comprehensive 
account. An open debate about this, seeing conflict as potentially creative, 
would be helpful in my view. This would include practice based evidence as 
well as evidence based practice. Both are articulated in policy documents but 
the former remains in IAPT as a polite footnote to what is promoted as vital: 
NICE recommended, evidence based therapies.  
 
I am finding that new ways of thinking are beginning to affect my practice in 
the Trust where I work in a more open way. I am much less inclined to seek 
solutions myself or to be dominated by project management plans. I am more 
inclined to engage in conversation with people of different professional 
groupings and encourage open discussion of conflictual issues to enable local 
decision making. I do not consider this to be a new technique, but rather a 
different way of understanding how people work and interact together. 
 
198 
 
This thesis is an exploration and interpretation of my experience. It has taken 
me back to where I began, but with a different understanding of myself and 
of processes that I have, as I now perceive it, co-created with others with 
whom I work and interact. Going forward, I would like to take up more fully 
the concept of phronesis, which Flyvbjerg (2001) uses in his proposal for a 
different way of researching social science, to explore further how we 
interact (expertly) together. It may be helpful to open up to further enquiry 
the importance of hermeneutics to an understanding of Foucault and critique 
the analysis of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983). For now, I have tried to 
illustrate how the daily interaction in a group responsible for delivering a 
major service development in England has been influenced by themes of 
professionalism, evidence and power. What I have learned is not the end, nor 
the answer, but it is, I hope, an illumination of social processes that are 
always at work. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
IAPT STEPPED CARE MODEL (Realising the Benefits, 2010) 
 
(Based on NICE’s recommendations for the Psychological Treatment of 
Depression and Anxiety Disorders) 
 
Staff Disorder Recommended 
Intervention 
Step 3: 
High 
intensity 
service 
 
 
Depression: 
moderate to 
severe 
 
Depression: 
mild to 
moderate 
 
CBT or IPT
1
, each with 
medication 
 
CBT or IPT
1 
 
Behavioural Activation 
(BA) 
1,2 
 
Behavioural Couples 
Therapy (if the patient has 
a partner, the relationship 
is considered to be 
contributing to the 
maintenance of the 
depression, and both 
parties wish to work 
together in therapy) 
 
Counselling
1
 or short-term 
psychodynamic therapy
1
 
(consider if patient has 
declined CBT, IPT, BA, or 
Behavioural Couples 
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Therapy) 
Panic disorder CBT 
GAD CBT 
Social Phobia 
CBT 
 
PTSD CBT, EMDR 
OCD CBT 
Step 2:  
Low 
intensity 
service 
 
 
Depression 
 
Guided Self-Help based on 
CBT, Computerized CBT, 
Behavioural Activation, 
Structured Physical 
Activity 
Panic disorder 
 
Self-Help based on CBT, 
Computerized CBT 
 
GAD 
 
Self-Help based on CBT, 
Psycho-educational 
Groups, Computerized 
CBT 
PTSD 
 
n/a
3 
Social Phobia n/a 
 
OCD 
 
Guided Self-Help based on 
CBT 
Step 1: 
Primary 
Care/IAPT 
service 
 
Recognition of 
problem 
 
Moderate to 
Severe 
Depression 
with a chronic 
Assessment/Referral/Active 
Monitoring 
 
Collaborative care 
(consider if depression has 
not responded to initial 
course of high intensity 
219 
 
physical health 
problem 
intervention and/or 
medication) 
 
Notes 
 
CBT = cognitive behaviour therapy. IPT = interpersonal therapy. EMDR = 
eye movement desensitization reprocessing therapy (considered by many to 
be a form of CBT). Behavioural Activation is a variant of CBT. Active 
Monitoring includes careful monitoring of symptoms, psycho education about 
the disorder and sleep hygiene advice.  
 
1 NICE’s recent (October 2009) updates on the treatment of depression come 
in two parts: recommendations for the treatment of “depression” and 
recommendations for the treatment of “depression in people with a chronic 
physical health problem”. The two guidelines are very similar. However, it 
should be noted that the “depression with a physical health problem” 
guideline does not recommend IPT, behavioural activation, counselling or 
brief dynamic therapy as high intensity interventions.
 
 
2 
Although the recent update of the NICE Guidance for Depression 
recommends Behavioural Activation for the treatment of mild to moderate 
depression, it notes that the evidence base is not as strong as for CBT or IPT.  
 
3
 NICE does not recommend any low intensity interventions for PTSD and 
recommends that you do NOT offer psychological debriefing. 
 
NICE has not yet issued guidance on the treatment of social phobia. 
However, there is a substantial body of evidence supporting the effectiveness 
of high intensity CBT.  Low intensity versions of CBT are being developed by 
several groups around the world and are likely to play a useful role in the 
future. At least one trial has also demonstrated that IPT is effective. 
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